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INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the elements affecting bank lending rates is an important issue in 
those contexts, such as the Italian one, characterized by the large presence of 
small and medium enterprises for which bank credit is the main and almost 
unique source of funding.   
During the nineties of the last century, the Italian banking system was interested 
of several legislative and regulatory changes that led to an increase in the degree 
of concentration and an improvement in the operating efficiency of the system. 
At the beginning of this period, almost the entire system was managed by the 
public sector, characterized by small or medium-sized banks and a limited 
degree of competition, efficiency and profitability. 
After the privatization process concerning major Italian banks, the increasing 
level of competition in both national and international financial markets, the 
progressive deregulation of the banking activity, and following several merger 
and acquisition operations that determined an increase in the average size of all 
banks, the Italian banking system revealed an increase of efficiency and 
profitability together with a more ample range of financial services offered.  
Particularly, the concentration process led to a substantial increase in the weight 
of the Central and Northern banks ownership in the Southern banks. Among the 
89 acquisitions operations (period 1990-2000) completed in the Mezzogiorno, 
only 9 were associated to Southern banks resident in the same area (Daniele, 
2003). 
Several authors believe that, since the second half of the nineties, these 
processes have improved profitability and assets quality of all Southern banks1.  
                                                 
1
 For example, Panetta (2003), analysing the accounting data of the Southern banks in 1990, 
1995 and 2001, comes to at conclusion that, since the second half of the nineties, there has been, 
for these banks, a substantial improvement in the profitability indexes and, in opposite to the 
dynamics observed during the previous years, a significant reduction in the ratio of bad loans to 
total loans. 
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Nevertheless these improvements in the efficiency of the Southern banking 
system, lending rates charged to the customers operating in the Mezzogiorno 
area have remained considerable larger than those applied to Northern and 
Central borrowers2.  
Particularly, at the end of 2009, short-term lending rates from 1 to 5 years 
observed in Southern Italy and in the Islands were equal, respectively, to 5.19% 
and 4.30%, while the national average rate was equal to 3.40%. 
Worse borrowing conditions penalize Southern firms’ activities and, in this way, 
are able to hinder the local economic growth processes. It is hence necessary to 
understand the causes of these differentials. 
The relevant question is if these spreads reflect objective and structural 
differences in the economic and banking system among regions or represent the 
result of a territorial discrimination based on exogenous and institutional factors. 
To this purpose, this thesis develops an empirical analysis based on 
macroeconomic elements, at a regional and provincial level, and microeconomic 
factors at firm level.  
In more details, this thesis is organized in three essays examining three different 
fields of research: the analysis of the determinants of interest rate spreads among 
the Italian provinces; the identification of the systematic and idiosyncratic 
elements influencing credit risk of the Italian firms; the relationship between 
institutional environment and the cost of money in Italy. 
Particularly, in order to identify the crucial factors influencing lending rates at a 
macro level, taking into consideration the period 1998-2003, the first essay 
examines the causal relationships between the cost of money and the main 
characteristics of the banking system at a provincial level.  
The second essay develops an analysis at microeconomic level. In order to 
identify credit risk’s determinants, the second chapter estimates a set of probit 
                                                 
2
 The Mezzogiorno area comprises the Islands area (Sardinia and Sicily) and the regions of 
Southern Italy (Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise and Puglia).  
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panel models on the basis of the balance sheets of 10,058 Italian firms. Also the 
main macroeconomic features of the regions where firms operate are included in 
the models. Because credit risk is one of the main factors that banks assess in 
their credit policy, this element should contribute to explain the territorial 
spreads in the cost of money observed in Italy.  
The results indicate that firms’ credit risk is influenced by both idiosyncratic 
elements (such as firms’ profitability, solidity and liquidity) and by the general 
conditions of the economic system. 
The third essay intends to verify the possibility Southern borrowers pay higher 
lending rates because of specific features of the institutional environment in 
which they operate rather than structural economic and financial characteristics. 
The previous empirical research has been concentrated on the relationship 
between social infrastructure and growth economic processes, while few 
contributions are focused on the effects of the institutional environment on the 
financial system (Guiso et al., 2004, Guiso, 2006 and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2009).  
This aspect is crucial allowing to investigate if the increasing attention imposed 
by the Basel Accords on the objective relationship between capital requirements 
(and lending rates) and credit risk is actually implemented by Italian banks or if, 
instead, Southern firms must pay a larger cost of money nevertheless their actual 
risk of default. 
The third essay indicates the institutional environment matters.  
The results achieved show that the more cumbersome conditions applied to 
Southern borrowers are caused, together with elements concerning both credit 
demand and supply, also by the worse quality of the institutional environment in 
the Mezzogiorno area in terms of crime, corruption and inefficiency of the 
justice system.  
 
 
 
4 
 
Main references 
BONACCORSI DI PATTI E. (2009), Weak institutions and credit availability: 
the impact of crime on bank loans, in “Questioni di Economia e Finanza della 
Banca d’Italia”, No. 52. 
DANIELE V. (2003), Il costo dello sviluppo. Note sul sistema creditizio e 
sviluppo economico nel Mezzogiorno, in “Rivista economica del 
Mezzogiorno”, No. 1-2. 
GUISO L. (2006) in CANNARI L. Perché i tassi di interesse sono più elevati 
nel Mezzogiorno e l’accesso al credito più difficile?, in CANNARI L. and 
PANETTA F. (Eds.), Il sistema finanziario e il Mezzogiorno. Squilibri 
strutturali e divari finanziari, pp. 239-265, Cacucci Editore, Bari. 
GUISO L., SAPIENZA P. and ZINGALES L. (2004), The Role of Social 
Capital in Financial Development, in “American Economic Review”, Vol. 
94, No. 3, pp. 526-556. 
PANETTA F. (2003), Evoluzione del sistema bancario e finanziamento 
dell’economia nel Mezzogiorno, in “Temi di Discussione della Banca 
d’Italia”, No. 467. 
 
  
5 
 
CHAPTER 1: THE INTERREGIONAL INTEREST RATE 
DIFFERENTIALS IN ITALY: THE EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to identify, on the basis of an analysis developed at a 
provincial level, the determinants of the differences in bank lending rates among 
the Italian areas.  
The quantitative analysis is based on a balanced panel data sample concerning 
the main features of the economic and banking system in the 103 Italian 
provinces during the period 1998-2003. 
The chapter is organized into five parts, beside this introduction. Paragraph 1.2 
illustrates the main theoretical contributions examining the reasons of 
interregional interest rate spreads especially with reference – as regards the 
Italian context – to the different interpretations of Daniele (2003), Mattesini and 
Messori (2004) and the opinion of Bank of Italy, Panetta (2003). 
Paragraph 1.3 illustrates the dynamics of bank lending rates and of other 
characteristics of the banking system in Italian provinces, pointing out that the 
differential of about 2 percentage points among Southern and Northern areas 
observed during the eighties of the last century has remained substantially 
unchanged until 2003.  
Paragraph 1.4 describes the sample data and the methodology employed, while 
paragraph 1.5 develops an empirical analysis based on the estimation of a set of 
dynamic panel models. This analysis examines the relationships among interest 
rates and several financial variables (ratio of bad debts to total loans, number of 
branches every 10,000 inhabitants, the utilization rate ratio per average loan 
granted and average loans for branch) to identify the several and hypothetical 
causes of these spreads such as the differences in the size and industry 
6 
 
composition of the bank customers, or a different explanation concerning 
structural features of the economic and financial system.  
Finally, the last paragraph summarizes the main results of the analysis.  
1.2 Literature review 
The literature on the regional differences in terms of cost of money, i.e. interest 
rate differentials, represents an old debate.  
At the beginning, this topic was stressed among US economists, while 
Europeans’ attention flourished in the last decades.  
Particularly, among the causes of these differentials, the main theoretical 
contributions enumerated together with imperfections of financial markets also 
elements such as structural differences in the perceived borrowers’ credit risk in 
different areas. 
According to Keleher (1979), interregional interest rates differentials were not 
due to credit market segmentation in the United States (the author assumed that 
financial markets were integrated) but were imputable to the heterogeneity, in 
terms of costs and risk, of financial assets. Therefore, financial assets were not 
perfectly comparable.  
Cebula and Zaharoff (1974) analysed the hypothesis of integrated financial 
markets in USA examining the responsiveness of financial flows (especially for 
deposits) to the differences, among regions, in terms of interest rates. The 
authors came to at conclusion that deposits were partially sensitive to 
interregional interest rate spread because of the gap among different areas in 
credit cost and risk.  
Henderson (1944), Edwards (1965), James (1976) and Aspinwall (1979) 
demonstrated interregional interest rates spreads were due to the following 
causes: 
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• factors related to credit market structure, such as degree of concentration, 
number of financial institutions operating in the market and existence of 
interest rate ceilings; 
• demand factors such as the diverse pressure on financial resources 
exerted in the different areas; 
• differences in terms of risk concerning both the demand side (borrowers’ 
credit risk) and the supply side (risk of banking default); 
• regional differences in transaction costs due, primarily, to larger costs that 
banks must sustain to obtain information about the degree of borrowers’ 
solvency in the peripheral areas.  
Interregional differences in transaction costs depend also on a “size 
effect” because of the existence of fixed costs in granting loans. In other 
words, the dimension of economies of scale is reduced if banks are 
constrained to finance small amount of loans to a pool of fragmented 
clients;  
• spatial factors such as the distance from central financial markets: large 
distances, in fact, may reduce the quantity and the quality of information 
available to local economic agents. 
Landon-Lane and Rockoff (2004) presented a different approach regarding how 
long regional financial markets in the USA became fully integrated. During the 
twentieth century the financial integration in the USA, i.e. the homogeneity 
across regions of interest rates, was paralleled by the economic integration of the 
American regions. 
Galli and Onado (1990), observing the Italian context and, particularly, the 
regional interest rate spread between Northern regions and Mezzogiorno, 
pointed out that during the eighties of the last century, on average, bank lending 
rates in Southern Italy and in the Islands were above the national average 
respectively of 2 and 2.4 percentage points.  
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According to these authors spreads could be caused by the larger credit risk of 
Southern households and firms, together with some features of the Italian 
Mezzogiorno credit supply related to a lower efficiency and ability of the 
Southern banks to allocate financial resources in the area with respect to the 
Northern banks. 
Finaldi Russo and Rossi (2000), analysing the cost and the credit availability for 
firms operating in the Italian industrial districts, emphasized how the 
localization affects lending rates. Particularly, firms operating in the Italian 
Mezzogiorno suffered higher costs and financial constraints with respect the 
ones operating in North and Central Italy. 
Daniele (2003) emphasized the decisive role of the banking system, especially 
in those contexts characterized by a large presence of small and medium-sized 
firms. By analysing the main features of the Southern banking system during the 
period 1996-2001, the author noted that short-term lending rates observed in the 
Mezzogiorno were significantly higher than those applied in the other Italian 
regions. This situation hinders the regional economic development via higher 
interest rates, slowing capital accumulation, and therefore reducing the 
production capacity. Among the Italian regions, interregional interest rates 
differentials could be caused by the differences in terms of degree of 
concentration of the banking system, risk of loans granted and operating 
efficiency of banks. Furthermore, according to Daniele, a lower level of 
economic regional development (represented by a smaller value of the real GDP 
per capita), determines a higher credit risk and, therefore, the application of 
larger lending rates and a lower supply of loans. Moreover, the latter 
circumstance hinders the economic development determining a vicious circle 
between the level of economic development and the amount of credit available 
at local level.  
Panetta (2003), taking into account the period 1986-2001, stressed that a part of 
the spread between the cost of bank credit to firms in the South and North Italy 
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was only nominal. This portion reflected differences, among regions, in firms’ 
size and industry structure. Particularly, by assuming the same firms’ size and 
industry composition in all regions, according to Panetta, at the end of 2001, the 
gap between interest rates in the Mezzogiorno and North and Central Italy was 
about of 0.9 point percentages.  
Panetta ascribed this further spread to the greater borrowers’ credit risk in the 
Italian Mezzogiorno in comparison with the Central and Northern part of Italy. 
This situation reflected the structural difficulties of the Southern productive 
system and external diseconomies that burden on firms operating in the 
Mezzogiorno such as the large distance from final markets, the insufficiency of 
infrastructures and the inefficiencies of the bureaucratic apparatus. Moreover, 
higher lending rates in the Mezzogiorno might be partially explained by the 
limited degree of efficiency of judicial proceedings that could be activated in 
order to recuperate the granted credit in case of borrower’s default. These 
proceedings seemed to be characterised in this area by a longer length to 
recuperate default loans, inducing banks to increase the required risk premium. 
Also Beretta (2004) focuses on the importance to neutralize the effect of the 
differences, among areas, in terms of industry and size composition of the bank 
customers. 
According to the author, during the period 1997-2003, lending rates are 
positively affected by the overall loans’ riskiness, the degree of concentration in 
the loan market and the share of collateralized loans. Particularly, the latter 
element indicates that banks tend to apply more cumbersome lending conditions 
in the regions where the share of loans backed by collateral is higher because 
they consider this element such as a signal of greater ex-ante credit risk. 
Furthermore, the diffusion of the branch network on the territory, the incidence 
of loans supplied by local banks and the degree of branches’ efficiency 
negatively influence the cost of money. 
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Mattesini and Messori (2004), analysing data concerning the Italian banking 
system for the period 1990-2000, underlined that, although since the second half 
of the nineties of the last century interregional differentials in the cost of money 
have been reduced, at the end of 2000 these spreads remained considerable.  
The authors examined the dynamics of these differentials together with the bank 
consolidation process in the Southern banking system and came to at conclusion 
that the higher lending rates in the Italian Mezzogiorno were caused by the 
greater credit risk in the area that was been partially influenced by the 
aggressive policies of entry in the banking system adopted by the Northern and 
Central banks.  
Furthermore, interregional interest rate differentials were due also to 
endogenous elements of the economic and financial system. Among these 
factors, authors emphasized the inadequacy of the Southern financial system that 
was not able to provide sufficient resources in order to support the economic 
development of the area. This inadequacy determined mechanisms of pressure 
inside the system causing, therefore, the application of greater interest rates to 
Southern households and firms. 
In this framework, another important contribution is the analysis developed by 
Guiso (2006). Particularly, the author aspired to verify if the differences in 
credit availability and lending rates, among the Italian provinces, are affected, 
together with the firms’ structural characteristics, also by institutional elements. 
Particularly, Guiso takes into consideration the following institutional variables 
(expressed at a provincial level): the inefficiency of the court system (measured 
by the number of civil suits pending per inhabitant), the level of social capital 
(expressed by the referenda turnout) and the ratio between illegal checks and 
GDP. 
In details, to assess the territorial differences in credit availability, Guiso 
examines the results of the Mediocredito Centrale surveys that have been 
conducted in 1998 and 2000 on about 4,500 Italian firms. The author develops a 
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set of probit models where the dependent variable is a limited variable that takes 
value 1 in case of credit rationing (the firm asked for a loan but its require has 
been totally or partially denied) and 0 otherwise.  
The probability to observe credit rationing is positively affected by the firm 
leverage and the share of material assets. The latter element is explained by 
assuming that firms with greater material assets tend to chose riskier projects 
because risk aversion reduces as total wealth increases. On the contrary, the 
exclusivity degree of the relationship between bank and firm does not influence 
credit availability. As regards the institutional aspects taken into consideration 
by Guiso, the level of social capital and the degree of inefficiency of the court 
system negatively affect the probability to be credit-rationed, while the ratio 
between illegal checks and GDP does not significantly explain differences, 
among the Italian provinces, in credit availability. 
The data on lending rates applied to the firms interviewed by the Mediocredito 
Centrale are obtained from Central Credit Register by calculating, for every 
firm, the average short-term lending rate applied during the fourth quarter of 
2000.  
According to the author, lending rates are negatively affected by the firm’s age, 
size and profitability. Furthermore, banks tend to apply better borrowing 
conditions to subsidiary firms. On the contrary, sales growth, ownership 
concentration and the incidence of intangible assets positively influence lending 
rates. However, the firms’ structural characteristics cannot explain the overall 
differences in the cost of credit between North and Central Italy and the 
Mezzogiorno.  
As regards the features of the relationship between bank and firm, the length of 
the relationship and the territorial distance do not affect lending rates, while the 
cost of money positively depends on the degree of loan concentration and the 
share of collateralized loans (banks tend to require more collateral to riskier 
firms).  
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Finally, with reference to the institutional variables analyzed by Guiso, social 
capital and the number of civil suits pending per inhabitant negatively influence 
lending rates. The negative relationship between the cost of money and the 
degree of inefficiency of the justice system is explained, according to the author, 
by hypothesizing that banks use more restrictive screening criteria in the 
provinces where the average length of civil trials is higher. Consequently, in 
these areas, banks tend to finance firms characterized by a lower default risk.  
On the whole, the work of Guiso points out that in Italy, in order to explain 
territorial differences in borrowing conditions, it is necessary to take into 
consideration also the institutional environment where firms operate. Indeed, the 
worse borrowing conditions observed in the Mezzogiorno depend on the lower 
quality of formal and informal institutions. 
1.3 The empirical evidence 
 Between 1998 and 2003, short-term lending rates decreased considerably in all 
Italian regions. During this period, the greatest reduction occurred in the Islands 
where short-term lending rates declined by 3.02 percentage points from 9.49% 
to 6.47%, while in the other geographical areas the reduction of the cost of 
money was about 2 percentage points (see table A1.1). 
The difference between the maximum and the minimum lending rate observed 
in Italian regions decreased from 4.17% in 1998 to 3.92% in 2003 (see table 
A1.2). Although this diminishing trend, the regional spread on borrowing 
conditions charged to economic agents continued to be large. At the end of 
2003, lending rates in Southern Italy and in the Islands were, respectively, 2.16 
and 1.47 percentage points above the national average value. In the same year, 
the difference between the largest and the smallest lending rate at provincial 
level was equal to 4.36%: the province with the highest lending rate – equal to 
8.36% - was Vibo Valentia (in Calabria, in Southern Italy), while the province 
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characterized by the best borrowing conditions was Bologna (in Emilia 
Romagna, in North-East Italy), with a provincial lending rate equal to 4.00%. 
Data show that the substantial reduction of lending rates in Italian regions 
between 1998 and 2003 was not associated with a significant reduction of 
interregional differentials in the cost of money also in relative terms; on the 
contrary, the difference between lending rates charged in Southern regions and 
the national average values remained around 2 percentage points. The same 
values were observed by Galli and Onado during the eighties of the last century. 
Although data on the cost of money are available up to the third semester of 
2010, it is not possible to compare the values of lending rates before 2003 with 
those observed in the subsequent period because of the relevant changes 
introduced in the sample survey of deposit and lending rates by Bank of Italy at 
the beginning of 2004.  
Because of this reason, the empirical analysis of the determinants of the 
interregional interest spreads in Italy will be based exclusively on the years 
1998-2003. 
In fact, by looking at the lending rates during after 2003, it is possible to notice 
that, in 2004, the cost of money is more homogenous among geographical areas.  
In details, the interest rates applied in Southern Italy and in the Islands are 
greater than the national value just of about 50 basis points taking into 
consideration an initial period of rate fixation up to 1 year or more than 5 years. 
Only for the intermediate time horizon (from 1 to 5 years) the gap between 
lending rates charged in Southern regions and the national value was significant 
(less than 130 basis point) but lower than the spread observed in 2003 (see table 
A1.3). 
Consequently, any comparison between these two different periods would be 
misleading. The sudden reduction of the spreads between 2003 and 2004 seems 
to be attributed to statistical causes and not to an actual improving of borrowing 
conditions in the Mezzogiorno area. 
14 
 
However, it is interesting to observe that also during the period 2004-2009, 
lending rates applied in Southern Italy and in the Islands were above the average 
national values.  
By taking into consideration the lending rates at a provincial level during the 
period 1998-2003, an initial correlation analysis indicates that the cost of money 
is larger in the provinces characterized by a larger riskiness of loans (expressed 
in terms of ratio between bad debts and total loans), a greater value of the 
amount of credit used by borrowers relative to credit granted by the banking 
system, a lower diffusion of branches into the territory (measured by the number 
of branches every 10,000 inhabitants) and a smaller value of average loans for 
branch (see table A1.4).  
The provinces whose banking system is characterized by these features are 
localized in the Mezzogiorno area. This element indicates, consistently with the 
main literature, that interregional spreads in the cost of money can be explained 
by looking at the differences in the structure of the banking system among areas.  
During the nineties of the last century, in Italy, the aggregation processes among 
banks led to a substantial increase in the degree of concentration of the banking 
system. Particularly, between 1990 and 2000, in the Italian banking system there 
were 229 acquisitions operations; nevertheless, while in the Northern Italy these 
acquisitions occurred, almost exclusively, in the same area, in the Italian 
Mezzogiorno only 9 out of 89 were effectuated by banks with legal residence in 
Southern regions. 
These events caused, between 1990 and 2003, a drastic reduction in the number 
of banks in the Mezzogiorno where, on the whole, banks decreased by 58 units. 
This diminution occurred largely from 1997 to 2003, when the number of banks 
operating in Southern Italy decreased by 42 units. 
As regards the number of banks every 10,000 inhabitants, during the same 
period, the value of this indicator in Southern Italy and in the Islands was lower 
than the value observed in North-West and Central Italy denoting, thereby, a 
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lower degree of competition of the banking system in Southern regions. In order 
to adequately assess the degree of competition of the banking system, it would 
be necessary to compute an indicator, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, 
for each area. Nevertheless, because data on banks’ market share are not 
publically available, the territorial diffusion of the bank network (expressed by 
the number of banks or branches per 10,000 inhabitants) can be considered a 
proxy of the banking system’s structure and, indirectly, of the degree of 
competition. This approach is consistent with the analysis developed by Bank of 
Italy (Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2009) that examines the relationship between credit 
availability and institutional environment in Italy and includes the number of 
branches per 1,000 inhabitants as a measure of spatial competition. 
Under the same conditions, a lower degree of competition could have led to a 
worsening of borrowing conditions applied to bank customers because of 
possible gains in the market power for banks involved. Nevertheless, the 
examined data do not support the hypothesis of a significant relationship 
between the degree of competition of the banking system and the cost of money 
(the correlation coefficients between the number of banks every 10,000 
inhabitants and lending rates is equal to -0.11).  
The lack of a significant correlation between the degree of competition and the 
cost of money can be caused by several factors. 
First, the increase in the degree of concentration of the Italian banking system 
may not be associated with a contemporaneous boost in the market power of the 
banks originated via the merger and acquisition procedures. This hypothesis 
might be confirmed by the expansion of the branch network that occurred 
contemporaneously with the reduction of the number of banks and that was 
facilitated by the deregulation process that, during the nineties of the last 
century, eliminated the territorial constraints to banking activity.  
Nevertheless, although during the period examined the number of branches 
increased in all areas, in 2003, in Southern regions the degree of territorial 
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diffusion of branches remained noticeably lower in comparison with the other 
ones. In details, in Southern Italy and in the Islands there were, respectively, 
3.10 and 3.53 branches per 10,000 inhabitants, a value less than the number 
observed, in the same year, at national level (5.27). 
Second, the lack of a significant relationship between the degree of 
concentration and the cost of money can be due to the possible gains in the 
operating efficiency that mergers and acquisition may have determined for the 
Italian banking system. According to Angelini and Cetorelli (2000), banks 
involved in concentration operations during the nineties, exhibited considerably 
lower marginal costs than other banks and, therefore, they were able to apply 
better borrowing conditions (in terms of lending rates) to all customers. 
Data show the presence of a negative relationship between operation size and 
the cost of money (the correlation coefficient between average loans for branch 
and lending rates is equal to -0.51). In addition, the level of average loans for 
bank in Southern Italy and in the Islands (equal, respectively, to 0.937 and 1.267 
millions of euros) were lower than the value observed, on average, in Italy 
(1.381 millions of euros). 
These data seem to indicate that larger size of loans should allow the Northern 
banks to apply better credit conditions given larger economies of scale. In order 
to verify this hypothesis, it would be interesting also to analyse microeconomic 
factors and examine, for example, micro and accounting data concerning the 
degree of innovation for each bank. However, data about these elements are not 
publically available.  
Another factor to explain interregional interest rate spread is the degree of “gap” 
of the banking system expressed in terms of utilization rate ratio per average 
loan granted. This indicator can be considered as a proxy for a spatial credit 
rationing because it relates actual satisfied credit demand with respect to credit 
supply granted. Values of the index greater than 1 denote the presence of 
potential credit crunch in the system because borrowers actually need an amount 
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of credit greater than the amount granted and, hence, the banking system is not 
be able or not willing to satisfy the local economic agents’ credit demand. 
Table A1.5, in appendix 1.1, shows that the utilization rate ratio was 
substantially stable in each macroarea. In 2003, this index took the highest value 
in Calabria, where it was equal to 85.0% (at national level, in the same year, the 
utilization rate ratio amounted to 72.3%).  
Finally, it is necessary to compare lending rates with the different perceived 
borrowers’ credit risk in the areas. This element can be expressed, in a macro 
perspective, through the ratio between bad debts and total loans, while at a 
micro level, the probability of default is a better indicator.  
Data show that during the period 1998-2003 the loans’ riskiness in the regions 
of the Italian Mezzogiorno was significantly higher than that observed in 
Northern and Central areas. 
During this period, the weight of bad debts to total loans decreased in all 
provinces. Southern Italy and the Islands were the geographical areas with the 
most substantial improvement of credit quality and, inside these areas, Sicily 
registered the highest reduction in the ratio of bad debts to total loans (from 
34.8% in 1998 to 13.5% in 2003).  
Although these positive results, at the end of the period taken into consideration, 
in Southern regions this indicator remained considerably higher with respect the 
national average value (in 2003, this ratio amounted, respectively, to 12.3%, 
13.1% and 4.9% in Southern Italy, in Islands and, on average, in Italy). These 
data denote, hence, the existence of a positive relationship between the cost of 
money and riskiness of loans. 
In order to evaluate the determinants of interregional interest-rate spreads, it is 
important to consider also the different levels of economic development of the 
areas.  
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The more intuitive proxy for this element is the level of GDP per capita, under 
the hypothesis that the areas with a larger value of this indicator are 
characterized also by a greater level of economic development. 
However, data on GDP per capita are not available at a provincial level but only 
at a regional level. Hence, it is necessary to consider another proxy for local 
development.  
Because the added value is strictly correlated to the GDP (the added value of an 
economy is the difference between total production and the value of the 
productive factors used into the productive phases), it appears appropriate to use 
the added value as a proxy for provinces’ total wealth. Hence, the added value 
per capita can be considered as a proxy of the degree of economic development, 
while the added value for employed represents a measure of the productivity of 
the economies. 
Data show that worse borrowing conditions are associated to lower levels of 
added value per capita and added value per effective labour unit (the correlation 
coefficient between these indicators and lending rates amount, respectively, to -
0.76 and -0.70). 
Furthermore, data show that the provinces more developed in terms of added 
value per capita are characterized also by a greater degree of territorial diffusion 
of branches, a larger banks’ operating size and a better credit quality (see table 
A1.4). 
The correlation matrix between the characteristics of the provincial economic 
and banking systems illustrated in this paragraph is shown in table A1.4. This 
matrix can be considered as a tool to choose relevant factors that can contribute 
to explain differences in the cost of money across the provinces, as well as to 
identify possible multicollinearity problems between the explanatory variables 
in a regression framework.  
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1.4 Data and methodology 
In order to identify the causes of the heterogeneity in bank interest rates among 
the Italian provinces, this work develops a quantitative analysis based on a set of 
balanced panel data concerning the main features of the economic and banking 
system in Italian provinces during the period 1998-2003.  
As I pointed out in paragraph 1.3, because of problems of data homogeneity, it 
is not possible to consider data concerning the cost of money after 2003. In fact, 
since 2004, data relating to interest rates are not comparable with those referred 
to the previous period because of the changes introduced in the quarterly sample 
survey of deposit and lending rates by Bank of Italy. Particularly, the new 
survey, applied since the first quarter of 2004, is based on a larger number of 
banks and on a modified report form. All comparisons are therefore not 
homogeneous.  
The following section examines the relationship among the cost of money 
(expressed in terms of short-term lending rates on loan facilities up to 18 
months) and several macroeconomic and financial variables that can influence 
the level of provincial lending rates. 
Short-term lending rates at provincial level have been estimated by the 
Guglielmo Tagliacarne Institute on the basis of the regional lending rates 
calculated by Bank of Italy according to the national sample survey developed at 
regional level3. 
                                                 
3According to section 2.3 of the methodological appendix of the Statistical Bulletin published by 
Bank of Italy in the last quarter of the period object of analysis: 
“Pursuant to Article 51 of the Banking Law, two groups of banks participate in the quarterly 
survey of interest rates: around 70 banks for lending rates and 60 for deposit rates. Both groups 
include the principal banks at national level. The information on lending rates refers to the rates 
charged to resident non–bank customers reported to the Central Credit Register in the last 
month of the reference quarter, provided the related loans and guarantees exceed the reporting 
threshold. 
For each name and with reference to each reporting category, banks must report the interest 
products and the amount received or debited for interest, commissions and fees. On the basis of 
these data, interest rates are calculated as the weighted average of the effective rate charged to 
customers, according to the formula:  
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These data represent the most reliable estimates of provincial lending rates that 
are available and the estimation methodology has been positively verified by 
Bank of Italy staff.  
The necessity to use provincial data is due to the limited number of observations 
(and, hence, of degrees of freedom) that would characterize an analysis based on 
regional data. In fact, if this analysis would be based on regional data, the 
number of observations for each variable would be equal to 120 (observations 
about 20 regions for 6 years). The possibility to consider provincial data 
noticeably increases the number of observations, improving the significance and 
the robustness of the whole analysis (for every variable, it is in fact possible to 
take into consideration 618 observations, i.e. data on 103 provinces for 6 years).  
The variables employed in the analysis and potentially able to affect regional 
lending rates are, on the basis of the correlation analysis previously developed, 
the ratio of bad debts to total loans, the number of branches per 10,000 
inhabitants, the utilization rate ratio (per average loan granted) and the level of 
average loans for branch. 
As regards the ratio of bad debts to total loans and the utilization rate ratio, it is 
necessary to consider that the numerator and the denominator of these indicators 
are characterized by different temporal dynamics; in fact, for each year, both 
bad debts and the amount of credit actually used refer to loans granted in 
previous years. Therefore, for each year, the ratio of bad debts to total loans was 
calculated as the ratio between the amount of bad debts during the year in 
question and the amount of total loans concerning the previous year. 
Analogously, the utilization rate ratio is computed as the ratio between the 
                                                                                                                                   
 
r(%) = amounts due*36.5/products 
 
This weighted average is used for the data on interest rates published in the Bulletin unless 
otherwise specified in the notes to the tables”. 
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amount of credit actually used by borrowers during the year taken into 
consideration and the total amount of credit granted during the previous period.  
Data concerning the financial system are elaborated by Bank of Italy, with the 
exception of data on lending rates that, as pointed out before, are provided by 
Guglielmo Tagliacarne Institute; data on population are elaborated by the Italian 
National Statistical Office (ISTAT). 
As regards the riskiness of loans, this analysis does not take into account also 
the quarterly default rates for loan facilities defined by Bank of Italy as “the 
ratio whose denominator is the amount of credit used by all the borrowers 
covered by the Central Credit Register not classified as “adjusted bad debtors” 
at the end of the previous quarter and whose numerator is the amount of credit 
used by such borrowers who become “adjusted bad debtors” during the quarter 
in question”4.  
Because of the considerable volatility of default rates, I preferred to include in 
the analysis the ratio of bad debts to total loans as proxy of granted loans’ 
riskiness. The high volatility of default rates would have biased the results of 
this work. 
An important element to verify is the stationarity of the variables included in the 
model. Generally, in order to evaluate the hypothesis of stationarity of panel 
series, the literature has proposed several tests based on different assumptions. 
Particularly, the most important unit root tests for panel data are those 
introduced by Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997), Maddala and Wu (1999) and Levin 
et al. (2002).  
                                                 
4
 Bank of Italy defines adjusted bad debts as “the total loans outstanding when a borrower is 
reported to the Central Credit Register: a) as a bad debt by the only bank that disbursed credit; 
b) as a bad debt by one bank and as having an overshoot by the only other bank exposed; c) as a 
bad debt by one bank and the amount of the bad debt is at least 70% of its exposure towards the 
banking system or as having overshoots equal to or more than 10% of its total loans 
outstanding; d) as a bad debt by at least two banks for amounts equal to or more than 10% of its 
total loans outstanding”. 
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Among these tests, I took into consideration the Im, Pesaran and Shin test 
(henceforth IPS test) and the Maddala and Wu test (henceforth MW test) 
because these two tests explicitly consider heterogeneity among groups5. This 
element seems to be very important in this analysis where the individual units 
are the Italian provinces, whose economic and banking structure is rather 
different. The test introduced by Levin and Lin, on the contrary, by assuming 
common unit root processes, does not allow this possibility.  
Furthermore, the IPS test and the MW test are more appropriate to evaluate the 
stationarity in micro-panel samples, with T fixed.  
The results are shown in appendix 1.1. According to these tests, we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of not stationarity for the following series: loans for bank, 
loans for branches, added value per effective labour unit and added value per 
capita. On the contrary, lending rates, the number of banks and branches per 
10,000 inhabitants, the utilization rate ratio, the ratio between bad debts and 
total loans and the growth rate of the added value are stationary series. However, 
all variables are I(1), i.e. if  the series are expressed in terms of first differences, 
these tests lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis of not stationarity6. 
In light of the above considerations, the econometric analysis is based on a set of 
dynamic panel models that analyze the statistical relationship between lending 
rates and the financial and macroeconomic variables mentioned above.  
The econometric models employed to identify the elements that, at a macro 
level, affect the cost of money, have been estimated through the methodology 
introduced by Arellano and Bond in 1991. In fact, it is clear that the causal 
relationships hypothesized have a dynamic and not static nature. This 
                                                 
5
 The criterion used to choose the number of lags included into the autoregressive equations that 
have been employed to verify the null hypothesis of unit root is the Schwarz Info Criterion.  
6
 As regards the ratio between bad debts and total loans expressed in first differences, according 
to the MW test it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of not stationarity.  
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specification allows hence to take into consideration the degree of persistence 
that characterizes borrowing conditions at provincial level. 
Among the dynamic panel models, the choice of the Arellano and Bond 
methodology is justified by three reasons. First, because the Arellano and Bond 
method is a procedure based on the moment conditions, its use allows to 
overcome possible endogeneity problems of the regressors; second, because the 
instrumental variables used through this method are expressed in first 
differences, the Arellano and Bond procedure allows to overcome the problem 
of not stationary of several regressors that are, however, I(1); third, the Arellano 
and Bond procedure leads to consistent estimates, for micro-panel samples, 
where there are a large number of individuals (N) observed over a short period 
of time (T).  
1.5 The econometric analysis 
The following analysis shows that the worse borrowing conditions in Southern 
provinces can be caused by factors concerning the structure of the banking 
system. 
In order to understand the effect of the banking structure on lending rates at 
regional level, the Arellano and Bond methodology is employed to estimate a set 
of dynamic panel models that examine the relationship between interest rates 
and the financial variables previously indicated. 
The explanatory variables of these models have been chosen by taking into 
consideration both the main results of the literature about the elements able to 
influence the cost of money at macroeconomic level and the results of the 
correlation analysis previously developed.  
It would be appropriate to have an exact measure of the degree of concentration 
of the banking system in every province, given the general positive relationship 
between concentration and price pointed out by the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm. However, in order to build up an indicator of the degree 
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of concentration of the banking system it would be necessary to analyse data on 
banks’ market shares. Because these data are not available, it is not possible to 
compute an indicator of this type. The dataset used in this work, however, gives 
us an implicit measure of the degree of competition of the banking system, 
because the diffusion of the branch network on the territory is generally positive 
correlated with the degree of competition of the system.  
According to the previous analysis, the factors potentially able to explain the 
different levels in the lending rates among the areas are: 
• operating size of branches, expressed in terms of average loans for 
branch; 
• diffusion of the branch network on the territory, measured by the number 
of branches per 10,000 inhabitants; 
• degree of tension in the banking system, expressed in terms of utilization 
rate ratio; 
• riskiness of loans, calculated as ratio between bad debts and total loans; 
• degree of economic development, approximated by the amount of added 
value per capita; 
• degree of productivity in the system, measured by the amount of added 
value per effective labour unit. 
Obviously, it is not possible to insert all these variable in a single model because 
of the significant correlation relationships between them that would cause 
multicollinearity problems. In fact, by looking at table A1.4, it is possible to 
notice as the added value per capita and the added value per effective labour unit 
are highly correlated with the other variables. Hence, these two variables are not 
included into the regression models.  
As regards the other variables, the most significant correlation is observed 
between the ratio of bad debts on total loans and the number of branches per 
10,000 inhabitants (the correlation index between these two indicators amounts 
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to -0.77). Therefore, in order to avoid multicollinearity, these two variables 
cannot be included into the same models.  
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Baltagi (2008) and Hsiao (2003), in panel data 
models the multicollinearity problems are substantially reduced, given the more 
degrees of freedom and information on individual attributes that panel data 
offer. Hence, I decided to not include, in the same model, variables for which 
the correlation coefficient is, in absolute value, bigger than 0.4.  
I estimated 16 specifications that are characterized by different assumptions on 
the nature – strictly exogenous or predetermined – of the explanatory variables. 
In order to analyze the effects of the structure of the banking system on lending 
rates, the estimated dynamic panel models include, among the regressors, the 
average loans for branch, the utilization rate ratio and, separately, the ratio of 
bad debts to total loans (from model 1 to model 8) and the number of branches 
per 10,000 inhabitants (from model 9 to model 16). The results are shown in 
appendix 1.1 (tables A1.7 and A1.8). 
Because of the limited number of periods taken into consideration in the 
analysis (6 years), the inclusion of a number of lags greater than 2 would 
significantly reduce the degrees of freedom and the robustness of the estimates. 
Furthermore, because of the high degree of persistence that characterizes 
lending rates (that is caused also by the imperfections in the banking system that 
cause sluggish adjustments in lending rates), every model includes 2 lags for the 
dependent variable. 
Three cross-sections are lost in constructing lags and taking first differences, so 
that the estimation period is 2001-2003 and the number of useable observations 
for each series is equal to 309.  
Each model has been evaluated on the basis of the Wald test, the Sargan test and 
the Arellano and Bond test in order to assess the consistency of the estimated 
coefficients.  
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The Wald test verifies the joint significance of the coefficients associated to the 
regressors7.  
The Sargan test verifies the hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are 
valid, i.e. the validity of the instruments employed in the regression.  
Finally, the Arellano and Bond test verifies the lack of second-order serial 
correlation among the residuals of the regression, i.e. [()] = 08. This 
condition represents a crucial assumption of the Arellano and Bond 
methodology and if it is not respected the estimated coefficients are inconsistent 
because, in this case, there exists a significant correlation between the regressors 
included into the matrix of instruments and the idiosyncratic component of the 
error. 
All models have been estimated through the one-step and the two-steps Arellano 
and Bond methodology (the results are shown in tables A1.7 and A1.8). 
However, as suggested by Arellano and Bond, because for samples of small size 
the two-steps standard errors are downward biased, it is preferable to make 
inference based on the one-step estimator.  
The results, confirm the consistency of the estimated coefficients. In fact, with 
the exception of three specifications (model 2, 3 and 7), the results of the 
Arellano and Bond test indicates that it is not possible to reject the null 
hypothesis of the lack of second-order serial correlation among the residuals of 
the regression. Furthermore, for all the models, the Wald test rejects the 
hypothesis that the estimated coefficient are not jointly significantly different 
from zero. 
Among the models for which the Arellano and Bond test does not reject the null 
hypothesis, the Sargan test leads to do not reject the hypothesis of validity of the 
instruments only for two specifications (model 8 and 15). In these two models, 
                                                 
7
 Under the null hypothesis of not joint significance of the estimated coefficients, the probability 
distribution of the Wald test is a chi-square with a number of degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of the regressors.  
8
 See appendix 1.2 for more details about the Sargan test and the Arellano and Bond test. 
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the ratio between bad debts and total loans, the average loans for branch and the 
utilization rate ratio are considered as predetermined while the number of 
branches every 10,000 inhabitants is considered as strictly exogenous. These 
results imply that it could be not appropriate to treat the features of the banking 
system included in the models as strictly exogenous because some shock could 
influence the future changes in these elements.  
The regression output indicates that, after controlling for the persistence in the 
lending rates series, borrowing conditions remain significantly affected by the 
regional banking structure. 
The sum of the coefficients associated to the lagged values of the dependent 
variable is always less than 1; the stationarity condition is therefore respected. 
Lending rates are negatively affected by the average branches’ operating size 
and of the territorial diffusion of the branch network.  
Particularly, under the same conditions, if average loans for branch increase of 1 
million of euros, lending rates reduces of 51 basis points, according to model 8, 
or 42 basis points according to model 15; an increase of 1 branch per 10,000 
inhabitants leads to a reduction of 162 basis points in lending rates (model 15). 
The results seem to confirm that the general augment in banks’ operating 
efficiency caused by the increase in their average operating size was be able to 
offset the possible gains in banks’ market power due to the aggregation 
processes.  
Consequently, the lower branches’ operating size (and, hence, the smaller 
degree of banks’ efficiency) and the smaller degree of spatial closeness between 
banks and firms in Southern Italy and in the Islands, represent one of the causes 
that determine worse borrowing conditions in these areas.  
Also the degree of diffusion of the branch network in the territory affects the 
cost of money. Under the hypothesis that a greater number of branches per 
10,000 inhabitants implies a larger degree of competition in the banking system, 
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the negative and significant relationship between this variable and lending rates 
is consistent with the structure-conduct-performance paradigm.  
The smaller number of branches per 10,000 inhabitants in Southern provinces 
(and, hence, the more implicit concentration of the banking system in these 
zones) contributes hence to determine a larger cost of money in Southern Italy 
and in the Islands.  
Another factor causing higher interest rates in Southern areas is the worse credit 
quality. Credit risk represents one of the main elements that banks take into 
account in their credit and pricing policies. While at microeconomic level credit 
risk is usually expressed in terms of probability of default, in a macro 
perspective the regional ratio of bad debts to total loans can be used as a proxy 
of borrowers’ credit risk.  
The results are consistent with the theory: a greater degree of borrowers’ 
riskiness determines the application of higher bank interest rates. In detail, 
according to model 8, an augment of 1% in the ratio of bad debts to total loans is 
associated with an increase of 11 basis points in lending rates.  
According to models 8 and 15, the utilization rate ratio does not significantly 
influence lending rates.  
The lack of a significant relationship between these two variables can be due to 
the greater homogeneity of the utilization rate ratio across the areas in 
comparison with the other explanatory variables.  
Particularly, in 2003, this index was equal, in Southern Italy, in the Islands and 
at national level, respectively, to 80.7%, 81.8% and 72.3% (table A1.5). 
In conclusion, these models show that the differences among regions in lending 
rates can be explained by taking into consideration the differences in terms of 
banking structure and borrowers’ behaviour. Larger branches operating in 
Northern regions, by exploiting bigger scale economies, are able to apply to 
their customers better borrowing conditions.  
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Another reason why banks apply larger lending rates in Southern regions is the 
larger loans’ riskiness that characterizes this area. On the other hand, this pricing 
policy can cause adverse selection phenomena in credit market and, 
consequently, increases the average regional credit risk determining a vicious 
circle between higher lending rates and larger borrowers’ risk. 
The higher cost of money in Southern provinces represents a crucial element 
because worse borrowing conditions are able to hinder the regional economic 
development, slowing investments and the capital accumulation process.  
It is important to analyze the structure of the banking system in those contexts, 
such as the Italian one, in which bank credit is the main (and in the most part of 
the cases the only) source of funding for private firms. The structural 
characteristics of the banking system, among which the worse borrowing 
conditions observed in Southern areas, can have large effects on the real 
economic system, by hindering the level of economic development.  
Furthermore, the difficulties that Southern firms face to obtain bank credit, can 
obstruct also their innovation ability and, hence, their productivity. This 
situation prevents improvements in Southern economy’s competitive level, a 
necessary condition to overcame the structural crisis that, for several decades, 
have burden on the Southern areas. 
1.6 Conclusions 
The causes of interregional interest rate differentials observed in several 
countries represents a topic, for a long period, object of debate in economic 
literature. Among the different reasons, several authors enumerate together with 
imperfections of financial markets also real and economic variables. 
Particularly, literature tends to explain these spreads through factors concerning 
credit market’s structure, regional differences in transaction costs, demand, 
borrowers’ localization and according to the differences, across the areas, in the 
perceived counterparts’ credit risk. 
30 
 
In Italy the difference of about 2 percentage points between lending rates 
charged in Southern regions and the national average, observed on average 
during the eighties of the last century, remained substantially unchanged until 
2003.  
A school of thought assumes that the higher lending rates in Southern regions 
are due, mainly, to the differences among areas, in the size and industry 
composition of bank customers, and the lack of infrastructures adequate to 
support economic growth (Panetta, 2003).  
A second view, instead, considers that the higher lending rates charged in the 
Italian Mezzogiorno can be due, primarily, to the greater riskiness of loans 
observed in the area and other factors such as a credit rationing strategy 
occurred in the Italian Mezzogiorno because of the inadequacy of the Southern 
financial system, not able to provide financial resources sufficient to sustain 
local development processes (Mattesini and Messori, 2004). 
The endogenous nature of the causes of interregional interest rate spreads was 
confirmed, as regards the American context, by the analysis developed by 
Landon-Lane and Rockoff in 2004. The American financial system achieved a 
high degree of financial integration (and, therefore, interregional interest rate 
differentials decreased) only after the second post-war, when the American 
economic system became more homogeneous. 
As regards the Italian case, the results of this work are partially in contrast with 
Panetta’s opinion. In order to understand why, in Southern areas, banks apply 
greater lending rates, before looking at the differences in the size and industry 
composition of borrowers, it is necessary to take into consideration the 
differences, among areas, in the banks’ structural characteristics.  
The analysis developed indicates, in fact, that during the period 1998-2003 in 
Southern Italy and in the Islands the larger cost of money was caused by several 
structural factors such as the lower average branches’ size and the smaller 
territorial diffusion of the branch network.  
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The operating size of branches (expressed in terms of average loans for branch) 
negatively influences bank interest rates because of the ability of large-sized 
branches to achieve greater levels of efficiency (by exploiting scale economies) 
and, hence, under the same conditions, to charge lower lending rates to the 
counterparts. 
The smaller degree of diffusion of branches in the territory observed in the 
Mezzogiorno (measured by the number of branches per 10,000 inhabitants) 
denotes a lower degree of competition in the area and hence determines worse 
borrowing conditions. 
Consistently with Panetta’s results, however, this analysis shows the existence 
of a significant and positive relationship between borrowers’ riskiness 
(measured by the ratio of bad debts to total loans) and the cost of money. Hence, 
a share of the interregional interest rate spreads in Italy is caused by the higher 
borrowers’ riskiness perceived in Southern Italy and in the Islands.  
However, the higher riskiness in these areas can be caused by adverse selection 
phenomena in the credit market (in other words, by the same application of 
worse borrowing conditions). Therefore, it is important to understand if the 
higher riskiness in Southern regions measured by the larger ratio of bad debts to 
total loans reflects the borrowers’ structural characteristics or if it is caused by 
market imperfections.  
This topic is very important in the light of the restraining effect of worse 
borrowing conditions on the degree of economic development. 
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Appendix 1.1: Tables 
Table A1.1. Short-term lending rates on loan facilities up to 18 months 
(1998-2003) – IV quarter. 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Piedmont 6.56 5.11 6.59 6.18 5.98 5.52 
Valle d'Aosta 8.20 6.69 8.10 7.82 6.43 6.54 
Liguria  7.62 6.07 7.32 6.95 6.75 5.97 
Lombardy 6.17 4.63 6.07 5.48 5.06 4.50 
Trentino Alto Adige 7.25 5.71 7.17 6.43 5.96 4.57 
Veneto 7.15 5.86 7.25 6.76 6.60 5.38 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 6.80 5.56 7.23 6.79 6.73 5.39 
Emilia Romagna 6.49 5.17 6.69 5.85 5.79 4.55 
Marche 6.95 5.18 6.53 6.24 5.99 5.12 
Tuscany 7.14 5.60 6.87 6.61 6.59 5.62 
Umbria 8.56 6.81 7.90 7.49 7.17 6.39 
Lazio 7.57 6.01 6.87 6.19 5.80 5.24 
Abruzzo 8.60 6.37 7.56 7.56 7.05 6.64 
Molise 9.37 8.16 9.02 8.20 8.29 8.01 
Campania 8.52 7.25 8.39 8.00 7.63 7.34 
Puglia 8.47 6.61 8.47 7.85 7.43 6.77 
Basilicata 9.32 7.85 8.76 8.29 6.97 7.04 
Calabria 9.81 7.04 9.90 9.37 8.64 8.01 
Sicily 9.52 6.96 8.27 7.63 7.87 6.92 
Sardinia 9.44 7.50 8.98 7.90 6.97 5.57 
North-West Italy 6.32 4.80 6.22 5.66 5.28 4.70 
North-East Italy 6.86 5.54 7.02 6.34 6.25 4.99 
Central Italy 7.40 5.80 6.86 6.35 6.10 5.39 
Southern Italy 8.69 7.02 8.48 8.04 7.59 7.16 
Islands 9.49 7.13 8.46 7.70 7.59 6.47 
Italy 6.70 5.30 6.64 5.91 5.73 5.00 
Source: Bank of Italy data. 
 
Table A1.2. Dispersion indexes of short-term lending rates on loan facilities 
up to 18 months (1998-2003) – IV quarter. 
Indexes 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Maximum 11.55 8.34 9.01 9.67 8.54 8.64 
Minimum 7.38 4.81 5.42 6.15 5.15 4.72 
Range 4.17 3.53 3.59 3.52 3.39 3.92 
Max./Min. 1.57 1.73 1.66 1.57 1.66 1.83 
Source: elaborations on Bank of Italy data. 
 
  
37 
 
Table A1.3. Lending rates on loan facilities - Distribution by geographical 
area and initial period of rate fixation – IV quarter. 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Initial period of rate fixation up to 1 year 
North-West Italy 4.01 3.85 5.05 6.05 6.24 3.05 
North-East Italy 4.00 3.92 5.14 6.15 6.23 3.03 
Central Italy 4.12 4.05 5.19 6.15 6.40 3.32 
Southern Italy 4.64 4.47 5.75 6.63 7.03 3.93 
Islands 4.57 4.38 5.50 6.50 6.74 3.70 
Italy 4.10 3.98 5.18 6.16 6.36 3.20 
Initial period of rate fixation from 1 to 5 years 
North-West Italy 3.05 3.05 3.93 5.07 4.65 2.66 
North-East Italy 3.41 3.52 4.46 5.53 4.98 3.98 
Central Italy 3.95 3.72 4.25 4.69 4.93 3.49 
Southern Italy 4.70 4.53 5.11 5.83 6.19 5.19 
Islands 4.53 4.58 5.19 6.01 5.94 4.30 
Italy 3.43 3.35 4.15 5.05 4.89 3.40 
Initial period of rate fixation more than 5 years 
North-West Italy 5.04 4.49 4.85 5.35 5.44 4.40 
North-East Italy 4.65 4.65 5.07 5.30 5.31 4.72 
Central Italy 5.34 5.04 5.13 5.17 5.08 4.76 
Southern Italy 5.78 5.23 5.22 5.42 5.61 5.42 
Islands 5.78 5.24 5.26 5.56 5.68 5.15 
Italy 5.28 4.90 5.07 5.29 5.32 4.79 
Source: Bank of Italy data. 
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Table A1.4. Correlation matrix.  
  
Rates Loans for bank 
Loans for 
branch 
Branches per 
10,000 inh. 
Banks per 
10,000 inh. 
Utilization 
rate ratio 
Bad debts on 
total loans 
Added value per 
effect. labour 
unit 
Added 
value 
growth 
Added value 
per capita 
Rates 1.0000 
         
Loans for bank -0.2680 1.0000 
        
Loans for branch -0.5058 0.3508 1.0000 
       
Branches per 
10,000 inh. -0.6135 0.0299 0.1676 1.0000       
Banks per 10,000 
inh. -0.1122 -0.3513 -0.0152 0.4286 1.0000      
Utilization rate 
ratio 0.3786 -0.2210 -0.1956 -0.3402 0.0376 1.0000     
Bad debts on total 
loans 0.6719 -0.2313 -0.4025 -0.7684 -0.2004 0.3369 1.0000    
Added value per 
effect. Labour unit -0.6958 0.3605 0.6338 0.5596 0.0789 -0.3486 -0.6519 1.0000   
Added value 
growth 0.0374 -0.0247 0.0271 0.0139 0.0173 0.0901 -0.0477 0.0178 1.0000  
Added value per 
capita -0.7587 0.2896 0.6199 0.8081 0.2197 -0.4367 -0.8231 0.8388 0.0250 1.0000 
Source: elaborations on Bank of Italy, ISTAT and Guglielmo Tagliacarne Institute data. 
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Table A1.5. Loans for bank, loans for branch, banks and branches per 
10,000 inhabitants, utilization rate ratio and bad debts on total loans in 
Italian regions (1998-2003) (*). 
  
Loans for 
bank  
Loans for 
branch  
Banks per 
10,000 
inhabitants 
Branches per 
10,000 
inhabitants 
Utilization 
rate ratio 
Bad debts on 
total loans 
  1998 2003 1998 2003 1998 2003 1998 2003 1998 2003 1998 2003 
Piedmont 1.991 2.648 0.027 0.032 0.07 0.07 5.24 5.92 0.631 0.660 0.045 0.032 
Valle d'A. 0.343 1.070 0.016 0.022 0.34 0.16 7.20 7.95 0.786 0.724 0.077 0.035 
Liguria 1.882 3.046 0.018 0.024 0.05 0.04 5.15 5.73 0.658 0.763 0.102 0.052 
Lombardy 1.093 1.808 0.038 0.056 0.20 0.19 5.65 6.32 0.672 0.681 0.050 0.026 
Trentino  0.106 0.212 0.017 0.027 1.52 1.19 9.34 9.48 0.770 0.727 0.029 0.018 
Veneto 0.948 1.703 0.022 0.030 0.14 0.12 6.10 7.03 0.710 0.750 0.061 0.027 
Friuli V. 0.472 0.906 0.019 0.024 0.26 0.20 6.49 7.69 0.719 0.740 0.053 0.028 
Emilia R. 1.056 1.872 0.026 0.033 0.16 0.13 6.60 7.71 0.724 0.705 0.050 0.046 
Marche 0.580 0.934 0.020 0.026 0.19 0.19 5.70 6.93 0.757 0.768 0.089 0.043 
Tuscany 0.789 1.130 0.024 0.032 0.17 0.17 5.44 6.22 0.799 0.812 0.077 0.036 
Umbria 0.687 0.986 0.022 0.024 0.16 0.15 5.04 6.18 0.866 0.905 0.094 0.062 
Lazio 1.750 2.259 0.064 0.063 0.14 0.13 3.87 4.62 0.786 0.739 0.102 0.064 
Abruzzo 0.474 1.066 0.020 0.023 0.17 0.10 3.89 4.77 0.767 0.744 0.166 0.078 
Molise 0.368 0.833 0.016 0.018 0.15 0.09 3.47 4.35 0.778 0.789 0.202 0.128 
Campania 0.515 1.210 0.023 0.026 0.11 0.06 2.40 2.62 0.796 0.818 0.159 0.096 
Puglia 0.670 0.990 0.020 0.022 0.08 0.07 2.82 3.30 0.825 0.829 0.246 0.147 
Basilicata 0.231 0.568 0.018 0.019 0.28 0.13 3.57 4.05 0.845 0.736 0.246 0.184 
Calabria 0.230 0.519 0.019 0.021 0.18 0.10 2.20 2.52 0.905 0.850 0.276 0.180 
Sicily 0.521 0.974 0.018 0.020 0.11 0.07 3.23 3.36 0.737 0.812 0.348 0.135 
Sardinia 2.844 3.831 0.018 0.023 0.02 0.02 3.86 4.07 0.841 0.829 0.160 0.123 
 
            
NW Italy 1.232 1.959 0.033 0.046 0.15 0.14 5.49 6.16 0.662 0.680 0.052 0.028 
NE Italy 0.527 0.984 0.023 0.030 0.28 0.23 6.61 7.58 0.722 0.726 0.053 0.034 
Centr. 
Italy 1.153 1.528 0.039 0.042 0.16 0.15 4.71 5.57 0.789 0.767 0.095 0.055 
South. 
Italy 0.449 0.937 0.021 0.023 0.13 0.08 2.70 3.10 0.808 0.807 0.202 0.123 
Islands 0.678 1.267 0.018 0.021 0.09 0.06 3.39 3.53 0.771 0.818 0.296 0.131 
Italy 0.805 1.381 0.028 0.036 0.16 0.14 4.61 5.27 0.721 0.723 0.093 0.049 
Source: elaborations on Bank of Italy and ISTAT data. 
(*) Data on loans for bank and loans for branches in millions of euros. 
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Table A1.6. Unit Root Tests. (*) 
  Im, Pesaran and Shin test Maddala and Wu test 
Variable Statistic Prob. Cross- 
section Obs. Statistic Prob. 
Cross- 
section Obs. 
Variables in levels 
        
Rates -8.47688 0.0000 103 515 447.214 0.0000 103 515 
Loans for bank (**) 5.58647 1.0000 98 489 131.818 0.9999 98 489 
Loans for branch 4.3293 1.0000 103 515 152.439 0.9980 103 515 
Branches per 10,000  
inhab. -1.70116 0.0445 103 515 259.289 0.0069 103 515 
Banks per 10,000 inhab. -17.4007 0.0000 100 500 332.106 0.0000 100 500 
Utilization rate ratio -1.74845 0.0402 103 515 252.348 0.0152 103 515 
Bad debts on total loans -3.03909 0.0012 103 515 288.559 0.0001 103 515 
Added value per effect.  
labour unit 7.39455 1.0000 103 515 95.7767 1.0000 103 515 
Growth added value -2.93266 0.0017 103 515 276.972 0.0007 103 515 
Added value per capita 6.63933 1.0000 103 515 87.9608 1.0000 103 515 
Variables in first differences 
        
Rates -19.5178 0.0000 103 412 603.361 0.0000 103 412 
Loans for bank (**) -8.43061 0.0000 98 391 313.187 0.0000 98 391 
Loans for branch -4.93867 0.0000 103 412 255.032 0.0113 103 412 
Branches per 10,000  
inhab. -9.18273 0.0000 103 412 277.519 0.0007 103 412 
Banks per 10,000 inhab. -78.3189 0.0000 100 400 456.388 0.0000 100 400 
Utilization rate ratio -11.4062 0.0000 103 412 402.553 0.0000 103 412 
Bad debts on total loans -2.72856 0.0032 103 412 223.998 0.1855 103 412 
Added value per effect.  
labour unit -9.41922 0.0000 103 412 347.556 0.0000 103 412 
Growth added value -11.7518 0.0000 103 412 389.207 0.0000 103 412 
Added value per capita -6.85408 0.0000 103 412 295.117 0.0000 103 412 
Source: elaborations on Bank of Italy, ISTAT and Guglielmo Tagliacarne Institute data. 
(*) The null hypothesis of the Im, Pesaran and Shin test and Maddala and Wu test assumes 
individual unit root processes for each province.  
(**) For the variable “loans for bank”, IPS and MW tests are based only on 98 cross-section 
because, during the period 2000-2003, there were no banks in the following provinces: Isernia 
(in Southern Italy), Nuoro (in the Islands), Imperia, Pavia and Vercelli (in North-West Italy). 
Consequently, it is not possible to calculate this indicator for 5 provinces out of 103. 
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Table A1.7. Regression output – one-step estimation (dependent variable: short-term lending rates). 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Rates         
L1. 0.360*** 0.348*** 0.171* 0.472*** 0.324*** 0.362*** -0.013 0.239** 
(4.53) (4.66) (1.84) (5.49) (3.82) (4.84) (-0.10) (2.55) 
L2. 0.236*** 0.172*** 0.144** 0.284*** 0.192*** 0.185*** 0.084 0.170** 
(4.24) (3.17) (2.16) (4.79) (3.11) (3.40) (1.00) (2.52) 
        
Baddebts/Totalloans         
-- 0.130*** 0.201*** 0.036 0.146*** 0.117*** 0.194*** 0.00008 0.107*** 
(6.49) (8.28) (1.49) (6.92) (4.10) (7.96) (0.00) (3.43) 
        
Branches         
--         
        
        
Loans/Branches         
-- -0.298*** -0.285*** -0.535*** -0.293*** -0.483*** -0.280*** -0.590*** -0.505*** 
(-15.80) (-14.77) (-17.81) (-15.16) (-16.76) (-14.70) (-14.34) (-15.48) 
      
  
Used/Granted       
  
-- 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.028*** 0.042*** 0.028*** 0.025*** -0.025** -0.008 
(4.03) (3.83) (4.41) (5.72) (4.46) (3.89) (-2.08) (-0.91) 
        
Cons 7.326*** 6.953*** 15.439*** 4.438*** 12.054*** 6.372*** 22.933*** 16.230*** 
  (5.92) (5.93) (9.82) (3.10) (8.52) (5.25) (8.51) (9.06) 
Wald test 484.56 466.31 446.05 432.30 468.79 468.60 303.58 398.75 
   Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan test 212.79 172.17 22.62 171.41 23.81 171.28 8.56 16.15 
   Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0071 0.0000 0.0135 0.0000 0.6628 0.2412 
AB2 test 1.923 1.967 2.139 1.500 1.864 1.943 2.080 1.923 
   Prob > z 0.0545 0.0492 0.0325 0.1336 0.0623 0.0520 0.0375 0.0541 
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Table A1.7 (continued) – one-step estimation. 
  Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Rates         
L1. 0.514*** 0.580*** 0.300*** 0.552*** 0.423*** 0.583*** 0.185 0.326*** 
(7.84) (8.40) (3.99) (8.29) (5.02) (8.40) (1.45) (3.16) 
L2. 0.296*** 0.292*** 0.185*** 0.320*** 0.246*** 0.296*** 0.143** 0.219*** 
(6.29) (5.99) (3.50) (6.75) (5.05) (6.03) (2.02) (3.97) 
        
Baddebts/Totalloans         
--         
        
        
Branches         
-- -2.870*** -3.964*** -1.770*** -2.872*** -2.429*** -4.030*** -1.624*** -1.935*** 
(-15.33) (-16.10) (-7.34) (-15.05) (-4.14) (-16.11) (-4.25) (-2.84) 
    
  
  
Loans/Branches     
  
  
-- -0.195*** -0.131*** -0.381*** -0.187*** -0.294*** -0.124*** -0.420*** -0.353*** 
(-10.83) (-6.32) (-13.00) (-10.50) (-4.83) (-5.96) (-6.49) (-4.89) 
      
  
Used/Granted       
  
-- 0.012*** 0.005 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.014* 0.0002 -0.021 -0.006 
(2.74) (1.09) (3.53) (2.82) (2.42) (0.04) (-1.55) (-0.99) 
        
Cons 20.676*** 25.181*** 21.197*** 19.822*** 21.621*** 25.719*** 25.518*** 22.832*** 
  (19.93) (20.64) (18.46) (17.35) (12.41) (19.42) (10.92) (13.72) 
Wald test 836.89 789.62 749.01 806.18 867.78 775.60 528.03 715.46 
   Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan test 113.83 51.45 27.99 119.91 50.97 52.97 12.65 39.96 
   Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3169 0.0001 
AB2 test -0.004 -0.121 1.590 -0.196 0.734 -0.138 1.918 1.172 
   Prob > z 0.9964 0.9041 0.1119 0.8446 0.4629 0.8904 0.0551 0.2413 
Source: elaborations on Bank of Italy, ISTAT and Guglielmo Tagliacarne Institute data. 
Notes: The values highlighted in bolditalics refer to predetermined variables, while the other values refer to strictly exogenous variables. The values in brackets are 
the values of the z-statistic. *** variable significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10%.  
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Table A1.8. Regression output – two-steps estimation (dependent variable: short-term lending rates). 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Rates         
L1. 0.336*** 0.335*** 0.083 0.457*** 0.310*** 0.337*** -0.069 0.194** 
(4.05) (5.23) (1.00) (5.85) (4.00) (5.27) (-0.60) (2.26) 
L2. 0.199*** 0.153*** 0.114** 0.229*** 0.188*** 0.149*** 0.073 0.144*** 
(4.05) (3.77) (2.36) (4.47) (4.23) (3.71) (1.31) (3.30) 
        
Baddebts/Totalloans         
-- 0.133*** 0.189*** 0.00003 0.166*** 0.097** 0.190*** -0.024 0.098** 
(3.85) (4.66) (0.00) (5.32) (2.41) (4.81) (-0.72) (2.27) 
        
Branches         
--         
        
        
Loans/Branches         
-- -0.336*** -0.320*** -0.587*** -0.317*** -0.502*** -0.321*** -0.626*** -0.503*** 
(-9.07) (-11.00) (-12.46) (-9.42) (-11.81) (-10.90) (-10.95) (-11.72) 
      
  
Used/Granted       
  
-- 0.016** 0.021** 0.031*** 0.039*** 0.026*** 0.023** -0.012*** -0.003 
(1.99) (2.52) (3.31) (3.14) (2.88) (2.25) (-0.77) (-0.31) 
        
Cons 8.697*** 7.855*** 17.304*** 5.251*** 12.869*** 7.726*** 23.414*** 16.416*** 
  (5.40) (5.81) (9.43) (3.36) (7.07) (5.81) (7.34) (8.03) 
Wald test 322.94 248.26 244.16 343.24 286.49 263.05 206.35 278.82 
   Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan test 40.66 42.46 13.10 42.04 19.35 47.51 10.11 17.39 
   Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.1582 0.0000 0.0550 0.0000 0.5202 0.1820 
AB2 test 1.992 2.024 2.462 1.615 1.953 2.045 2.369 2.211 
   Prob > z 0.0464 0.0429 0.0138 0.1064 0.0508 0.0409 0.0179 0.0270 
 
  
44 
 
Table A1.8 (continued) – two-steps estimation. 
  Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Rates         
L1. 0.522*** 0.636*** 0.274*** 0.578*** 0.429*** 0.634*** 0.176* 0.346*** 
(7.89) (9.70) (3.62) (8.95) (6.40) (9.72) (1.84) (4.21) 
L2. 0.262*** 0.280*** 0.149*** 0.281*** 0.222*** 0.277*** 0.117** 0.200*** 
(6.11) (6.91) (3.51) (6.97) (6.38) (7.00) (2.40) (5.21) 
        
Baddebts/Totalloans         
--         
        
        
Branches         
-- -2.891*** -4.075*** -1.704*** -3.008*** -2.159*** -4.119*** -1.673*** -2.048*** 
(-10.60) (-13.92) (-5.93) (-11.82) (-4.42) (-14.13) (-5.03) (-3.63) 
    
  
  
Loans/Branches     
  
  
-- -0.196*** -0.116*** -0.398*** -0.186*** -0.321*** -0.111*** -0.421*** -0.331*** 
(-8.12) (-6.27) (-9.00) (-8.31) (-6.26) (-5.92) (-8.06) (-5.69) 
      
  
Used/Granted       
  
-- 0.010* 0.003 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.015** 0.002 -0.007 0.002 
(1.90) (0.75) (3.05) (2.79) (2.39) (0.31) (-0.69) (0.40) 
        
Cons 21.654*** 26.417*** 21.567*** 21.009*** 21.635*** 26.646*** 25.181*** 22.940*** 
  (16.08) (17.36) (16.02) (15.65) (12.46) (16.82) (13.33) (13.43) 
Wald test 549.14 432.51 482.51 555.68 599.52 412.58 452.35 600.03 
   Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan test 41.09 26.84 11.18 40.35 23.05 28.30 10.53 26.094 
   Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0015 0.2637 0.0000 0.0174 0.0029 0.4832 0.0165 
AB2 test 0.229 -0.059 2.067 0.065 0.989 -0.038 2.249 1.290 
   Prob > z 0.8192 0.9530 0.0387 0.9479 0.3229 0.9693 0.0245 0.1970 
Source: elaborations on Bank of Italy, ISTAT and Guglielmo Tagliacarne Institute data. 
Notes: The values highlighted in bolditalics refer to predetermined variables, while the other values refer to strictly exogenous variables. The values in brackets are 
the values of the z-statistic. *** variable significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10%.  
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Appendix 1.2: The Arellano and Bond estimator 
In 1991, Arellano and Bond (AB henceforth) provided an efficient estimator for 
dynamic panel models in which the number of time periods, T, is small and the 
number of individual units, N, is large. 
More in details, this estimator is an application of the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) on first-differenced equations. 
Let us take into consideration the following autoregressive model without 
regressors:  
  =  ∑ () +  ,     | | < 1,    t = (p+1), ..., T,    i = 1, ..., N [1] 
 
where  = η +  , | | < 1 is the stationarity condition, p is the number of 
lags of the dependent variable, ηi ~ IID(0, σ2η) and vit ~ IID(0, σ2v) 
Note that () and η are necessarily correlated. The transformation in first 
differences allows to eliminate the individual effects, but it reduces the number 
of observations. 
The AB estimator exploits all the possible moment conditions and let their 
number change according to t.  
Let us suppose, for example, that the number of lags, p, is equal to 1 and that the 
only parameter to be estimated, α, is associated with the variable y lagged value 
of one period. 
Model [1] becomes: 
  = () +  η +  ,     || < 1,    t = 2, ..., T,    i = 1, ..., N [2] 
 
while the model in first differences becomes: 
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 − () = (() − ())  + ( −  ()))   ∆ =  ∆() + ∆,                   t = 3, ..., T     i = 1, ..., N [3] 
 
For t = 3, we have: 
   −  = ( −  )  + ( −  ) 
 
where   is a valid instrument for ( −  ) because it is correlated with the 
latter but not with ( −  ) as long as  is serially uncorrelated. 
For t = 4, we have: 
  −  = ( −  )  + ( −  ) 
 
In this case, both   and   are valid instruments for ( −  ), because 
they are correlated with the latter difference but they are not correlated, under 
the assumptions of the model, with ( −  ). 
Hence, the set of valid instruments, as shown in the following scheme, depends 
on time: 
 
Equation: Instrument: ∆ =  ∆ + ∆   ∆ =  ∆ + ∆    ,  
 ⋮    ⋮ ∆ =  ∆() + ∆  ,  , ..., () 
 
The moment conditions exploited by the AB procedure (whose number is time 
varying) are: 
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( −  ) = 0 t = 3 
( −  ) = 0 t = 4 ( −  ) = 0 
 
Generally, for T time periods, the model implies the following m = ()()  
moment conditions: 
 !( −  )()" = 0  j = 2, …, (t – 1),    t = 3, …, T [4] 
 
These moment conditions can be concisely written as: 
 #′  % = 0 [5] 
 
that is equivalent to: 
 !#&(∆ −  ∆())" = 0 [6] 
 
where # is the matrix of instruments9: 
 
# = ' 0 00 ,  0∙ ∙ ∙0 0 , ⋯ , , + [7] 
 
and % = (∆, ⋯ , ∆)′ is a [(, − 2) × 1] vector [8] 
 
Analogously, let us define the vectors: 
                                                 
9
 # is a [(, − 2)  × 0] block diagonal matrix whose sth block is (, ⋯ , 1). 
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2 = (∆, ⋯ , ∆)′ as a [(, − 2) × 1] vector [9] 
and 2() = (∆, ⋯ , ∆)′ as a [(, − 2) × 1] vector [10] 
 
If the errors are independent distributed with constant variance σ2, we have [%%′] =  σ3, where H is a (, − 2) square matrix which has twos in the 
main diagonal, minus ones in the first subdiagonal and zeros otherwise.  
 
3 =
455
56 2 −1 0 ⋯ 0 0 0−1 2 −1 ⋯ 0 0 0⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮0 0 0 ⋯ −1 2 −10 0 0 ⋯ 0 −1 2 899
9:
 [11] 
 
The AB estimator of  is based on the sample moments ∑ ;&<=2<><?@A  =  ;B=2A  
 
Where # =  (#& , ⋯ , #A& ) is a C(, − 2) × 0 matrix and % = (%& , ⋯ , %A& ) is a C(, − 2) × 1 vector. 
In details, we have: 
 
D  = EFG0HIJ(%&#)KA(#&%) = ∑ L2<(M@)B< ;<N> ∑ ;<BL2<<∑ L2<(M@)B ;<< N> ∑ ;<BL2<(M@)<  [12] 
 
By setting KA  =  (∑ ;<BO;<< A ), the one step AB estimator, D, is obtained. In 
equation [12], the expression (∑ #&3# ) is a weighting matrix that leads to a 
consistent estimator of α as long as  is serially uncorrelated.  
If the errors  are heteroskedastic, it is possible to obtain a more efficient 
estimator - the so-called two-steps AB estimator, D - by imposing KA  =  PQA 
in equation [12], where: 
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PQA  =  ∑ ;<B=2Q<=2Q<B;<< A  [13] 
 
and %Q are the differenced residuals obtained from the preliminary consistent 
estimator  D. 
A consistent estimate of the variance matrix of D, for an arbitrary KA, is given 
by: 
 
EEFR (D) = C ∑ L2<(M@)B< ;<N>ST>N> ∑ ;<B< L2<(M@)(∑ L2<(M@)B ;<< N> ∑ ;<BL2<(M@)< )U  [14] 
 
Note that  D and  D are asymptotically equivalent if the  are IID(0, σ=). 
However, AB suggest to employ the one-step estimator in finite-sample 
inference because, in this framework, according to their simulations, the two-
step standard errors could be downward biased in samples of small size. 
Let us extend model [2] by including k explanatory variables: 
  = () +  V&W +  η + ,     || < 1,    t = 2, ..., T,    i = 1, ..., N [15] 
 
The parameters in equation [15] can be estimated by using GMM, analogously 
with the model without explanatory variables above illustrated. In other words, 
the procedure remains the same as before, but the set of valid instruments will 
change according to the hypothesis about W. 
More in details, if all the W are correlated with η: 
• If W are strictly exogenous, that is if [W1] = 0, for all X, Y = 1, 2, ⋯ , ,, 
then all the W are valid instruments for the first differenced equation of [15].  
In this case, [W& , W& , ⋯ , W& ] should be added to each diagonal element of #. 
Therefore, the instruments matrix becomes: 
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# =  455
6[, W& , W& , ⋯ , W& ] 0 0 00 [, , W& , W& , ⋯ , W& ] 0 0⋮ ⋯ ⋱ ⋯0 0 0 [, ⋯ , (), W& , W& , ⋯ , W& ]89
9:
    [16] 
 
• If W are predetermined¸ that is if [W1] = 0 for Y ≥ X and [W1] ≠ 0 
for Y < X, then, for every s, only [W& , W& , ⋯ , W(1)& ] are valid instruments for 
the differenced equation at period s.  
In this case, the instrument matrix becomes: 
 
# =  455
6[ , W& , W& ] 0 0 00 [ , , W& , W& , W& ] 0 0⋮ ⋯ ⋱ ⋯0 0 0 [, ⋯ , (), W& , W& , ⋯ , W()& ]89
9:
    [17] 
 
Let us suppose instead that there exists a subset W of W uncorrelated with η. 
In this case: 
• If W are strictly exogenous, observation on W  for all t become valid 
instruments in the levels equations. There are only T extra restrictions that 
can be expressed as: 
 ]∑ 1W1 , ^ = 0, (X = 1, ⋯ , ,) 
• If W are predetermined, according to AB there are other T extra restrictions: [W] = 0 and [W] = 0, for (X = 2, ⋯ , ,). The optimal matrix of 
instruments becomes: 
 
#_ =  
45
55
6#  0 0 0 00 [W& , W& ] 0 0 00 0 W& 0 0⋮ ⋮ ⋯ ⋱ ⋮0 0 0 0  W& ]89
99
:
    [18] 
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where # is given by [17]. 
The AB estimator is consistent if there is no second-order serial correlation 
among the residuals of the regression, i.e. [()] = 0. 
In order to test this hypothesis, AB propose a test based on residuals from the 
first-differenced equations and that is defined only for , ≥ 510. The null 
hypothesis of lack of second-order serial correlation is not rejected if the errors 
in the model in levels are not serially correlated or if they follow a random walk 
process. In the latter case, AB pointed out that both OLS and GMM estimates in 
first-differences are consistent and they suggest a Hausman type test based on 
the differences between the two estimators.  
Furthermore, AB suggest a Sargan test to verify the hypothesis of validity of 
over-identifying restrictions given by: 
 Y =  ∑ D& #(∑ #&A DD&#) ∑ #& D    ab χc  [19] 
 
where D  =   − D() − Vd& W, D and Vd are the two-step estimates of  
and V for a given instrument matrix of instrument #, p is the number of 
columns in # and k is the number of coefficients to be estimated. 
  
                                                 
10
 See equations (8) and (9), page 282, in Arellano and Bond (1991), Some Tests of 
Specifications for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment 
Equations, in “The Review of Economic Studies Limited”, 58. 
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CHAPTER 2: CREDIT RISK DETERMINANTS AND 
SPREADS RISK ADJUSTED FOR ITALIAN REGIONS 
2.1 Introduction 
During the last decade, the debate about the possible consequences of the Basel 
Accords generated a renewed interest in modeling credit risk’s determinants. 
Economists generally believed that Basel II would have ensured an increase in 
the stability of the financial system by identifying a quantitative relationship 
between banks’ capital requirements and riskiness of their assets.  
The recent global crisis has determined concerns about the Basel II Accord 
efficacy. However, the main weaknesses of this accord were due to the limited 
attention on liquidity risk, on the quality of the instruments that could be 
included into the regulatory capital and on capital requirements’ procyclicality; 
on the contrary, credit risk management continues to play a central role also in 
the current revision framework.  
Hence, the default risk assessment remains a crucial aspect in credit policies. 
Particularly, because capital requirements positively depend on borrowers’ 
probability of default (PD), if banks overestimate the credit risk of their assets, 
they must set aside larger capital provisions and sustain higher costs; on the 
contrary, an underestimation of the riskiness of banks’ assets reduces the overall 
degree of financial stability in the system. 
The relationship between credit risk and capital requirements is on the basis of 
pricing models currently employed by banks in order to determine the lending 
rates applicable to their customers. 
In light of the above considerations, understanding credit risk’s determinants is a 
crucial issue. Credit risk, expressed in terms of probabilities of default (PD), 
depends on borrowers’ specific characteristics (idiosyncratic components) 
together with the general economic environment where borrowers operate 
(systematic factors) that reflects exogenous territorial elements.  
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In this framework, this chapter aims to examine the idiosyncratic and systematic 
elements influencing Italian firms’ PD. To reach this aim the relationship 
between credit risk and borrowing conditions is examined at a regional level. 
The empirical analysis takes into consideration the period 2002-2006 and 
focuses on 36,303 observations for 10,058 Italian private firms and 639 default 
cases. 
The work is organized into five parts, besides this introduction. Paragraph 2.2 
illustrates the main theoretical contributions on the determinants of firms’ credit 
risk. Particularly, it is possible to distinguish four fields of research: models 
mainly based on firm-specific characteristics; models analyzing the joint effect 
of idiosyncratic and systematic elements; contributions that are mainly focused 
on the relationship between default and macroeconomic variables and, finally, 
contributions mainly based on market information. 
Paragraph 2.3 describes the methodology employed, the sample analyzed, the 
explanatory variables taken into consideration and the main results obtained by 
estimating the models proposed. The independent variables included in the 
models are accounting indicators (amount and growth rate of total annual sales, 
ratio between bank debts and total sales, ratio between equity and total assets, 
ratio between current assets and current liabilities and ROA index), 
macroeconomics variables (GDP growth rate and GDP per capita) and 
indicators of the financial system structure (loans growth rate, incidence of 
cooperative banks and branches in the banking system and number of branches 
and banks every 10,000 inhabitants).  
Paragraph 2.4 analyzes the effect of credit risk in the determination of lending 
rates. By following Zazzara and Cortese (2004), this paragraph presents a model 
to estimate the Spread Risk Adjusted (SRA), that is the metric the represents the 
share of the final lending rate exclusively based on loans’ credit risk. 
In paragraph 2.5, the value of the SRA for each observation is estimated while 
the main results of the analysis are summarized in paragraph 2.6.   
54 
 
2.2 Literature review  
In recent years, the debate about the possible consequences of the Basel Accords 
has renewed the attention on the measurement and pricing of credit risk, tools 
able to favor the stability of the banking and financial system.   
The earliest analysis concerning the identification of credit risk’s determinants 
date back to the sixties of the last century. During this period, Beaver (1966) and 
Altman (1969) developed the first models to assess private firms’ credit risk. 
These studies applied discriminant analysis and used, primarily, firms’ 
accounting data.  
The following developments focused on the identification of the idiosyncratic 
and systematic components of credit risk and are subdivided into the following 
categories (table 2.1):  
• models mainly based on firm-specific characteristics; 
• models analyzing the joint effect of the idiosyncratic and systematic 
components of credit risk; 
• models primarily focused on the relationship between default and 
macroeconomic variables; 
• models that point out the importance of market information to evaluate 
firms’ credit risk.  
The first group of studies includes Bernhardsen (2001), Eklund et al. (2001), 
Bunn and Redwood (2003) and Jiménez and Saurina (2004). 
Models based on accounting data take into account some measures of 
profitability, liquidity and leverage. Nevertheless, there is no consensus about 
which variables are the most important in the estimation of the PD.  
Bernhardsen (2001), Eklund et al. (2001) develop a model in order to predict 
bankruptcy probability on the basis of a sample of Norwegian firms during the 
period 1990-1996 (about 400,000 observations). According to firm-specific data 
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Table 2.1. Literature about credit risk’s determinants. 
Authors Year Methodology Main explanatory variables Approach 
Bernhardsen 2001 Transformed 
logit model 
- (Cash and deposits - Value of short term debt)/Revenue from operations 
Models mainly 
based on firm-
specific 
characteristics 
Eklund,  2001 -  Outstanding payments of public dues/Total assets 
Larsen and   -  Trade credits/Total assets 
 Bernhardsen   -  (Result before extra ordinary items + Ordinary write offs + Depreciation - Taxes)/Total assets 
    
-  Book value of equity/Total assets 
    -  Current book value of equity is less than the value of equity injected (dummy) 
    -  Dividends paid current year 
    -  Number of years since incorporation (8 dummies) 
    -  (Ln(total assets) - 8,000)2 
    -  Mean value, for the industry, of the ratio Book value of equity/Total assets 
    
-  Mean value, for the industry, of the ratio Trade credits/Total assets 
    
-  Variance of the variable (Results before extra ordinary items + Ordinary write offs + 
Depreciation - Taxes)/Total assets 
Bunn and 2003 Probit model -  Profit margin (3 dummies) 
 Redwood   -  Ebit/Interest payments 
    -  Debts/Total assets 
    -  Liquidity ratio 
    -  Profit margin < 0 and Debts/Total assets > 0.35 (dummy) 
    -  Ln(number of employees) 
    -  The firm is a subsidiary (dummy) 
    -  Industry (6 dummies) 
    -  Profit margin < 0 and the firm is a subsidiary (dummy) 
    -  GDP growth rate 
Jiménez and  2004 Logit model -  Collateral coverage (3 dummies) 
 Saurina   -  Type of financial institution (3 dummies) 
    -  Type of instrument (6 dummies) 
    -  Currency (dummy) 
    -  Maturity (2 dummies) 
    -  Temporal dummies 
    -  Size of the loan 
    -  Number of borrowers' banking relationships 
    -  Industry (10 dummies) 
    -  Region (17 dummies) 
    -  GDP growth rate 
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Table 2.1 (continued) - Literature about credit risk’s determinants. 
Authors Year Methodology Main explanatory variables Approach 
Benito, Javier Delgado and  2004 Probit model -  Industry (15 dummies) 
Models 
analyzing the 
joint effect of 
the 
idiosyncratic 
and systematic 
components of 
credit risk 
Martinez Pagés   -  Borrowing ratio (Interest payments/Ordinary profit plus interest payments) 
    -  Return on assets 
    -  Liquid assets/Total assets 
    -  Debts/Total Assets 
    -  Trade credits/Total Assets 
    -  Omit dividend 
    -  Real sales growth 
    -  Ln(real sales) 
    -  Firm age (dummy) 
    -  GDP growth rate 
    -  Time dummies 
Carling, Jacobson, Lindé and  2007 Duration model -  Duration dummies 
Roszbach   -  Credit type according to the maturity (3 dummies) 
    -  Total sales 
    -  EBITDA/Total assets 
    -  Debts/Total assets 
    -  Inventories/Total sales 
    -  Bank payment remarks 
    -  Legal payment remarks 
    -  Output gap 
    -  Household expectations 
    -  Yield curve 
Bonfim 2009 Probit model and 
duration model 
-  Sales growth 
    -  ROA 
    -  Solvency ratio 
    -  Investment rate 
    -  Liquidity ratio 
    -  Industry (11 dummies) 
    -  Size (3 dummies) 
    -  Interest rate on loans to firms 
    -  Yield cuve slope 
    -  Loan growth rate 
    -  Stock market price variation 
    -  GDP growth rate 
    -  Temporal dummies 
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Table 2.1 (continued) - Literature about credit risk’s determinants. 
Authors Year Methodology Main explanatory variables Approach 
Borio, Furfine and Lowe 2001 Descriptive analysis -  Output gap 
Models that are 
mainly focused 
on the 
relationship 
between default 
and 
macroeconomic 
variables 
    
-  Indicators of banking system performance (provisions, profitability, equity 
prices, capital) 
    -  Loan to value ratio 
Pederzoli and Torricelli 2005 
Conditional and 
unconditional PDs 
and probit models 
-  Term spread between the ten-year treasury bond and the three-month treasury 
bill rate  
Jiménez and Saurina  2006 GMM estimations, 
logit and probit 
models 
-  Loan growth rate 
    -  Size of the loan 
    -  Maturity of the loan (2 dummies) 
    -  Collateral coverage (2 dummies) 
    -  Region (dummies) 
    -  Industry (dummies) 
    -  Size of bank 
    -  Type of bank (dummies) 
    -  Time dummies 
    -  GDP growth rate 
    
-  Borrowers' characteristics (if they were in default the year before or the year 
after the loan was granted, their indebtedness level) 
    -  Characteristics of the borrower-lender relationship (duration and scope) 
    -  Level of competition in the loan market 
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Table 2.1 (continued) - Literature about credit risk’s determinants. 
Authors Year Methodology Main explanatory variables Approach 
Shumway 2001 Multiperiod logit model -  Market size  
Models mainly based 
on market information 
    -  Past stock returns 
    -  Idiosyncratic standard deviation of stock returns 
    -  Net income/Total assets 
    -  Total liabilities/Total assets 
Tudela and  2003 Merton approach -  Value and volatility of the company's equity 
 Young   -  Book value of the company's equity 
Moody's  2004 Functional form related to generalized 
additive models (with non-parametric 
transforms) and Merton approach 
-  Accounting data, varying according to the country taken into 
consideration and concerning, generally, profitability, leverage, debt 
coverage, assets and sales growth rates, liquidity, inventories, cash flow 
and size 
    
    
    
    -  Industry (dummies) 
    -  Industry distance to default 
Couderc  2005 Parametric and semi-parametric factor 
models 
-  Return on S&P500 
 and    -  Volatility of S&P500 
 Renault   -  10 year treasury yield 
    -  Slope of term structure 
    -  GDP growth rate 
    -  Industrial production growth 
    -  Personal Income growth 
    -  CPI growth 
    -  Spread of long term BBB bonds over treasuries 
    -  Spread of long term BBB bonds over AAA bonds 
    -  Net issues of Treasury securities 
    -  Loan growth rate 
    -  Investment grade and non investment grade classes upgrade rates 
    -  Investment grade and non investment grade classes downgrade rates 
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such as firms’ age, size, profitability, liquidity and industry’s characteristics, the 
analysis is based on a logit model that estimates the bankruptcy probability.  
The non linear nature of the model permits transformations of the explanatory 
variables to obtain flexible rates of compensation (i.e. varying according to the 
level of the variables). 
According to the model, riskier firms, with a larger bankruptcy probability, are 
characterized by a lower size (in terms of total assets), profitability, liquidity, an 
higher gearing and greater value of the ratios between trade creditors and total 
assets and between outstanding public dues and total assets. The dividend 
distribution during the last year can be interpreted as a signal of solidity and 
profitability; therefore the dummy associated with this event negatively 
influences the bankruptcy probability. Furthermore, under the same conditions, 
youngest firms are riskier than the oldest ones. Finally, firms’ bankruptcy 
probability is higher in the industries with a greater average degree of leverage 
and a larger volatility of firms’ profitability. Moreover, Bernhardsen 
distinguishes between the probability of bankruptcy and the probability of 
insolvency. While bankruptcy probability can be empirically estimated because 
the bankruptcy event is observable, the prediction of the probability of 
insolvency is problematic because of the impossibility to observe the state of 
insolvency. Although these difficulties, according to the author it is possible to 
compute the bankruptcy probability conditional on the insolvency (estimated to 
equal 49%). 
Runn and Redwood (2003) develop a probit model to identify the determinants 
of PD on the basis of a sample of English firms (about 100,000 observations), 
on the period 1991-2001. This sample, however, is not completely 
representative because it does not include observations about firms with less 
than 100 employees because, according to the authors, accounting data are 
generally incomplete for smaller firms.  
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According to the model, PD is influenced by firm-specific elements (such as 
profitability, size, industry, liquidity, interest cover and ratio debt/total assets) 
together with the general conditions of the economy that are represented by the 
GDP growth rate. Particularly, there is a negative relationship between credit 
risk and firms’ profitability, liquidity, size (in terms of number of employees), 
interest cover and capitalization. Thanks to the possibility that, in case of 
difficulties, subsidiary firms can be assisted by the holding company, subsidiary 
firms are less risky and the size of this effect is larger if the firm makes a loss. 
Finally, there is a negative relationship between PD and GDP growth rate. This 
event can be determined by the behavior of banks that, during recession periods, 
are more risk adverse and tend to close down the largest risks more rapidly.  
Jimenéz and Saurina (2004) present a different approach and examine the 
determinants of the PD analyzing credit risk at a loan level and not at a borrower 
level. The study is based on over 3 millions loans granted by the Spanish 
financial system during the period 1988-2000. 
The authors, by estimating logit models, come to the conclusion that more 
collateral imply greater PD because banks tend to require more collaterals for 
those loans characterized by a greater ex-post credit risk. PD decreases in case 
of loans in foreign currency, of larger size or with longer maturity. For these 
loans, in fact, banks pay more attention on their screening process, diminishing 
ex-post credit risk.  
Closer relationships between banks and borrowers (expressed by the number of 
banks with which each borrowers relates) are characterized by larger PDs: in 
these conditions, banks are willing to finance riskier loans because they can 
recover the larger expected loss by applying higher lending rates to their other 
exclusive or nearly exclusive borrowers. Hence, there are informational rents for 
banks thanks to the higher quality of information about their borrowers due to 
the close relationship with the customer.  
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Finally, the authors point out that, in order to obtain more appropriate estimates 
of loans’ PD, it is necessary to take into consideration also the general 
conditions of the macroeconomic environment. These conditions can be 
expressed by the GDP growth rate, variable that negatively influences credit 
risk.  
The group of contributions that jointly analyze the effect of idiosyncratic and 
systematic elements include Benito et al. (2004), Carling and al. (2007) and 
Bonfim (2009). 
Benito et al. (2004) develop a probit model to estimate the PD on the basis of a 
sample of about 18,000 non-financial Spanish firms and take into consideration 
the period 1985-2001. According to the authors, in order to explain exhaustively 
the determinants of firms’ PD, it is necessary to combine accounting data and 
macroeconomic factors. Furthermore, it is important also to evaluate the firms’ 
credit status since that financial indicators can summarize different information 
if the default status is a persistent conditions (i.e. if the firm object of analysis 
stays in this status for more than a year) or a non persistent condition.   
Compared with non-defaulting firms, those defaulting are characterized by 
larger debts, more dividend omissions and lower profitability, liquidity and sales 
growth. There is a positive relationship between PD and size (in terms of annual 
sales); younger companies have a higher PD with respect to the older ones. The 
analysis points out the relevance of the non-linearities in the relationship 
between PD and financial ratios. 
As regards macroeconomic factors, there is a positive relationship between PD 
and the aggregate cost of debt; on the contrary, GDP growth rate negatively 
influences firms’ credit risk. This condition might be determined by externalities 
among firms and by a growing risk aversion of banks during recession periods.  
Carling et al. (2007) use a different methodology and develop a duration model 
to explain the determinants of the survival time to default for a sample of about 
55,000 Swedish firms (period 1994-2000). 
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The model includes accounting information, loan-specific characteristics and 
macroeconomic variables. According to the authors, the general conditions of 
the macroeconomic environment have a significant explanatory power in the 
analysis of credit risk. Particularly, the output-gap (defined by the difference 
between actual and potential GDP), households’ expectations and the slope of 
the yield curve negatively influence credit risk. In terms of idiosyncratic 
elements, credit risk is positively influenced by the debt ratio and the level of 
inventories over total sales; on the contrary, there is a negative relationship 
between credit risk and profitability and credit risk and firms’ size (measured by 
total sales). 
The authors point out the importance to take into consideration also the survival 
time of loans because of the existence of duration dependence. In fact, firms’ 
credit risk increases over the survival of their loans. Particularly, “the time a 
borrower has managed to avoid default directly affects the risk of default” 
(Carling at al., page 15). This situation is explained by the fact that when firms 
obtain the required loans, they are characterized by a good degree of solidity 
because they had managed to pass the banks’ screening process. Successively, 
borrowers’ default risk might increase and this tendency is captured by the 
introduction of time dummies in the model.  
In order to explain exhaustively the causes of default rates, also Bonfim (2009) 
focuses on the necessity to jointly analyze accounting data at firm level and 
macroeconomic elements. Using a sample of 33,000 Portuguese firms (period 
1996-2002), Bonfim develops a probit model to estimate firms’ PD and duration 
models examining the time dimension of default risk.  
Firms with greater sales growth and investment rates and larger profitability, 
liquidity and a higher value of the solvency ratio, are also characterized by a 
lower credit risk in terms of both PD and time to default. Instead, size does not 
significantly explain the difference in the PD across firms. Among 
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macroeconomic elements, GDP and loan growth rates are the variables with the 
largest effect, negative, on credit risk.  
According to the author, credit risk is created during expansive periods while the 
high default rates observed during recession periods represent mainly the 
materialization of credit risk accumulated during upturns. Macroeconomic 
dynamics matters and influences firms’ credit risk.  
The analysis developed by Borio et al. (2001), Pederzoli and Torricelli (2005) 
and Jiménez and Saurina (2006) belong to the third category of contributions 
that focus on the relationship between default rates and macroeconomic 
elements. 
Borio et al. (2001) focuses on the procyclical behavior of the financial system 
that is caused by banks’ difficulties in the assessment of credit risk’s time 
dimension. Because of these difficulties, risk tends to be underestimated during 
expansion periods and, on the contrary, to be overestimated in recession phases. 
These errors tend to amplify economic fluctuations, causing instability in the 
system.  
According to the authors, banks have to establish their credit policies taking into 
consideration that risk tends to build up during expansion phases while, during 
recession periods, most defaults represent the materialization of the risk 
originated in the past expansion periods. These defaults do not imply, 
necessarily, an increase in the overall risk in the system.  
Hence, banks have to adopt longer time horizons in their risk assessment, while 
capital requirements should increase during upturns in order to cover losses that 
will materialize during successive downturns.  
Also Pederzoli and Torricelli (2005) focus on the procyclicality caused by the 
general methodology used by banks in order to compute patrimonial 
requirements. Particularly, they estimate a forward-looking model for time-
varying capital requirements. This model could reduce procyclicality and, at the 
same time, preserve risk-sensitivity of bank provisions proposed by the Basel 
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Accords. Thanks to the determination of capital requirements depending on the 
expected macroeconomic conditions, this model allows to overtake the trade-off 
between risk-sensitivity and procyclicality of provisions. According to this new 
approach, in fact, banks’ provisions increase during upturns (in anticipation of a 
recession phase) and reduce during downturns (in anticipation of an expansion 
phase). On the whole, provisions should be more stable during the business 
cycle.  
This model presupposes the estimation of PDs conditional on the expected 
macroeconomic conditions. For each rating class, particularly, the PD is 
estimated as the expected value of a default rate whose distribution is a weighted 
average of an expansion and a recession distribution and the weights are the 
probability of a future expansion phase and the probability of a future recession 
phase.  
The theoretical model is applied to US data for the period 1971-2002. In this 
application, the probability of a recession phase is a decreasing function of the 
term spread between the ten-year Treasury bond and the three-month treasury 
bill rate. 
Jiménez and Saurina (2006) take into consideration the credit risk profile of 
banks’ loan portfolios along the business cycle and, hence, the risk’s time 
dimension.  
For the period 1984-2002, the authors verify the hypothesis that during credit 
expansion (characterized by a loan growth rate larger than the average value), 
loans’ PDs tend to increase. Furthermore, they show that collaterals tend to 
decrease during expansion periods, when the GDP growth rate is greater than 
the average level. Therefore, during upturns, banks increase their loan 
portfolios’ risk by reducing the amount and the quality of required collaterals 
and by financing, with a greater willingness, riskier borrowers. The larger risks 
built up during upturns will materialize during recession periods, inducing a 
lower stability in the financial system.  
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Finally, Shumway (2001), Tudela and Young (2003), Moody’s (2004) and 
Couderc and Renault (2005) belong to the group of works that estimate firms’ 
credit risk on the basis of market information. 
According to Shumway (2001), traditional single-period models used to predict 
firms’ credit risk obtain biased and inconsistent estimates with respect to hazard 
models that are, instead, based on the whole time-series for each firm. In this 
context, Shumway proposes a hazard model for the estimation of bankruptcy 
probability that is able to capture the time changes in firms’ credit risk. This 
methodology is empirically applied to a sample of about 3,000 US firms taking 
into account the period 1962-2002. 
Shumway shows that, including in his hazard model the accounting variables 
used by Altman and Zmijewski, only the ratios EBIT/total assets, market 
equity/total assets and net income/total assets can significantly explain credit 
risk. On the contrary, the other variables taken into consideration are not 
statistically significant bankruptcy predictors.  
The author develops a new hazard model that examines the joint effect, on the 
bankruptcy probability, of accounting data and market variables. Particularly, 
credit risk is negatively influenced by firm’s market size and past stock returns. 
On the contrary, there is a positive relationship between bankruptcy probability 
and the idiosyncratic standard deviation of stock returns and between 
bankruptcy probability and firm’s liability. The inclusion in the model of market 
information considerably improves the accuracy of the estimated bankruptcy 
probabilities.  
Tudela and Young (2003) apply the Merton approach in order to quantify 
credit risk for a sample of about 7,500 English firms (period 1990-2001). 
Differently from the original Merton model, in the Tudela and Young model the 
event of default can take place at any time and not only at the maturity of the 
debt.  
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The predictive capacity, in terms of accuracy-ratio, seems to be larger with 
respect to the models based exclusively on accounting variables. So, in order to 
adequately assess credit risk, it is important to take into account also market 
information at firm level.  
The RiskCalc v3.1 model developed by Moody’s (2004) estimates a credit risk 
measure, the Expected Default Frequency, on the basis of market information 
(systematic elements), accounting data (idiosyncratic factors) and industry 
variables.  
This model is developed on the basis of a database concerning accounting data 
for about 1,500,000 firms and is based on financial ratios varying according to 
the country where firms operate. Furthermore, the model allows taking into 
consideration the non-linearities in the relationship between credit risk and 
financial ratios.  
By applying the Merton methodology, the model permits to obtain an 
assessment of credit risk based on market information also for not publicly 
traded firms for which market data are not available. This result is achieved by 
including in the model the distance to default for a sample of publicly trade 
firms operating in the same industry of the firm object of assessment. According 
to Moody’s, this indicator has a larger predictive capacity with respect to other 
macroeconomic variables such as interest rates, GNP or unemployment rate.  
Finally, Couderc and Renault (2005) point out that some of the shortcomings 
of the most analysis in the literature are the scarce importance given to the 
business cycle and the use of explanatory variables without lags. 
The authors estimate times-to-default of individual firms that belong to different 
rating classes on the basis of Standard & Poor’s ratings database including 
information concerning ratings of about 10,000 firms during the period 1981-
2003. Particularly, the paper examines common drivers of PD by using 
information about the business cycle and market data. The conclusion is that, in 
order to identify credit risk’s determinants, it is necessary to take into 
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consideration jointly market data and information about business cycle and 
credit market. Furthermore, in their analysis, not lagged explanatory variables 
have a limited predictive capacity.  
Couderc and Renault reach at the conclusion that economic trends and past 
shocks appear as the main drivers of the PD. 
2.3 The model 
2.3.1 The methodology 
After analyzing the main factors that, according to the literature, influence 
private firms’ PD in several economic and territorial contexts, in this paragraph I 
will examine the methodology employed to develop a probit panel model which 
aim is to identify the main determinants of the default risk for a representative 
sample of Italian private firms11.  
                                                 
11
 The analysis developed in this essay is based on level firm data extracted from the database 
AIDA (Analisi Informatizzata delle Aziende - Firms analysis computerized), that is provided by 
Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publisher. I wish particularly to thank Umberto De Marco for the 
sample provided. 
The sample is composed by 10,058 Italian firms (registering 639 default events) for which I 
examined balance sheets during the period 2002-2006 (on the whole, the number of observations 
is 36,303).  
The stratification method employed to extract the sample permits to examine a representative 
subset, in terms of industry and territorial distribution, of Italian firms. In more details, for every 
region, the share of firms extracted from the database AIDA is equal to the percentage actually 
observed in 2006 according to Unioncamere data. Furthermore, for every region, the number of 
firms extracted in each economic sector (according to the Classification Ateco 2002), has been 
established by taking into consideration the actual incidence of each industry in the number of 
firms in 2006.  
For every region and industry, the share of default firms is equal to 6%, which is, on average, the 
percentage of default firms included in the empirical contributions that I examined in paragraph 
2.2.  
After determining, the territorial and industry composition of the sample, I used a procedure that 
permits to consider the main representative firms in the different territorial contexts. First, for 
every region, inside each industry, I identified the median firm, in terms of total sales, whose 
balance sheet is included in the AIDA database. Second, the firms extracted have been selected 
in order to obtain an interval of observations that is centered on the median firm.   
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The model developed is a probit model applied to panel data with random 
effects. This type of models is commonly employed in the empirical literature 
under the hypothesis that errors are normally distributed.   
The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the firm “i” is in 
default at the time “t” and 0 otherwise.  
Particularly, a firm is in default if, alternatively, has been declared in failure, has 
been subject to bankruptcy agreement, is in receivership or if insolvency status 
has been declared12. 
The model is based on the latent variables methodology that assumes that the 
variable e ∈ (0,1) is function of a not observable variable – the latent variable 
– e∗  that depends, in a linear way, from k independent variables h, h, ⋯ , hc and an error term : 
 e∗ = Vi + Vh + Vh ⋯ + ⋯ Vchc +  = h& V +  [1] 
 
e = j 1 Hk e∗ > 00 mXℎoFpHYoq 
 
where: h&  = matrix of the k independent variables; β = vector of the k + 1 coefficients. 
 
Given the random structure of the model13, the error term  can be subdivided 
into two components according to the following formula: 
                                                 
12
 This definition is employed by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publisher.  
13
 It is not possible to consider fixed effects in probit panel models.  
As C → ∞, for ,fixed (that is the case analyzed in this chapter), the number of parameters µ 
increases with C; therefore, µ cannot be consistently estimated for T fixed (incidental 
parameters problem). The inconsistency of µD  is transmitted also to the maximum likelihood 
estimator of β.  
In the linear case this problem is overcame by eliminating µ (by the Within transformation). 
Instead, in our case, the transformation of the latent model to eliminate the fixed effects does not 
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  = µ +   [2]   where: µ~C~0,σ ~C(0,σ=) m(µ, ) = 0  µ denotes the unobserved period-specific random effect, while  represents 
the remainder error term14. 
                                                                                                                                   
make sense because there is not a direct relationship between ∗ − 2∗ and  − 2, where 2∗ 
and 2 are, respectively, the individual means of ∗  and . 
To overtake the incidental problem, the usual solution is to maximize the likelihood function 
conditioned to a sufficient statistic for µ.  
By denoting the density function of , ⋯ ,   as k(, ⋯ , |µ , V), a sufficient statistic X for µ is an observable variable such that: 
 k(, ⋯ , | X , µ , V) = k(, ⋯ , | X, V) 
 
where the second density function does not depend on µ. Consequently, to overcome the 
incidental parameter problem it is possible to maximize the conditional likelihood function k( , ⋯ , | X , V).  
For the logit specification, Chamberlain (1980) finds that 2 is a sufficient statistic for µ. 
Instead, for the probit specification, a sufficient statistic for µ does not exist (Baltagi, 2008); 
therefore, the probit panel model can be estimated only with a random effects specification. 
14
 Defining ρ as the proportion of the total variance of the error component µ +  due to the 
variance of the individual fixed effects µ, through the likelihood ratio test it is possible to verify 
the null hypothesis of not significance of individual random effects (ρ = 0) against the 
alternative hypothesis of individual heterogeneity (ρ > 0). 
 3i: ρ = 0 3: ρ > 0 
 
The likelihood ratio statistic is calculated on the basis of the following formula: 
  = 2( − )~χ(1) 
 
where: = value of the log-likelihood function in the unrestricted model (model with individual 
random effects); = value of the log-likelihood function in the restricted model (model under the null hypothesis 
of not significance of the individual random effects). 
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Hence, according to the latent variable approach we have: 
 Fm[e = 1] = Fm[e∗ > 0] = Fm[h& V +  > 0] = Fm[h& V +µ+ > 0] = Fm[ > −h& V − µ] = (h& V + µ) [3] 
 
where (h& V + µ) is the cumulative distribution function for . 
In the empirical analysis, the independent variables are lagged of one period 
because of the lags with which, generally, they influence the default event and to 
avoid endogeneity problems.  
2.3.2 The variables 
This analysis can be included into the second category of models with which the 
literature intends to explain credit risk’s determinants; in fact, this chapter 
simultaneously examines idiosyncratic factors at firm level and macroeconomic 
elements.  
The PD for a given firm depends on its specific accounting characteristics 
(idiosyncratic components) together with the general economic environment 
where it operates (systematic factors). A more dynamic economic context might 
be characterized from a larger presence of firms with a greater financial solidity 
(and, hence, with a lower riskiness). At the same time, a more dynamic 
economic environment might encourage expansive bank credit policies 
increasing the average risk profile of banks’ borrowers.  
In light of the above considerations, our model examines the relationship 
between the PDs of a representative sample of Italian firms, their main 
accounting indexes and a small group of macroeconomic variables expressed at 
a regional level. Following Shumway (2001) and other authors, also market 
information are significant factors in explaining firms’ credit risk. However, 
because of the limited size of the Italian market and the consequent availability 
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of market information only for a very restricted number of Italian firms, in this 
analysis it is not opportune to take into consideration market information. 
The independent variables included into the models are subdivided into two 
categories. The first one consists of idiosyncratic indicators drawn from firms’ 
balance sheets that change among firms and over time. The second class of 
independent variables comprises macroeconomic indicators changing among 
regions and over time: for every year of the period analyzed, the value of these 
variables does not change among firms operating in the same region but vary 
only among firms operating in different regions.  
In order to identify the firm-specific factors influencing the PD, I included, 
among the independent variables, the main accounting indicators traditionally 
considered in the literature.  
Hence, this analysis examines the effect on the PD of firms’ size, solidity, 
liquidity, profitability, sales growth rate and the ratio between bank debts and 
total sales. With particular reference to the last two indicators, the sales growth 
rate is a measure of firms’ short term performance and should negatively 
influence the risk of default. The relationship between PD and the ratio bank 
debts/total sales is more controversial. Larger bank debts should induce greater 
interest expenses and larger financial pressures, increasing the risk of default. 
On the other hand, we could empirically observe a negative relationship 
between this ratio and credit risk. The reason depends on banks’ behavior 
because they tend to grant larger loans to firms characterized by a greater 
solidity degree and, hence, a lower PD.  
As regards the other accounting indicators included in the analysis, the ratio 
between equity and total assets has been considered by the literature as a proxy 
of firms’ solidity. The risk of default should decrease if this ratio increases 
because a lower incidence of debts in total assets should induce less financial 
pressures. Moreover, the presence of a considerable amount of equity is a 
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crucial aspect because, in this case, firms are more likely able to get external 
finances and reduce the probability of default. 
Also liquidity should negatively influence, in the short run, firms’ credit risk. 
Particularly, the liquidity index taken into consideration in the empirical analysis 
is the ratio between current assets and current liabilities. An increase of this ratio 
should allow to firms to punctually manage their short-term obligations, 
reducing their PD. 
Profitability should negatively affect the risk of default; in fact, a larger 
profitability should be associated with greater cash flows allowing firms to 
manage their obligations with more facility. Additionally, greater earnings 
should increase the firms’ ability to obtain external finance. Finally, a greater 
profitability should allow to firms to set aside larger financial reserves 
increasing, by this way, their solidness. 
More in details, the profitability measures taken into consideration are the 
Return on Assets (ROA) and the Return on Equity (ROE). I consider ROA a 
better indicator to analyze the firm’s ability to generate wealthy because it is a 
metric of the normal profitability level. This index expresses the profitability of 
the operating activity and does not include the results of financial and extra 
ordinary activities. In order to avoid multicollinearity problems caused by the 
significant correlation between ROE and ROA (0.43 in the sample), only the 
ROA index is included in the econometric analysis. 
I employed two indicators for firms’ size: total sales and total assets. The current 
literature agrees with the presence of a significant and negative relationship 
between size and PD. However, there are several contributions stressing that 
larger firms have a greater risk of default (Benito et al., 2004) or retaining that 
the relationship between firms’ size and PD is not statistically significant 
(Bonfim, 2009).  
For the second category of regressors, reflecting macroeconomic dynamics on 
default risk, I included in the econometric analysis a set of variables (at a 
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regional level) able to summarize the general conditions of the economic and 
financial system: the real GDP growth rate, the real GDP per capita, the 
unemployment rate, the loan growth rate, the ratio between cooperative banks 
(branches) and total banks (branches) and the number of banks and branches per 
10,000 inhabitants.  
While the real macroeconomic variables (GDP and loan growth rates) have been 
traditionally taken into consideration to explain credit risk according to 
macroeconomic dynamics, information about the structural conditions of the 
banking system is generally ignored. By considering these variables, it is 
possible to verify if there exists a statistical relationship between the banking 
structure and the default event. Particularly, the analysis of the statistical 
significance of the number of banks and branches per 10,000 inhabitants and the 
incidence of cooperative banks and branches in the system allows to empirically 
evaluate if the spatial and social proximity between banks and firms influences 
firms’ risk of default.  
2.3.3 The empirical analysis 
The empirical analysis takes into consideration the period 2002-2006 focusing 
on 36,303 observations for 10,058 Italian firms registering 639 default events. 
Firm-specific accounting data are drawn from the database AIDA (Analisi 
Informatizzata delle Aziende - Firms analysis computerized) produced by 
Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. Data on GDP growth rate, GDP per 
capita, unemployment rate and population have been elaborated by the Italian 
National Statistical Office (ISTAT), while data concerning the banking system 
structure have been supplied by Bank of Italy.  
Table A2.1 shows the mean and median values of the main accounting indexes 
for the firms in default and for the remaining firms. 
On average, default firms seem to differ from other firms. Particularly, in terms 
of median values, default firms are slightly smaller with respect to non-default 
74 
 
firms both in terms of total sales and total assets. Moreover, coherently with the 
literature, default firms present a lower degree of profitability (both in terms of 
ROA and ROE) and liquidity, larger debts and a lower ratio between equity and 
total assets.  
Also the median sales growth rate is considerably different among these 
subsamples. Particularly, this indicator takes a positive value (+10.0%) for non 
default firms and is equal to zero for the other firms. 
The differences between default firms and non-default firms in terms of ratio 
between bank debts and total sales are less significant: for the first subsample 
the mean of this indicator is equal to 8.57 while it is equal to 9.26 for non 
default firms. 
In order to avoid possible biases caused by outlier values, in the econometric 
estimation, for every accounting index, I set those observations above the 99th 
percentile and below the 1st percentile at the value, respectively, of the 99th and 
1st percentile.  
On the basis of the methodology illustrated in paragraph 2.3.1, I elaborated a set 
of probit models with random effects in order to estimate the probability of firm 
being in default during the following year, based on accounting and 
macroeconomic data for the current year. Table A2.4 shows the results for the 
estimated models.  
Initially, the estimated models are based exclusively on firm-specific accounting 
data (model 1 – model 4); then, in order to analyze the determinants of firms’ 
PD taking simultaneously into consideration data at firm level and 
macroeconomic dynamics, also macroeconomic indicators have been included 
among the explanatory variables (model 5 – model 13).  
The models do not include regional and industrial dummies because, for every 
region and industry, the share of default firms is the same, i.e. it is equal to 6% 
(for further information see note 11). 
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To avoid multicollinearity problems caused by the correlation between the ratio 
equity/total assets and the liquidity index (as shown in table A2.2, the 
correlation coefficient between these two indicators amounts to 0.45), the effect 
of these variables on default risk is evaluated through different regression 
models.  
The explanatory variables in model 1 and model 2 are the amount and the 
growth rate of total sales, the ratio between bank debts and total sales and the 
ROA index. The first model includes, among regressors, also the ratio 
equity/total assets; the liquidity ratio is considered in model 2. Coherently with 
the literature, the degree of profitability and liquidity and the amount of equity 
affect negatively and significantly the risk of default; on the contrary, there is no 
significant relationship between size (expressed in terms of total sales) and PD. 
Moreover, according to these models, the sales growth rate does not influence 
credit risk, while there is a negative relationship between the ratio bank 
debts/total sales and PD at 10% level of significance. 
As indicated above, the literature agrees on the presence of a significant and 
negative statistical relationship between firms’ size and PD. However, other 
works consider a positive relationship between these two variables (Benito et al., 
2004) or a not significant relationship (Bonfim, 2009). In order to assess more 
accurately the dimensional effect, I take into consideration an alternative 
indicator of the firms’ size: the amount of total assets. 
Model 3 and model 4 examine the relationship between PD, total assets, sales 
growth rate, ratio between bank debts and total sales, ROA, ratio equity/total 
assets (model 3) and liquidity index (model 4). These models confirm the 
existence of a negative and significant relationship between PD, profitability, 
equity and liquidity. Furthermore, according to model 3, there is a positive 
statistical relationship between firms’ PD and size (measured by total assets) at 
10% level of significance. 
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Departing from model 3 (that is the best model, among these four specifications, 
in terms of pseudo-R2), I tried several other specifications including also 
macroeconomic variables. Because of the significant correlation between GDP 
per capita and unemployment rate, GDP per capita and number of branches per 
10.000 inhabitants and between the latter variable and the unemployment rate 
(see table A2.3), the effect of these pairs of variables on firms’ PD is estimated 
through separated regressions.  
All these specifications confirm the results achieved by the first four models. In 
other words, at idiosyncratic level, an increase in profitability or equity leads to 
a decline in PD.  
On the contrary, the relationship between size (expressed in terms of total 
assets) and default risk is significantly positive, in agreement with Benito’s 
conclusions. This finding denies the traditional opinion that smaller firms, 
because of their “structural weakness”, are riskier than larger firms. This result 
can be explained by two possible factors. A self selection approach could 
indicate how the sample’s coverage of small firms might be biased towards 
“good” companies (in order to explain the positive relationship between credit 
risk and size, Benito follows this reason). The second cause, of economic nature, 
might be the existence, for larger firms, of possible diseconomies of scale that 
reduce their creditworthiness.  
In order to identify the possible macroeconomic determinants of default risk, 
together with the accounting indicators included in model 3, model 5 and 6 
comprise also GDP and loan growth rates, GDP per capita (model 5) and 
unemployment rate (model 6). According to these models, GDP and loan growth 
rates influence significantly and negatively firms’ PD, while the structural 
characteristics of regional economies (expressed in terms of GDP per capita or 
unemployment rate) do not affect significantly the risk of default.  
Models 7 and 8 add to the variables included in model 5, respectively, the share 
of cooperative banks in the system and the number of banks per 10,000 
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inhabitants. These two models confirm the results achieved by model 5 and 
show that there does not exist a significant relationship between the two 
variables concerning the structure of the banking system and firms’ PD. In other 
words, in the Italian context a higher spatial and social closeness between banks 
and firms does not lead to better performances of the entrepreneurial system 
measured via default events.  
These conclusions remain valid even if the share of cooperative banks is 
replaced using the share of cooperative branches (model 9). 
Models 10, 11 and 12 include the same regressors of models 7, 8 and 9 with the 
exception of GDP per capita that is replaced by the unemployment rate. These 
models generally confirm the results illustrated above; however, according to 
model 11 there exists a positive relationship (at 10% level of significance) 
between number of banks per 10,000 inhabitants and risk of default.  
Finally, model 13 includes among the macroeconomic regressors, GDP and 
loans growth rates and the number of branches per 10,000 inhabitants. The 
positive relationship between the latter variable and PD is coherent with model 
11. 
The lack of a negative impact, on firms’ PD, of the social closeness between 
banks and firms, expressed in terms of incidence, in the banking system, of 
cooperative banks and branches, might be due to the low amounts of loans 
granted by these financial institutions.  
In other words, although at a microeconomic level, cooperative banks can play 
an important role in supporting firms that experience financial difficulties (in 
fact, they traditionally tend to be more sensitive to local firms’ problems), at an 
aggregate level the limited share of loans granted by these banks might lead to 
the lack of a negative statistical relationship between their number and the risk 
of default. 
Totally, these estimates indicate that, in the Italian system, the crucial 
determinants of credit risk are idiosyncratic factors at firm level: particularly, 
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firms’ financial structure, liquidity and profitability. Macroeconomics elements 
at a regional level can be useful in explaining the differences in the riskiness of 
firms operating in different regions but their inclusion does not improve 
considerably the models’ goodness of fit in terms of pseudo-R2 (see table A2.4). 
Banks should hence carefully determine lending rates via a correct and deep 
analysis of borrowers’ structural characteristics. 
2.4 The impact of credit risk in bank interest rates and the 
calculation of the Spread Risk Adjusted 
The Basel Accords determine quantitatively the relationship between PD and 
regulatory capital provisions that banks have to set aside in order to face the 
credit risk of their loan portfolios. This relationship is on the basis of the pricing 
models currently employed by banks in order to determine the borrowing 
conditions to apply to their customers. 
Banks have to calculate lending rates that are able to remunerate, together with 
the funding cost and operating costs, also a set of risks that are linked both to 
borrowers’ riskiness and to the overall banking activity. 
Particularly, the main risks of credit intermediation can be subdivided into the 
following classes: 
• operational risk; 
• credit risk; 
• liquidity risk; 
• market risk.  
Operational risk is the typical risk of whatever firm and it is related to the 
variability of expected profit. It is defined by the Basel II Accord (§644) as “the 
risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and 
systems or from external events. This definition includes legal risk, but excludes 
strategic and reputational risk”. For smaller banks, for example, a classical 
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operational risk is the possibility to suffer diseconomies of scale linked to the 
small size.   
As regards the second category, credit risk is the possibility that borrowers are 
not able or willing to accomplish, at the maturity, to their obligations and, hence, 
do not pay the granted debt (principal and/or interests).  
This type of risk was crucial in Basel II and continues to play a central role also 
in the new proposal to strengthen the resilience of the banking sector (Basel III). 
In this context, this paragraph focuses on credit risk and aims to examine the 
relationship between firms’ PD and lending rate. Particularly, the share of the 
final bank interest rate that remunerates exclusively the loan’s credit risk is the 
Spread Risk Adjusted (SRA). This indicator is function of the borrower’s PD, 
the Loss Given Default (LGD), the Exposure at Default (EAD) at the loan’s 
Maturity (M). These values are internally estimated by banks if they adopt the 
Advanced Internal Rating Based Approach. For those banks adopting the 
Foundation Internal Rating Based Approach, the only indicator estimated 
through internal models is the PD; the other parameters assume, instead, values 
defined by the Basel II Accord.  
The current debate focuses with a particular emphasis on the third category of 
risk. Generally, liquidity risk is linked to the probability that financial entries 
and disbursements are not temporally correlated compromising, by this way, a 
firm’s profitability or reputation. For banks a careful management of liquidity 
risk represents a very crucial element because a substantial share of their assets 
(represented by loans) is not negotiable into secondary markets and a 
considerable share of their liabilities is represented by short-term debts.  
This situation actually occurred, at a global level, during the last two years when 
the economic crisis and the uncertainty about the correct functioning of the 
financial system locked the interbank market. 
80 
 
After that the financial crisis had showed the considerable intensity of liquidity 
risk and its effects on the overall financial system’s stability, supervisors have 
significantly increased their commitment to face this kind of risk.  
Particularly, the Basel Committee is introducing a global minimum liquidity 
standard for internationally active banks that includes a 30-days liquidity 
coverage ratio requirement underpinned by a longer-term structural liquidity 
ratio. 
Finally, market risk is defined by the Basel II Accord (§683) as “the risk of 
losses in on and off-balance-sheet positions arising from movements in market 
prices”.  
In order to determine the final pricing applied to loans, banks have to add to the 
funding cost a spread to cover operating costs, the SRA and, finally, have to 
downgrade or upgrade the pricing on the basis of the specific borrower’s 
assignment (also of business type). Although the SRA is a crucial metric to 
calculate lending rates (it allows to adjust the pricing to the credit risk) it is not 
binding because the determination of the final pricing remains a business choice. 
In fact, in the determination of the final lending rate, it is possible to “depart 
from” the SRA by recuperating profitability margins through an increase of “not 
lending” earnings and, hence, through those earnings’ components that are not 
linked to credit risk. A parallel way to recuperate profitability margins is the 
request of further collaterals (banks can reduce the expected loss and capital 
provisions via loss given default), but at the extreme this procedure denies the 
logic of a correct pricing determination of risk. 
This section, following Zazzara and Cortese (2004), presents a model to 
calculate the SRA and demonstrates a negative relationship, under the same 
SRA, between PD and LGD. Furthermore, I simulate the calculation of capital 
requirements established by Basel II and show that, under the same conditions, 
capital requirements are larger for loans granted to greater firms. 
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The underlying logic of the SRA determination process is of statistical-actuarial 
nature, based on the link between borrower’s risk (measured by PD), loans’ 
collaterals (expressed in terms of LGD) and credit risk’s remuneration. 
Particularly, the SRA can be considered as the theoretical price for an insurance 
against the borrower’s default risk, that is the probability of default.  
The SRA is computed by adding the expected loss remuneration and the 
unexpected loss remuneration: 
 SRA = expected loss remuneration + unexpected loss remuneration [4] 
 
The expected loss (EL) is calculated by multiplying borrower’s PD, LGD and 
EAD and, because it is expected, it has to be covered by an account-specific 
provision.  
 Expected loss (EL) = PD × LGD × EAD [5] 
 
The unexpected loss (UL) represents an uncertain event, covered by the bank’s 
equity and can be reduced through adequate diversification policies. 
Particularly, the UL is the difference between the possible maximum loss for a 
given time horizon and confidence level (Value at Risk) and the EL. The UL can 
be considered as a systematic component of risk, estimable through a portfolio 
model. Nevertheless, according to several authors15, the portfolio models 
employed by the main investment banks and by the main international 
consulting companies (the Creditmetrics model of JP Morgan, the CreditRisk+ 
model of Credit Suisse First Boston, the Credit Portfolio View model of 
McKinsey and the Portfolio Manager model of KMV) are not sufficiently 
adequate to estimate the UL linked to illiquid assets (such as credit loans) 
                                                 
15
 See Zazzara and Cortese (2004). 
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because these models are mainly based on market data. Taking into 
consideration these limits, the Basel Committee developed the functions to 
calculate the level of capital requirements that banks have to set aside in face of 
a given exposure and that can be considered as an estimate of the UL. In this 
work, I employ the general functions indicated by the Basel Committee. 
According to these formulas, the UL is function of PD, LGD, Maturity and total 
annual sales. 
  = IoW oXo¡ mYY =k[¢(+), £¢(+), ¤(+), ,mXE¥ EIIE¥ YE¥oY(−)]  = ¦KY × 0.08 [6] 
 
where RWAs indicates banks’ risk weighted assets. 
The formulas to compute capital requirements are distinguished according to 
borrower’s total sales level. Particularly, firms are subdivided into three 
segments: Corporate (if the firm’s total sales are greater than 50 millions of 
euros), Small Medium Enterprise (if the firm’s total sales are not greater than 50 
millions of euros and the firm does not belong to the Retail class) and Retail 
(firms whose loans are managed as detail credits and for which the total 
exposure of the banking group is less than 1 million of euros). Under the same 
conditions, on the basis of these functions, capital requirements are larger for 
Corporate segment and decrease for SME and Retail exposures. This 
relationship derives from the hypothesis that, among the different segments, the 
average correlation between loans is lower for smaller firms because these firms 
are less sensitive to the business cycle. Hence, the assumption is that the 
systematic component of risk, not diversifiable, decreases if also borrowers’ size 
reduces. Consequently, under the same conditions, banks must set aside larger 
provisions for loans granted to Corporate firms because of the greater riskiness 
linked to the larger correlation among loans into this segment.  
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This assumption is incorporated into the functions for the calculation of capital 
requirements by supposing an inverse relationship between correlation and PD 
(hypothesizing that smaller firms, because of their structural weakness, have a 
larger PD with respect to larger firms).   
In the following box, the functions for the computation of capital requirements 
developed by the Basel Committee are shown in detail. 
It is worth to note that the Basel Committee’s proposals to strengthen the global 
capital regulation do not change the methodology to calculate RWAs; moreover, 
the ratio between regulatory capital and RWAs remains equal to 8%16. What 
Basel III will change are the criteria – more rigid - that capital instruments have 
meet to be included into the regulatory capital.  
 
Box 2.1. Formulas for the computation of banks’ capital requirements. 
CORPORATE SEGMENT 
 = ]£¢ × C ](1 − )i.© × £(¢) + ª 1 − «i.© × £(0.999)^ − ¢ × £¢^× (1 − 1.5 × ) × (1 + (¤ − 2.5) × ) 
 
 = 0.12 × ~1 − h(−50 × ¢)~1 − h(−50) + 0.24 × ]1 − ~1 − h(−50 × ¢)~1 − h(−50) ^ 
  = ~0.11852 − 0.05478 × C(¢) 
 ¦KY  =  × 12.5 × K¢ 
 
 
                                                 
16
 The only exception is the calculation of capital requirements for exposures to financial 
intermediaries that are regulated banks, broker/dealers and insurance companies with assets of at 
least $25 billion, and for exposures to other (unregulated) financial intermediaries, including 
highly leveraged entities that generate the majority of their revenues from financial activities, 
such as hedge funds and financial guarantors. For this kind of exposures, the Basel Committee is 
proposing to apply a multiplicative factor of 1.25 to the formula used to compute the correlation. 
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SME SEGMENT 
 = ]£¢ × C ](1 − )i.© × £(¢) + ª 1 − «i.© × £(0.999)^ − ¢ × £¢^× (1 − 1.5 × ) × (1 + (¤ − 2.5) × ) 
 
 = 0.12 × ~1 − h(−50 × ¢)~1 − h(−50) + 0.24 × ]1 − ~1 − h(−50 × ¢)~1 − h(−50) ^ − 0.04
× ¯1 − (° − 5)45 ± 
  = ~0.11852 − 0.05478 × C(¢) 
 ¦KY  =  × 12.5 × K¢ 
 
RETAIL SEGMENT17 
 = £¢ × C ](1 − )i.© × £(¢) + ª 1 − «i.© × £(0.999)^ − ¢ × £¢ 
 = 0.03 × ~1 − h(−35 × ¢)~1 − h(−35) + 0.16× ´1 − ~1 − h(−35 × ¢)/~1 − h(−35)¶ 
  = ~0.11852 − 0.05478 × C(¢) 
 ¦KY  =  × 12.5 × K¢ 
where: 
K = capital requirement; 
R = average correlation among loans into the segment taken into consideration; 
b = maturity adjustment; 
                                                 
17
 The formulas shown for the calculation of capital requirements and correlation concerning the 
exposures to the Retail segment refer to loans that are not secured by residential mortgages and 
that do not represent qualifying revolving retail exposures. For these classes of loans, the Basel 
II Accord (§§328-329) indicates specific formulas in order to determine capital requirements, 
whereas correlations take predefined values. 
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S = total annual sales (total annual sales smaller than 5 millions of euros are considered 
equivalent to 5 millions of euros in order to calculate capital requirements); 
N and G denote, respectively, the cumulative distribution function and the inverse 
cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable; 
RWAs = risk weighted assets. 
Source: Basel II Accord (§§271-274; 324-330). 
 
Following Zazzara and Cortese (2004), taking into consideration an horizon 
time of 1 year, in order to compute the cost of EL concerning a given loan, it is 
possible to adopt the risk-neutrality approach by assuming that a bank is 
indifferent between to invest in a risk-free security (with a yield equal to Fk) or 
to grant, at a rate equal to H, a guaranteed loan (with a Loss Given Default equal 
to £¢) to a borrower with a probability of default equal to ¢. According to 
this approach, we obtain the following formula: 
 (1 + Fk) = (1 + H) × (1 − ¢) + (1 − £¢) × ¢ [7] 
 
where H indicates the remuneration of the EL linked to a given exposure. 
Generalizing for n years, formula [7] becomes: 
 (1 + Fk·)· = (1 + H·)· × (1 − ¢·) + (1 − £¢·) × ¢· [8] 
 
and by solving for H· we obtain: 
 
H· =  = ¸((_¹º)º(»¼½º)×¾½º)(¾½º) ¿ ·À − 1 [9] 
 
where: Fk· = n years-risk-free rate; H·() = n years rate adjusted for risk. This rate expresses the remuneration of 
the expected loss; 
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¢· = n years probability of default; £¢· = n years loss given default. 
 
In order to obtain the spread risk-adjusted that remunerates the expected loss 
(ELS), we have to subtract the risk-free rate from equation [9]: 
 
° =  −  Fk· = ¸((_¹º)º(»¼½º)×¾½º)(¾½º) ¿ ·À − Fk· − 1 [10] 
 
By taking into consideration a general horizon time of n years, the remuneration 
of the UL (that is the second component of the SRA) is calculated on the basis 
of the following formula: 
  = ÁÁ· × (Â2· − ·) [11] 
 
where: 
ULR = remuneration of the UL; ÁÁ· = cost of the economic capital, that is the weighted average of the costs 
sustained to supply the capital that banks have to set aside in face of the 
exposure; Â2· = capital requirement of Basel II; · = expected loss. 
 
By assuming that the economic capital is composed by risk capital and 
subordinated liabilities with percentages, respectively, equal to α and β (with  + β = 1) and that these components are remunerated at rates equal, 
respectively, to the expected ROE and H1Ä, the remuneration of the UL can be 
expressed through the following formula: 
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 = (Â2· − ·) × ~ × ÅÆÇÆÈÆÉ + V × H1Ä [12] 
 
The UL spread remuneration (ULS) is then computed by subtracting the risk-
free rate from formula [12]: 
 ° =  − Fk· = (Â2· − ·) × ~ × (ÅÆÇÆÈÆÉ − Fk·) + V × (H1Ä −Fk·)) [13] 
 
Finally, adding the EL spread to the UL spread, we obtain the total value of the 
SRA: 
 °K =
¸((_¹º)º(»¼½º)×¾½º)(¾½º) ¿ ·À − Fk· − 1 + (Â2· − ·) × ~ × (ÅÆÇÆÈÆÉ −Fk·) + V × (H1Ä − Fk·)) [14] 
 
According to these results, the lending rate applied to a given exposure is 
positively influenced by borrower’s riskiness (expressed in terms of the 
borrower’s PD) and loan’s riskiness (measured by LGD that is influenced by the 
amount and solidity of collaterals). 
Figure 2.1 shows capital requirements distinguished according to the borrower’s 
class. This graph has been elaborated according to the functions defined by the 
Basel Committee and taking into consideration benchmarking values for LGD, 
Maturity and EAD equal, respectively, to 45%, 5 years and 100%. Furthermore, 
for the SME segment, total annual sales are set to 10 millions of euros.  
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Figure 2.1. Basel II capital requirements. 
 
 Source: personal elaborations. 
 
These simulations underline that, under the same PD and LGD, loans granted to 
smaller firms (in terms of total annual sales) determine lower capital 
requirements. Consequently, under the same conditions, banks should charge 
lower lending rates to loans granted to smaller firms. Nevertheless, generally, 
the structural weakness of small and medium firms and their limited ability to 
provide collaterals Basel II compliant (that are reflected in larger values for the 
PD and the LGD) may cause the application of larger SRAs with respect to 
those charged to Corporate firms.  
Into the same class of SRA, there is an inverse relationship between PD and 
LGD. With particular reference to SME segment, figure 2.2 shows the possible 
combinations PD/LGD that allow falling within the same SRA interval. This 
graph has been elaborated by assuming that the bank’s economic capital is 
composed by basic equity (Tier 1) and by supplementary capital (Tier 2) with 
percentages equal, respectively, to 75% and 25% and that these shares are 
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remunerated, respectively, at the expected ROE and at the rate upon 
subordinated liabilities. Furthermore, the amount of total annual sales taken into 
consideration is set to 10 millions of euros.  
According to the inverse relationship between PD and LGD, if PD increases, 
firms have to provide further collaterals to reduce LGD in order to fall within 
the same SRA interval. Moreover, curves farther from the origin are associated 
with larger SRAs because, under the same PD, an increase of LGD leads to an 
increase of total credit risk and, therefore, banks should be willing to grant loans 
only charging worse borrowing conditions. We can consider these curves as 
“indifferent” combinations between PD and LGD given a fixed level of SRA. 
 
Figure 2.2. PD/LGD/SRA relationship - SME segment. 
 
Source: personal elaborations. 
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2.5 Simulating SRAs for Italian regions 
In this section, the pricing model illustrated in paragraph 2.4 is employed to 
simulate the SRAs applicable to a sample of Italian firms subdivided into 20 
regional subsamples. 
These simulations represent the borrowing conditions that banks should apply to 
their customers, at a regional level, on the basis of objective elements such as 
the borrowers’ PD and loans’ LGD. 
First, for each firm into the sample, the PD has been estimated taking into 
account, simultaneously, idiosyncratic factors at firm level and systematic 
(macroeconomic) elements at regional level.  
Among the models that include both idiosyncratic and systematic regressors, I 
had chosen to employ model 11 given the higher pseudo-R2 and the greater 
number of significant independent variables (see Table A2.4).   
The mean and median values of the PDs of the non-defaulting firms in the 
sample are reported in table A2.5. 
Southern firms are characterized by a credit risk similar to firms operating in 
Central Italy, while the territorial area with the greatest average aggregate PD is 
North-West Italy. These results are contrasting with the common opinion that 
Southern firms are riskier than Northern and Central firms because of their 
structural weakness. Presumably, they could be caused by the slenderness of the 
sample (comprising 10,058 firms) with respect to the entire population (in 2006 
Italian firms amounted to 6,125,514) but they remain very significant.  
The estimated PDs represent the first input in order to determine the pricing. 
The procedure that I use to compute SRA for each observation allows getting 
results perfectly comparable inside the sample; in other words, the calculated 
SRAs reflect, exclusively, the differences among firms in terms of PD and, for 
the SME segment, total annual sales. Therefore, for two firms characterized by 
the same values of total annual sales and PD, the methodology employed leads 
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to the same value for the SRA, nevertheless the region where the two firms 
operate.  
In order to calculate banks’ capital requirements, I applied the functions defined 
by Basel II (see Box 2.1). These formulas remain valid also according to the 
current Basel Committee’s proposals to determine banks’ regulatory capital. 
Particularly, for 35,658 observations (that do not include default events), I 
employ the formula defined for the SME segment, while for the remaining 6 
observations (regarding firms with total annual sales larger than 50 millions of 
euros), I use the formula concerning the Corporate segment. Following a general 
practice in the literature, I hypothesize that banks’ economic capital is composed 
by risk capital (Tier 1) and subordinated liabilities (Tier 2) with percentages 
respectively equal to 75% and 25%. According to the Basel Committee’s new 
proposal, from 2015 these values will actually become compulsory. 
For each firm, the SRA is computed by assuming: 
• a PD estimated through model 11; 
• with reference to the SME segment, as established by the Basel II Accord, 
an amount of total annual sales equal to the actual value if sales are larger 
than 5 millions of euros or, alternatively, equal to 5 millions of euros; 
• an LGD equal to 45% for each exposure. This value represents the 
percentage that, according to the Basel II Accord (paragraph 287), under 
the IRB Foundation, has to be applied to senior claims on corporate, 
sovereigns and banks not secured by recognized collaterals; 
• a value of maturity equal to 1 year; 
• a risk-free rate equal to EURIRS rate 1 year; 
• a subordinated claims interest rate (that is the rate that remunerates Tier 2 
capital) equal to EURIRS rate 10 years plus a spread of 0,20%; 
• an expected ROE (that is the rate that remunerates Tier 1 capital) equal to 
the subordinate claims interest rate multiplied by 1.5 (I had also 
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considered a multiplying factor equal to 2, but the results differ, on 
average, only of about 0.06 percentage points).  
After calculating the SRA value for each observation, I estimated 20 regional 
SRAs by computing, for every region, the arithmetic mean of the SRAs 
calculated for each firm operating in the region taken into consideration. The 
results are shown in table A2.5 (not weighted SRA). 
The differences, among regions, in terms of SRA, reflect the different aggregate 
riskiness expressed by the regional average of the PDs.  
For Southern regions, the average value of SRA is similar to the one observed in 
Central Italy, while the geographical area characterized by the highest average 
SRA is North-West Italy. 
By calculating 20 regional SRAs through the arithmetic mean of the SRAs 
applicable to the firms operating in each region, it is not possible to take into 
consideration that firms are not equally important in terms of the implications of 
their potential default. So, I calculated also two synthetic indicators of regional 
SRA that reflect the amount of total debts and the amount of bank debts for each 
firm.  
The first indicator, SRA1r, is defined, for the region r, as the weighted average of 
the SRAs applicable to the Fr firms operating in the region r, where the weights 
are the amounts of total debts of each firm. 
 °K = ∑ ~°K¹ × ,mXE¥ ¡oXY¹/,mXE¥ ¡oXYÊ¹  [15] F = 1 ⋯ 20 
 
where:  =  number of observations in region r; k =  observation f in region r, with k = 1 ⋯ F; °K¹ =  SRA applicable to observation f in region r; 
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,mXE¥ ¡oXY¹ =  total debts of observation f in region r; ,mXE¥ ¡oXY =   total debts of firms operating in region r. 
 
Analogously, for each region, the second indicator, SRA2r, is the weighted 
average of the SRAs applicable to every firm in the region, where the weights 
are the amount of bank debts of each firm. 
 °K = ∑ ~°K¹ × ÂEIË ¡oXY¹/ÂEIË ¡oXYÊ¹  [16] F = 1 ⋯ 20 
 
where:  =  number of observations in region r; k =  observation f in region r, with k = 1 ⋯ F; °K¹ =  SRA applicable to observation f in region r; ÂEIË ¡oXY¹ =  bank debts of observation f in region r; ÂEIË ¡oXY =   total bank debts of firms operating in region r. 
 
The results, shown in table A2.5, confirm the conclusion above illustrated: in 
Southern regions the indicators SRA1r and SRA2r take values similar to those 
observed in Central regions and lower than those observed in North areas. 
These simulations imply that, on the basis of the sample analyzed and under the 
hypothesis illustrated, banks should not apply larger lending rates to the firms 
operating in Southern regions.  
Nevertheless, in order to calculate the actual SRA applicable to each firm, it is 
necessary to know the actual value of the LGD that depends on the type of 
collaterals provided. This information is not available into the dataset used in the 
analysis. 
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A first potential proxy of the LGD at a regional level could be the ratio 
losses/total debts in the bankruptcy procedures. Table A2.6 shows that in North-
West and North-East Italy the losses occurred in bankruptcies are generally 
smaller than those observed in the other areas. On the other hand, by substituting 
the regional values of the ratio losses/total debts to the regional LGDs, the 
resulting SRAs in the Mezzogiorno are less than the ones simulated for Northern 
regions. This result remains valid nevertheless the arithmetic or the weighted 
averages of the SRAs applicable to the regional customers are taken into 
account (table A2.7).  
However, it is necessary to note that in the Mezzogiorno the bankruptcy 
procedures’ average length is considerable larger with respect to Northern 
regions. Particularly, during the period 2002-2006, in North-West Italy, North-
East Italy, Southern Italy and in the Islands, the bankruptcies lasted, on average, 
2,572, 2,947, 3,072 and 3,486 days. 
This element is important because the larger bankruptcies’ length reduces the 
expected recovery rate and, on the contrary, increases the expected LGD. 
Consequently, to estimate a proxy for LGD, it seems opportune to combine 
information about bankruptcies’ losses and average length. To this end, for each 
year of the period 2002-2006, I normalized the bankruptcies’ length in the 
interval 0-1 by calculating an index number with base equal to the maximum 
length observed in Italian regions. Afterwards, I calculated a second proxy of 
the LGD at a regional level by computing the mean of this index number and the 
ratio losses/total debts for each region (the underlying hypothesis is that for 
creditors the amounts that they can recover in bankruptcies procedures and the 
time length of these procedure have the same importance).  
By considering this second regional LGD proxy, the resulting SRAs are more 
homogenous among areas (table A2.8).  
As previously discussed, although the SRA is a crucial indicator to compute 
lending rates, it is not constraining for banks. In order to determine the final 
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pricing, banks have to take into consideration also other elements such as 
operating and funding costs. Finally, the determination of the final lending rate 
remains a “business choice” because banks can “depart from” the SRA by 
recuperating profitability margins through the increase of “not lending” 
earnings, not linked to the credit risk.  
The results obtained in this analysis allow to conclude that the main cause of the 
larger lending rates observed, empirically, in Italian Southern regions, cannot be 
identified in the greater credit risk of the borrowers operating in these areas 
implied by their structural characteristics. Interregional interest rate spreads in 
Italy seem related to other factors such as business and institutional 
considerations.  
2.6 Conclusions 
The identification of credit risk’s determinants continues to be an important 
topic also in the current revision framework of the Basel II Accord. The Basel 
Committee’s new proposals attribute greater relevance to the credit risk 
management process, promoting the strengthening of banks’ ability to assess 
borrowers’ creditworthiness.  
In this framework, this work can be included into the second category of 
contributions with which the literature intends to explain credit risk’s 
determinants by analyzing simultaneously idiosyncratic factors at firm level and 
macroeconomic elements. Particularly, the empirical analysis, based on the 
Italian economic system, took into consideration the period 2002-2006 and the 
sample examined is composed by 36,303 observations for 10,058 Italian firms.  
The factors that are potentially able to explain differences in borrowers’ 
riskiness include both accounting and macroeconomic elements together with 
variables related to the banking system’s structure. On the contrary, the analysis 
did not take into consideration market information because of the limited size of 
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the Italian market and the consequent availability of this type of information 
only for a very restricted number of firms. 
The results suggest that firms’ credit risk is negatively influenced by firms’ 
profitability, degree of liquidity and level of equity on total liabilities.  
The relationship between size and default risk is positive. This finding is 
contrasting with the common opinion that smaller firms are characterized by a 
larger credit risk because of their structural weakness, but at the same time 
dimension is not a proxy variable for firm’s profitability and solvency. 
Firms’ probability of default is negatively influenced by GDP and loan growth 
rate, while the structural characteristics of regional economies (expressed in 
terms of GDP per capita or unemployment rate) do not affect significantly the 
risk of default. As regards the structure of the banking system, the degree of 
territorial diffusion of branches and banks seems to positively influence firms’ 
PD, while the incidence of cooperative banks and branches does not affect 
firms’ default risk. Hence, in the analyzed context, the spatial and social 
closeness between banks and firms does not reduce the number of default 
events.  
The estimated models indicate that systematic variables can be useful in order to 
explain the regional differences in the risk of default, but their inclusion does 
not significantly improve models’ goodness of fit. Hence, banks should establish 
their credit policies and lending rates on the basis of borrowers’ structural 
characteristics such as firms’ financial structure, liquidity and profitability.  
Moreover, this work points out that in order to establish a credit policy that 
maximizes the value creation, an adequate bank pricing system represents a 
crucial aspect together with the actual comprehension of credit risk’s 
determinants.  
The analyzed sample shows that another important element is represented by the 
fact that the SRAs applicable to Southern firms should be not greater than those 
chargeable to North-Western firms because, according to the sample analyzed, 
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the firms operating in Southern Italy and in the Islands are characterized by a 
lower average probability of default. So, the higher lending rates actually 
observed in Southern regions do not seem to reflect the different borrowers’ 
credit risk.  
These results should be certainly corrected in order to take into consideration 
possible differences, among regions, such as the ability to provide recognized 
collaterals or the degree of efficiency of the bureaucratic apparatus. 
However, these results indicate that, in Italy, the application of higher lending 
rates in Southern regions is not caused by the actual structural borrowers’ 
characteristics but it could be due to the different economic and territorial 
environment where firms operate and by other exogenous factors. 
Therefore, in this framework, it is opportune to verify the hypothesis of a 
territorial discrimination of lending rates potentially based on exogenous and 
institutional factors. 
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Appendix 2.1: Tables 
Table A2.1. Accounting indicators for default and non-default firms. 
  Mean Median 
Total sample  
Sales 1,074 984 
Sales growth 0.136 0.100 
Total assets 1,326 821 
Total debts 933 595 
Equity/total assets 0.086 0.073 
Total bank debts/sales 9.248 0.000 
Liquidity ratio 0.974 0.820 
ROA 4.768 4.130 
ROE 7.935 5.340 
Non default firms  
Sales 1,075 987 
Sales growth 0.136 0.100 
Total assets 1,325 822 
Total debts 928 593 
Equity/total assets 0.087 0.073 
Total bank debts/sales 9.259 0.000 
Liquidity ratio 0.979 0.820 
ROA 4.924 4.170 
ROE 8.014 5.360 
Default firms  
Sales 1,016 835 
Sales growth 0.093 0.000 
Total assets 1,399 741 
Total debts 1,254 705 
Equity/total assets 0.011 0.032 
Total bank debts/sales 8.572 0.000 
Liquidity ratio 0.688 0.550 
ROA -3.958 1.440 
ROE 1.273 3.340 
Source: elaborations on AIDA data.  
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Table A2.2. Correlation matrix of the accounting indicators included in probit models. 
  
Sales Total  
assets 
Sales  
growth 
Bank debts/ 
Sales 
Equity/ 
Total assets 
Liquidity 
 ratio ROA ROE 
Sales 1.00 0.28 0.04 0.08 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.00 
Total assets 0.28 1.00 0.00 0.13 0.13 -0.01 -0.14 -0.09 
Sales growth 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.05 0.09 
Bank debts/Sales 0.08 0.13 0.00 1.00 -0.05 -0.12 -0.06 -0.07 
Equity/Total assets 0.02 0.13 -0.04 -0.05 1.00 0.45 0.33 0.07 
Liquidity ratio -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.12 0.45 1.00 0.22 0.09 
ROA 0.02 -0.14 0.05 -0.06 0.33 0.22 1.00 0.43 
ROE 0.00 -0.09 0.09 -0.07 0.07 0.09 0.43 1.00 
Source: elaborations on AIDA data. 
 
 
Table A2.3. Correlation matrix of the macroeconomic variables included in probit models. 
  
GDP 
growth 
GDP per 
capita 
Unemployment 
rate 
Loan 
growth 
Cooperative 
banks/ 
Total banks 
Cooperative 
branches/ 
Total branches 
Banks per 10,000 
inhabitants 
Branches per 10,000 
inhabitants 
GDP growth 1.00 0.21 -0.17 0.06 -0.06 0.12 0.07 0.15 
GDP per capita 0.21 1.00 -0.89 -0.29 -0.61 0.37 0.36 0.84 
Unemployment rate -0.17 -0.89 1.00 0.12 0.51 -0.33 -0.35 -0.90 
Loan growth 0.06 -0.29 0.12 1.00 0.33 0.13 0.05 -0.12 
Cooperative banks/ 
Total banks -0.06 -0.61 0.51 0.33 1.00 0.35 0.11 -0.33 
Cooperative branches/ 
Total branches 0.12 0.37 -0.33 0.13 0.35 1.00 0.51 0.52 
Banks per 10,000 
inhabitants 0.07 0.36 -0.35 0.05 0.11 0.51 1.00 0.52 
Branches per 10,000 
inhabitants 0.15 0.84 -0.90 -0.12 -0.33 0.52 0.52 1.00 
Source: elaborations on AIDA, Bank of Italy and ISTAT data. 
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Table A2.4. Probit regressions (dependent variable: default). 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
Sales -0.0001 1.13E-07                       
  (-1.41) (0.00)                       
Sales growth rate 0.0033 -0.0072 -0.0153 -0.0065 0.0027 -0.00003 -0.0002 -8.76E-06 -0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0033 -0.0008 -0.0008 
  (0.05) (-0.10) (-0.26) (-0.10) (0.04) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.02) (-0.05) (-0.01) (-0.01) 
Bank debts/Sales -0.0071* -0.0077* -0.0055 -0.0063 -0.0045 -0.0046 -0.0046 -0.0046 -0.0046 -0.0046 -0.0050 -0.0051 -0.0051 
  (-1.74) (-1.89) (-1.63) (-1.63) (-1.08) (-1.10) (-1.10) (-1.10) (-1.10) (-1.10) (-1.17) (-1.17) (-1.21) 
Equity/Total assets -2.744***   -2.142***   -3.013*** -3.025*** -3.060*** -3.078*** -3.059*** -3.059*** -3.123*** -3.185*** -3.037*** 
  (-6.24)   (-7.55)   (-6.53) (-7.08) (-6.54) (-7.59) (-6.52) (-6.50) (-7.54) (-7.74) (-6.74) 
Liquidity ratio   -0.369***   -0.232**                   
    (-3.44)   (-2.19)                   
ROA -0.022*** -0.040*** -0.016*** -0.035*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
  (-3.69) (-7.36) (-3.38) (-6.40) (-3.84) (-3.94) (-3.84) (-3.94) (-3.86) (-3.82) (-3.91) (-3.96) (-3.97) 
Total assets     0.00007* -0.00002 0.00003 0.00008** 0.00008** 0.00009** 0.00009** 0.00009** 0.0001*** 0.00007* 0.00009** 
      (1.91) (-0.63) (0.75) (2.06) (2.22) (2.28) (2.32) (2.26) (3.27) (1.82) (2.51) 
GDP growth rate         -22.30*** -21.89*** -22.51*** -22.45*** -22.44*** -21.95*** -22.17*** -22.54*** -22.76*** 
          (-4.38) (-4.39) (-4.42) (-4.43) (-4.41) (-4.40) (-4.34) (-4.36) (-4.52) 
GDP per capita         0.000009   0.00001 0.000002 0.000005         
          (0.66)   (0.62) (0.11) (0.37)         
Unemployment            -0.0170       -0.0094 -0.0030 -0.0149   
rate           (-1.38)       (-0.67) (-0.23) (-1.13)   
Loans growth rate         -11.59*** -11.88*** -11.73*** -12.41*** -11.76*** -11.87*** -11.99*** -11.74*** -11.39*** 
          (-6.00) (-6.33) (-5.85) (-6.36) (-5.83) (-5.92) (-6.22) (-5.95) (-5.99) 
Cooperative banks/             -0.1177     -0.2249       
Total banks             (-0.31)     (-0.62)       
Cooperative branches/                 -0.0746     0.6653   
Total branches                 (-0.10)     (0.96)   
Banks per 10,000               0.6061     0.8127*     
inhabitants               (1.42)     (1.95)     
Branches per                          0.0941** 
10,000 inhabitants                         (2.36) 
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Table A2.4 (continued) - Probit regressions (dependent variable: default). 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
Number of observations 36,303 36,303 36,303 36,303 36,303 36,303 36,303 36,303 36,303 36,303 36,303 36,303 36,303 
Log-likelihood -1,491 -1,465 -1,291 -1,525 -1,443 -1,436 -1,444 -1,440 -1,445 -1,444 -1,420 -1,412 -1,440 
Wald Chi2 82.92 76.01 119.79 49.92 119.47 137.78 121.42 151.66 120.06 122.05 150.12 152.45 128.93 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Rho 0.9529 0.9664 0.9710 0.9524 0.9575 0.9595 0.9570 0.9577 0.9567 0.9572 0.9639 0.9661 0.9577 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0239 0.0407 0.1549 0.0015 0.0550 0.0597 0.0542 0.0572 0.0536 0.0545 0.0701 0.0753 0.0571 
 Source: elaborations on AIDA, Bank of Italy and ISTAT data.  
Notes: The values in brackets are the values of the z-statistic. *** variable significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10%.  
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Table A2.5. Probability of default and simulated Spreads Risk Adjusted for 
Italian regions (LGD = 45%). 
Region Number of 
observations 
PD Not weighted SRA SRA1r SRA2r 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Abruzzo 877  1.38% 0.84% 0.86% 0.61% 0.96% 0.77% 
Basilicata 406  2.60% 2.12% 1.51% 1.28% 1.68% 1.24% 
Calabria 1,002  1.29% 0.89% 0.82% 0.63% 1.00% 0.73% 
Campania 3,003  0.83% 0.61% 0.58% 0.47% 0.66% 0.51% 
Emilia Romagna 2,902  1.85% 1.48% 1.12% 0.95% 1.35% 0.91% 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 700  1.79% 1.42% 1.07% 0.92% 1.24% 0.94% 
Lazio 3,179  1.44% 1.03% 0.91% 0.71% 1.17% 1.09% 
Liguria 914  2.09% 1.83% 1.23% 1.13% 1.59% 1.14% 
Lombardy 5,779  1.26% 1.01% 0.80% 0.70% 0.95% 0.79% 
Marche 1,074  1.27% 1.05% 0.82% 0.72% 0.98% 0.76% 
Molise 232  1.74% 0.85% 1.04% 0.61% 1.29% 1.31% 
Piedmont 2,678  2.21% 1.88% 1.31% 1.16% 1.56% 1.31% 
Puglia 2,167  1.56% 1.38% 0.97% 0.90% 1.03% 0.77% 
Sardinia 1,135  1.74% 1.32% 1.07% 0.87% 1.20% 0.88% 
Sicily 2,759  1.30% 0.70% 0.82% 0.52% 0.94% 0.66% 
Tuscany 2,329  1.11% 0.88% 0.73% 0.63% 0.89% 0.66% 
Trentino Alto Adige 753  1.56% 1.21% 0.97% 0.81% 1.17% 0.98% 
Umbria 539  1.78% 1.31% 1.08% 0.87% 1.12% 0.95% 
Valle d'Aosta 97  2.83% 2.67% 1.64% 1.56% 1.82% 1.82% 
Veneto 3,139  1.35% 1.04% 0.86% 0.72% 1.03% 0.83% 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
North-West Italy 9,468  1.62% 1.33% 1.00% 0.87% 1.20% 1.00% 
North-East Italy 7,494  1.61% 1.21% 0.99% 0.81% 1.19% 0.89% 
Central Italy 7,121  1.33% 0.99% 0.85% 0.69% 1.07% 0.87% 
Southern Italy 7,687  1.28% 0.83% 0.81% 0.60% 0.97% 0.81% 
Islands 3,894  1.43% 0.94% 0.89% 0.66% 0.99% 0.69% 
Italy 35,664  1.47% 1.07% 0.92% 0.74% 1.10% 0.88% 
Source: elaborations on AIDA, Bank of Italy and ISTAT data. 
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Table A2.6. Bankruptcy procedures’ losses on total debts and time length. 
 Macroarea Year Losses/Total debts Bankruptcy procedures’ length (in days) 
North-West Italy 
2002 
86.4% 2,454 
North-East Italy 80.2% 2,889 
Central Italy 88.8% 2,485 
Southern Italy 88.1% 2,910 
Islands 83.0% 3,551 
Italy 85.9% 2,724 
North-West Italy 
2003 
86.2% 2,588 
North-East Italy 81.8% 2,987 
Central Italy 87.9% 2,649 
Southern Italy 91.7% 2,870 
Islands 89.5% 3,238 
Italy 86.7% 2,785 
North-West Italy 
2004 
83.1% 2,573 
North-East Italy 81.7% 3,011 
Central Italy 85.1% 2,780 
Southern Italy 85.3% 3,185 
Islands 86.9% 3,428 
Italy 83.8% 2,897 
North-West Italy 
2005 
83.4% 2,583 
North-East Italy 80.8% 2,915 
Central Italy 85.7% 2,882 
Southern Italy 88.0% 3,199 
Islands 90.6% 3,642 
Italy 84.3% 2,923 
North-West Italy 
2006 
85.9% 2,661 
North-East Italy 82.7% 2,934 
Central Italy 84.8% 2,964 
Southern Italy 87.9% 3,197 
Islands 85.8% 3,573 
Italy 85.2% 2,964 
Source: elaborations on ISTAT data. 
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Table A2.7. Probability of default and simulated Spreads Risk Adjusted for 
Italian regions. (*) 
Region Number of 
observations 
PD Not weighted SRA SRA1r SRA2r 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Abruzzo 877  1.38% 0.84% 1.52% 1.10% 1.70% 1.38% 
Basilicata 406  2.60% 2.12% 2.81% 2.40% 3.10% 2.32% 
Calabria 1,002  1.29% 0.89% 1.59% 1.26% 1.93% 1.43% 
Campania 3,003  0.83% 0.61% 1.10% 0.90% 1.26% 0.98% 
Emilia Romagna 2,902  1.85% 1.48% 2.00% 1.67% 2.40% 1.61% 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 700  1.79% 1.42% 1.87% 1.61% 2.17% 1.63% 
Lazio 3,179  1.44% 1.03% 1.67% 1.28% 2.14% 2.00% 
Liguria 914  2.09% 1.83% 2.25% 2.09% 2.91% 2.09% 
Lombardy 5,779  1.26% 1.01% 1.47% 1.29% 1.74% 1.44% 
Marche 1,074  1.27% 1.05% 1.50% 1.33% 1.78% 1.39% 
Molise 232  1.74% 0.85% 2.02% 1.22% 2.62% 2.87% 
Piedmont 2,678  2.21% 1.88% 2.37% 2.08% 2.82% 2.36% 
Puglia 2,167  1.56% 1.38% 1.80% 1.69% 1.92% 1.43% 
Sardinia 1,135  1.74% 1.32% 1.89% 1.53% 2.14% 1.58% 
Sicily 2,759  1.30% 0.70% 1.53% 0.98% 1.76% 1.23% 
Tuscany 2,329  1.11% 0.88% 1.33% 1.14% 1.63% 1.21% 
Trentino Alto Adige 753  1.56% 1.21% 1.79% 1.48% 2.16% 1.81% 
Umbria 539  1.78% 1.31% 1.99% 1.58% 2.07% 1.78% 
Valle d'Aosta 97  2.83% 2.67% 3.09% 3.08% 3.42% 3.40% 
Veneto 3,139  1.35% 1.04% 1.53% 1.25% 1.82% 1.47% 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
North-West Italy 9,468  1.62% 1.33% 1.82% 1.59% 2.18% 1.81% 
North-East Italy 7,494  1.61% 1.21% 1.77% 1.43% 2.12% 1.60% 
Central Italy 7,121  1.33% 0.99% 1.56% 1.25% 1.95% 1.59% 
Southern Italy 7,687  1.28% 0.83% 1.53% 1.14% 1.84% 1.58% 
Islands 3,894  1.43% 0.94% 1.64% 1.22% 1.83% 1.28% 
Italy 35,664  1.47% 1.07% 1.67% 1.34% 2.01% 1.62% 
Source: elaborations on AIDA, Bank of Italy and ISTAT data. 
(*) To simulate the regional SRAs, the LGD has been estimated as the ratio losses/total debts in 
bankruptcy procedures. 
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Table A2.8. Probability of default and simulated Spreads Risk Adjusted for 
Italian regions. (*) 
Region Number of 
observations 
PD Not weighted SRA SRA1r SRA2r 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Abruzzo 877  1.38% 0.84% 1.61% 1.19% 1.80% 1.46% 
Basilicata 406  2.60% 2.12% 2.96% 2.71% 3.23% 2.52% 
Calabria 1,002  1.29% 0.89% 1.76% 1.42% 2.11% 1.59% 
Campania 3,003  0.83% 0.61% 1.09% 0.91% 1.23% 0.98% 
Emilia Romagna 2,902  1.85% 1.48% 2.11% 1.80% 2.51% 1.71% 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 700  1.79% 1.42% 1.84% 1.60% 2.13% 1.61% 
Lazio 3,179  1.44% 1.03% 1.56% 1.23% 1.99% 1.84% 
Liguria 914  2.09% 1.83% 2.20% 2.05% 2.84% 2.02% 
Lombardy 5,779  1.26% 1.01% 1.44% 1.26% 1.68% 1.40% 
Marche 1,074  1.27% 1.05% 1.75% 1.58% 2.06% 1.63% 
Molise 232  1.74% 0.85% 2.10% 1.33% 2.55% 2.59% 
Piedmont 2,678  2.21% 1.88% 2.27% 1.96% 2.69% 2.24% 
Puglia 2,167  1.56% 1.38% 1.98% 1.90% 2.11% 1.60% 
Sardinia 1,135  1.74% 1.32% 1.97% 1.63% 2.21% 1.65% 
Sicily 2,759  1.30% 0.70% 1.73% 1.15% 1.97% 1.43% 
Tuscany 2,329  1.11% 0.88% 1.41% 1.24% 1.71% 1.30% 
Trentino Alto Adige 753  1.56% 1.21% 1.59% 1.25% 1.88% 1.58% 
Umbria 539  1.78% 1.31% 2.08% 1.74% 2.13% 1.83% 
Valle d'Aosta 97  2.83% 2.67% 2.87% 2.66% 3.20% 3.18% 
Veneto 3,139  1.35% 1.04% 1.61% 1.35% 1.89% 1.53% 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
North-West Italy 9,468  1.62% 1.33% 1.76% 1.53% 2.09% 1.75% 
North-East Italy 7,494  1.61% 1.21% 1.82% 1.49% 2.15% 1.61% 
Central Italy 7,121  1.33% 0.99% 1.58% 1.32% 1.94% 1.61% 
Southern Italy 7,687  1.28% 0.83% 1.62% 1.20% 1.93% 1.63% 
Islands 3,894  1.43% 0.94% 1.80% 1.35% 2.02% 1.46% 
Italy 35,664  1.47% 1.07% 1.71% 1.39% 2.03% 1.63% 
Source: elaborations on AIDA, Bank of Italy and ISTAT data. 
(*) To simulate the regional SRAs, the LGD has been estimated by taking into consideration 
both bankruptcies procedures’ losses/total debts and time length. For more details, see paragraph 
2.5. 
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CHAPTER 3: INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND 
THE COST OF MONEY IN ITALIAN PROVINCES 
3.1 Introduction 
The results obtained in the first essay indicate that, at a macroeconomic level, 
interregional differentials in the cost of money in Italy are caused both by the 
greater overall riskiness of loans and by factors concerning credit supply, such 
as the average operating size and the degree of territorial diffusion of the branch 
network. Nevertheless, according to the analysis developed in the second 
chapter (based on a representative sample of Italian firms), specific elements at 
firm level are not able to completely explain the interregional interest rate 
spread actually observed in Italy. Therefore, it is interesting to verify the 
hypothesis that the worse borrowing conditions in the Mezzogiorno area are due 
also to institutional elements. 
Generally, in order to adequately assess the performance of an economic system, 
economists agree about the importance of the institutional environment. In other 
words, according to this recent paradigm, it is not possible to completely 
understand the economic dynamics of a system if the quality of social 
institutions is not taken into consideration. 
Because in an efficient credit market the economic agents’ results are the main 
factors that banks should evaluate in order to determine borrowing conditions, it 
is natural to hypothesize that a causal relationship between institutional 
environment and local lending rates also exists.  
In the last years, in order to verify this assumption, the literature has increased 
its attention towards the relationship between social infrastructure, credit 
availability and borrowing conditions. The elements taken into consideration are 
the degree of crime, the efficiency of the court system and the effective 
protection of property rights. Generally, these aspects have been examined 
separately.  
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In this context, this chapter intends to verify if the quality of the institutional 
environment is able to influence local borrowing conditions together with the 
other elements taken into consideration in the previous chapters. 
In order to reach this aim, it is necessary to summarize the several aspects 
reflecting the institutional environment in a small number of variables.   
The methodology that will be applied is the principal component analysis (PCA) 
because it allows to sum up the information contained in a dataset composed by 
many variables, keeping the largest part of data variability.  
The aspects of the social infrastructure examined in this work are the degree of 
crime, the degree of corruption and the degree of property rights protection 
guaranteed by the court system.  
The chapter is subdivided into three paragraphs, besides this introduction. 
Paragraph 3.2 illustrates the main contributions that analyze the effects on 
economic performances and on the financial system determined by the 
institutional environment. 
After describing the variables used in the empirical analysis, paragraph 3.3 
develops an institutional index for Italian provinces during the period 2000-2003 
and examines the relationship between the quality of social institutions and the 
cost of money. Finally, the last paragraph summarizes the main results of the 
chapter.  
3.2 Literature review  
The economic literature largely recognizes the relationship between institutional 
environment and economic performance. 
North (1990), particularly, focused on the necessity to integrate institutions’ 
role into economic theory. This need is caused by the presence of asymmetric 
information and transaction costs that make the neoclassic paradigm of complete 
markets only a theoretical assumption. 
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According to North, “institutions consist of a set of constraints on behavior in 
the form of rules and regulations; and, finally, a set of moral, ethical behavioral 
norms which define the contours that constrain the way in which the rules and 
regulations are specified and enforcement is carried out […] institutions are 
therefore the framework within which human interaction takes place”.  
Consequently, because institutions (both formal and informal) influence 
transaction and production costs, according to North, they can be included 
among the determinants of the long run performances of economic systems. 
On the basis of the North’s work, economists have traditionally focused on the 
direct effect of the institutional environment on GDP growth rates and on the 
level of economic development. These analysis are mainly based on cross-
country data.  
The quality of the institutions is generally measured by taking into consideration 
the following elements: social and human capital, corruption, crime rates and 
degree of property rights protection.  
The general conclusion is that the quality of the institutional environment affects 
economic results because it is a crucial aspect to guarantee the correct 
implementation of operators’ transaction. 
This element is particularly pointed out by Zak and Knack (2001) that 
elaborate a general equilibrium growth model with transaction costs in which 
heterogeneous agents face a moral hazard problem. In this context, a low degree 
of trust (that is caused by a insufficient level of social capital and weak formal 
institutions) reduces the rates of investment and growth. This hypothesis is 
confirmed by the empirical analysis that is based on a sample of 41 countries 
during the period 1970-1992. 
With particular reference to the Italian context, the main contributions about the 
relationship between social infrastructure and economic performance are Aiello 
and Scoppa (2000), Del Monte and Papagni (2001), Golden and Picci (2005), 
Daniele and Marani (2008) and Albanese (2010). 
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Taking into consideration the period 1980-1982, Aiello and Scoppa (2000) 
explain the regional differences in the levels of output per worker according to 
the greater degree of total factor productivity (TFP) observed in Northern 
regions. Particularly, the TFP is also influenced by the institutional environment 
because it depends on the degree of development of the financial system, the 
agglomeration economies, the efficiency of infrastructures, the degree of crime 
and the government intervention in the economy (that is expressed in terms of 
incidence of public employment in the labour market). 
Del Monte and Papagni (2001) verify if corruption can be included among the 
causes of the failure of the huge program of public expenditure that has been 
carried out during the last fifty years in favor of the Mezzogiorno regions. 
Particularly, this program has not been able to reduce the distance between 
Northern and Southern regions in terms of GDP per capita.  
On the basis of data concerning the Italian regions during the period 1963-1991, 
the authors show a negative effect of corruption (measured in terms of the 
number of crimes against the public administration per million employees) on 
GDP per capita. This relationship is due to the reduction of the quantity and the 
quality of infrastructures and public services provided to the private sector that 
is caused by corruption and, hence, to a lower degree of efficiency of the public 
expenditure in the regions characterized by a high level of corruption. 
For the year 1997, Golden and Picci (2005) develop a specific indicator of 
corruption for Italian provinces. This measure is obtained by calculating the 
difference between the amounts of physically existing public infrastructure and 
what government cumulatively pays for public infrastructure (that represents the 
potentially feasible stock of public capital). The hypothesis underlying the 
significance of this index is that, for the most part, this difference is caused by 
the loss of public money for fraud and embezzlement activities. Golden and 
Picci point out that, although the amount of public investments is greater in 
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Southern regions, Northern regions are more infrastructure-abundant. This result 
indicates a greater degree of corruption in the Mezzogiorno area.  
Taking into consideration the period 2004-2006, Daniele and Marani (2008) 
show that organized crime negatively affects the Mezzogiorno attractiveness 
and, generally, the overall potential investors’ opinion about Southern regions. 
Organized crime (measured by the number of extortions, people denounced for 
criminal conspiracies, attempts and arsons per inhabitant) negatively influences 
foreign direct investments in the Mezzogiorno area because it represents an 
additional cost for private firms. 
Finally, Albanese (2010) develops a cross-section analysis for Italian regions 
during the year 2004. The aim of this work is to estimate an indicator that takes 
into consideration the main aspects of the social infrastructure (corruption, 
crime, efficiency of the court system and degree of intervention in the economy) 
and that is able to explain differences between North and South Italy in the level 
of GDP per capita. 
According to the author, the differences among Italian regions in the level of 
economic development are caused by an institutional gap among Northern and 
Southern areas, while the traditional impact of social and human capital on the 
level of GDP per capita observed by the literature is not any more significant 
when the role played by social infrastructure is taken into account.  
During the last years, another research field has been represented by the study of 
the relationship between institutional environment and economic system by 
means of the credit market’s and financial system’s channels.  
Particularly, because the cost and the availability of financial resources 
influence the investors’ investment ability, these aspects are crucial factors for 
the economic growth processes above all in those contexts characterized by the 
dominant presence of small firms for which external financial resources are the 
main source of funding.  
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The group of works that analyze the relationship between institutional 
environment and financial system includes Mauro (1995), La Porta et al. (1998), 
Claessens and Laeven (2003), Diamond (2004), Qian and Strahan (2007) and 
Bae and Goyal (2009) and, for the Italian context, Guiso et al. (2004), Jappelli et 
al. (2005) and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2009).  
Taking into consideration a panel of 32,665 households during the period 1989-
1995, Guiso et al. (2004) focus on the relationship between institutional 
environment and degree of development of the financial system. 
The aspects of the social infrastructure analyzed by these authors are the degree 
of crime (expressed by the number of violent crime divided by the population), 
the degree of inefficiency of the law enforcement (measured by the average 
length of the first-degree trials), the human capital (expressed in terms of 
average number of schooling years) and the social capital (measured by the 
participation in referenda and by the number of blood donations every 1,000 
inhabitants, i.e. by behaviors that are not caused by economic reasons but are 
driven only by social pressure and internal norms). 
With particular reference to the latter aspect, social capital should influence the 
level of development of the financial system because the probability that a 
contract takes place depends not only on its legal enforceability but also on the 
degree of trust among the agents, that is positively influenced by social capital.  
A greater development of the financial system is expressed by a larger incidence 
of the households that use checks, portfolio allocation, face less constraints to 
obtain bank loans and do not depend on informal lending (i.e. on loans that are 
made by relatives and friends and that are considered as an alternative to bank 
credit if banks reject the household’s credit request).  
The authors show that the level of development of the financial system is greater 
in the areas characterized by larger levels of human and social capital, a better 
efficiency of the court system and a smaller presence of organized crime. 
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Particularly, social capital significantly affects the use of checks, the probability 
to face constraints in the credit market and the probability to ask for informal 
lending only in the areas with a smaller efficiency of the judicial system. 
Consequently, in areas characterized by a low contracts’ enforceability (that is 
caused by a low degree of efficiency of the court system), the role played by 
social capital is more relevant because social capital imposes internal norms and 
social sanctions that are able to reduce opportunistic behavior on the part of 
borrowers. 
Furthermore, social capital significantly influences the borrowers’ probability to 
be financed by banks in the areas with a low average level of education. The 
reason is that, low-education people involved in the transaction cannot fully 
understand most of the terms of the contracts; consequently low-education 
people will delegate more educated agents to conclude the transaction and they 
will require more trust. 
Jappelli et al. (2005) have a different approach concerning how the degree of 
efficiency of the court system influences credit availability.  
In more details, this work develops a theoretical model where agents transact 
and face a moral hazard problem and the court system is inefficient. According 
to this model, an improvement in the degree of efficiency of the judicial system 
leads to a reduction of credit rationing because of the greater protection of 
banks’ rights in case of default. This hypothesis is confirmed by an empirical 
analysis based on data about the 27 Italian judicial districts (that existed during 
the nineties of the last century) during the period 1984-1998. Particularly, the 
degree of efficiency of the court system (measured by the average length of the 
civil judicial processes and the number of civil suits pending per 1,000 
inhabitants) positively affects credit availability; on the contrary a greater degree 
of efficiency of the judicial system determines lower lending rates and a smaller 
number of default events.  
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This result is also obtained by Bonaccorsi di Patti (2009) that, developing a 
cross-section analysis at a provincial level on 300,000 bank-firm relationships in 
2000, shows that access to credit is positively affected by the degree of 
efficiency of the court system.  
The institutional aspects taken into consideration by Bonaccorsi di Patti reflect, 
at a provincial level, the level of crime (number of offences for which the 
authorities have opened a judicial procedure per 1,000 inhabitants and the share 
of offences against individuals reported to law enforcement officers) and the 
inefficiency of the judicial system (expressed in terms of length in years of a 
first-degree civil court trial used in Guiso et al. (2004)). 
According to the author, lending rates are higher in the areas where crime rates 
are larger and courts are inefficient; on the contrary, where there is more trust in 
institutions, borrowing conditions are better. Particularly, borrowers operating in 
the provinces with a larger degree of crime must pay lending rates that are 
around 30 basis points higher than those paid by similar borrowers operating in 
low-crime provinces. The effect of crime on the cost of money decreases for 
larger firms.  
Furthermore, crime rates positively affect the collateral amount and the 
probability that the utilization rate ratio (i.e. the ratio between used and granted 
credit) is bigger than 1, denoting the existence of credit rationing. 
As regards the international framework, taking into consideration data on 70 
countries during the period 1980-1983, Mauro (1995) examines the relationship 
between institutional environment and economic performance by means of the 
investment channel. According to the author, corruption and inefficiency of 
bureaucracy slowdown investments and, by this way, reduce GDP growth rates.  
La Porta et al. (1998) analyze the relationship between legal protection of 
investors (both companies’ creditors and shareholders) and corporate 
governance models.  
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In this context, by examining data on a set of 49 countries during the nineties of 
the last century, the authors show that in French-civil-law countries (where 
investors’ legal protection is the lowest one) the ownership is extremely 
concentrated. This result support the idea the more concentrated ownership is 
considered as an instrument that allows to investors to actually exercise their 
control rights in an adverse institutional environment. On the contrary, in 
common-law countries (that are the countries with the highest investors’ legal 
protection) the ownership is generally not concentrated. 
By analyzing a sample of 45 countries during the period 1980-1989, Claessens 
and Laeven (2003) focus on the relationship between property rights protection 
and resources allocation by firms.  
According to the authors, firm growth is influenced, besides the financial 
resources availability, also by the allocation of investable resources. 
Particularly, property rights protection is able to affect the allocation of 
resources across alternative investment projects because firms operating in 
markets with weaker property rights tend to invest a share of their financial 
resources in material assets that is larger than the optimal one. The reason is 
that, in these frameworks, firms find relatively less difficult to secure the returns 
from fixed assets from illegal behaviors on the part of their competitors. 
The empirical analysis confirms this hypothesis: the authors show that a greater 
development of the financial system (measured by the ratio between private 
loans and GDP) and a better legal protection system (expressed by taking into 
consideration several indexes that were developed by international agencies 
according firms’ surveys) facilitate firms’ growth by increasing financial 
resources availability and the efficiency of resources allocation by firms. 
Qian and Strahan (2007) examine a sample of 4,321 bank loans in 43 countries 
during the period 1994-2003 and come at the conclusion that the institutional 
environment (measured by the degree of creditor rights protection) significantly 
affects contract terms and the degree of loan concentration.  
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In details, in those contexts with better legal protection, banks generally grant 
credit at better conditions (lower lending rates and longer maturities). The 
reason is that, in these realities, banks have greater ability to force repayment or 
take control of the firm in case of default.  
Furthermore, on average, the number of lenders is lower (i.e. the concentration 
of loan ownership is bigger) in countries with a larger degree of property rights 
protection and for smaller and opaque firms. 
Finally, because of the significant presence of asymmetric information, foreign 
banks are more sensitive to the legal environment: a reduction of the degree of 
creditor rights protection leads to a decline in foreign banks’ market shares in 
favor of domestic banks.  
Bae and Goyal (2009) point out that borrowing conditions are not influenced by 
the formal creditor rights protection system but by the actual enforceability of 
bank contracts.  
On the basis of a sample of 63,158 bank loans in 48 countries during the period 
1994-2003, these authors show that banks apply more cumbersome conditions in 
those countries where the degree of creditor rights protection is worse in 
response to the greater uncertainty of the legal environment. Particularly, in 
these contexts, banks tend to reduce loans maturity in order to review their 
lending decisions more frequently and apply higher interest rates to compensate 
the greater credit risk. Moreover, Bae and Goyal show that firms with similar 
structural characteristics pay larger lending rates if they operate in countries 
characterized by higher levels of corruption, greater risk of expropriation and 
larger risk of contract repudiation.  
Finally, Diamond (2009) develops a theoretical analysis. The author elaborates 
a model where short loans’ maturities represent a solution in those contexts 
where creditors must sustain higher costs in order to enforce debt contracts. 
If loans’ maturities are short and firms borrow from multiple lenders, borrowers 
will repay their debts also if enforcement is costly and single lenders could be 
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induced not go to bankruptcy court after a borrower default. The reason is that, 
in this case, borrowing with large amounts of short-term debts from different 
lenders can lead to the threat of “firm runs” that are very similar to the bank runs 
during liquidity crisis. This threat is able to commit borrowers to repay debt 
rather than renegotiate the claim at the maturity. 
According to Diamond, the minimum number of lenders that is necessary to 
commit borrowers to repay debt increases with enforcement costs that are 
positively influenced by the degree of corruption in the legal system and 
negatively affected by the degree of creditor rights protection. 
3.3 The empirical analysis: estimating an institutional index for 
Italian provinces 
3.3.1 Institutional environment and the cost of money 
According to the literature illustrated in the previous paragraph, institutional 
environment is an aspect able to significantly affect potential growth both 
directly and indirectly by means of the financial channel (i.e. institutional 
elements affect the functioning of the financial system and, consequently, the 
operators’ investment ability).  
In this framework, this chapter intends to verify if, in Italian provinces, social 
infrastructure is able to significantly influence borrowing conditions. In order to 
reach this aim, the quality of the institutions must be expressed in quantitative 
terms.  
Social infrastructure can be expressed by means of various factors. Particularly, 
literature traditionally has taken into consideration the following aspects: crime, 
degree of legal protection assured by the court system and corruption.  
With particular reference to the first element, in high-crime areas, banks can 
apply to their customers more cumbersome borrowing conditions because of the 
greater perceived risk. In this situation, firms must indeed face the risk of losses 
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caused by criminal activities (such as extortions) and must sustain additional 
costs for security and protection.  
The negative effect of crime in a territory can be alleviated by an efficient 
judicial system. Coherently with Bae and Goyal’s results, borrowing conditions 
are not influenced by formal creditor rights protection but by the actual 
contracts’ enforceability. In this context, an efficient court system allows to 
operators to enforce contracts without time and financial resources waste. 
A greater efficiency of the judicial system should improve borrowing conditions 
by means of two channels. The first one is the disincentive to illegal behaviors 
that determines the reduction of the average crime rate. The second channel is 
the increase in the bank contracts’ enforceability and in the probability that bank 
credits are totally repaid by borrowers. In light of the latter element, it appears 
very important to take into consideration, together with data concerning penal 
and civil justice, also data about bankruptcy procedures.  
Finally, as regards the last aspect of the social infrastructure traditionally 
analyzed by the literature, corruption can affect the accurate functioning of the 
financial system because it distorts the whole economic system and the price 
mechanisms.  
3.3.2 The Italian judicial system 
The following analysis concerns the period 2000-2003 and is based on 
provincial data about civil and penal justice and bankruptcy proceedings 
provided by the Territorial Information System of Justice developed by ISTAT.  
I chose to take into consideration this period because of the limited availability 
of data about justice at a provincial level: in fact, ISTAT releases the main data 
about the court system in Italian provinces from 2000 to 2005. However, in 
order to estimate an institutional indicator, I chose to take into account only the 
period 2000-2003 because this work intends to analyze the relationship between 
institutional environment and the cost of money and homogenous data on 
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lending rates are available exclusively during the period 1998-2003 (during the 
period 2000-2003 both data on judicial system and homogenous data on lending 
rates are hence available). 
As regards the civil and penal justice, the variables included into the analysis are 
those traditionally taken into consideration by the literature in order to assess the 
effect of the social institutions on economic performance: the average length in 
days of a first-degree civil court trial, the number of civil suits pending per 
100,000 inhabitants, the ratio between the number of civil suits pending and 
settled during the year (this indicator is an inverse measure of the courts’ ability 
to dispose of civil trials) and the number of total crimes, crimes against the 
State, criminal associations and mafia criminal associations (per 100,000 
inhabitants) for which the judicial authority began the penal action.  
Furthermore, I included into the analysis also a variable concerning bankruptcy 
proceedings (that is a field that traditionally has not been taken into 
consideration by the literature). Particularly, the indicator analyzed is the ratio 
between losses and liabilities because it reflects the average amount that 
creditors can obtain in bankruptcies procedures. This ratio can be considered 
such as a proxy of the degree of contracts’ enforceability and, hence, of the 
degree of property rights protection in the system. 
As data demonstrate, in Italy there are relevant differences, among the different 
geographical areas, in the degree of efficiency of the court system, crime and 
corruption. 
Table 3.1 confirms that Mezzogiorno is the geographical area with the highest 
level of organized crime (the legend of the indicators is shown in table A3.1 in 
appendix 3.1). Particularly, the differences among areas in terms of number of 
criminal associations and extortions per 100,000 inhabitants are very significant 
given that these types of offences are linked to organized crime. In Southern 
Italy and in the Islands, indeed, both indicators take values considerably larger 
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than those observed in the other geographical areas and indicate the bigger 
incidence of organized crime in Southern regions. 
 
Table 3.1. Average values of variables on the Italian justice system for 
geographical area during the period 2000-2003. 
Variable North-West 
Italy 
North-
East 
Italy 
Central 
Italy 
Southern 
Italy Islands Italy 
Average_length 769 900 970 1,302 1,281 1,032 
Civil_trials_pending_10000
0 
1,385 1,533 2,602 2,818 2,467 2,120 
Civil_trials_pending_settle
d 
1.80 2.17 2.08 2.77 2.96 2.31 
Crimes_action_100000 5,734 3,408 5,491 4,493 4,614 4,822 
Crimes_state_100000 80.18 64.65 127.82 140.43 144.20 108.49 
Extortions_100000 4.84 3.87 5.59 9.16 8.77 6.31 
Criminal_associations_100
000 
1.38 1.37 1.80 3.18 3.44 2.14 
Loss_liabilities 86.12 77.05 87.53 86.94 85.86 84.80 
Source: elaborations on ISTAT data.  
 
Analogously to Del Monte and Papagni (2001), the number of crimes against the 
State per 100,000 inhabitants for which the judicial authority began the penal 
action is considered such as a proxy of corruption in the public administration. 
In Southern Italy and in the Islands this indicator is equal, respectively, to 
140.43 and 144.20 (while it takes a value of 108.49 at national level). These data 
indicate that in the Mezzogiorno area there exists a higher level of corruption in 
the bureaucracy and in political institutions with respect to the other areas. 
Furthermore, Southern Italy and the Islands are the areas with the greatest 
average length of first-degree civil court trials (in these areas, these types of 
trials last, respectively, 1,302 and 1,281 days versus a national average of 1,032 
days).  
According to Carmignani and Giacomelli (2009), during the period 2000-2005 
the larger litigation rate in the Mezzogiorno area is associated to bigger 
resources in terms of judges in civil courts even by taking into account the 
differences in the number of proceedings in the different areas. Nevertheless, 
these data do not consider the heterogeneity (i.e. the different level of difficulty) 
of trials in the areas. Consequently, it is not possible to understand if the greater 
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quantity of pending trials in the Mezzogiorno area is caused by inadequate 
resources or by courts’ lower degree of productivity. 
However, the greater average length of civil trials and the bigger quantity of 
pending trials determine a lower degree of rights protection in Southern regions. 
Instead, the geographical distribution of the ratio between losses and liabilities 
in bankruptcy proceeding (that can be considered such as a proxy of the loss 
given default) is more homogenous among provinces.  
The main conclusion to be drawn by analyzing data on the justice system is that 
Mezzogiorno is the Italian area with the worst quality of the institutional 
environment because of the highest degree of crime, corruption and the lowest 
rights protection assured by the court system. 
3.3.3 Estimating an institutional indicator for Italian provinces 
Data discussed in the previous paragraph show that the degree of corruption, 
crime and rights protection (indicators that reflect the quality of the institutions) 
can be represented by several variables that tend to move in the same direction.  
Although in order to represent the different characteristics of the institutional 
environment it is important to take into consideration as many variables as 
possible, the inclusion of too many correlated variables would not allow to 
properly assess the importance of each element.  
In order to overcome this trade-off, principal component analysis (PCA) is 
employed. This methodology allows to express the information contained in a 
dataset composed by a large number of highly correlated variables by using few 
indicators. Appendix 3.2 explains this methodology in more details.  
The PCA is hence applied to the eight variables analyzed in the previous 
paragraph in order to calculate one or more indicators that are able to efficiently 
summarize the information contained in the dataset.  
The indicators obtained by means the PCA are linear combinations of the eight 
variables, with weights equal to the elements of the corresponding eigenvectors 
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of the correlation matrix of the initial variables involved. These weights permit 
to account for the largest part of data variability (see appendix 3.2). 
PCA is based on the correlation matrix rather than the variance and covariance 
matrix because the eight variables object of analysis have different order of 
magnitude. Because the variance depends on the absolute value of the variables, 
considering in the PCA the variance and covariance matrix rather than the 
correlation one would lead to components that are considerably affected by the 
variables with the largest absolute values; on the contrary the information 
contained in the variables characterized by a large variability but low absolute 
values would be lost. In other words, if the analysis developed in this paragraph 
would have been based on the variance and covariance matrix of the original 
variables, the calculated components would be a combination of the number of 
offences per 100,000 inhabitants for which the authorities opened a judicial 
procedure and the number of civil suits pending per 100,000 inhabitants (i.e. the 
variables with the highest order of magnitude), while the weights associated to 
the other six variables would be approximately equal to zero.  
The eigenvalues of the correlation matrix are shown in table A3.2 in appendix 
3.1. For every component, the corresponding eigenvalue represents its variance, 
while the ratio between the eigenvalue and the total sum of all eigenvalues is the 
percentage of the dataset variance that is explained by the component taken into 
consideration (see appendix 3.2).  
Table A3.2 shows that the first component explains 42.6% of the overall 
variance with an eigenvalue equal to 3.41. Taken together, the first two 
components explain almost 60% of the variance. 
In order to summarize the information contained in the dataset, only the first two 
components are considered. The choice of the number of components to take 
into account is based on the Kaiser rule, according to which only the main 
components corresponding to an eigenvalue which is higher or equal to 1 have 
to be selected.  
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With reference to the first component, the eigenvector (reported in table A3.3) 
shows how the number of civil suits pending, the ratio between the number of 
civil suits pending and settled, the number of crimes against the State and the 
average length of first-degree trials have similar weights. The number of crimes 
for which the judicial authority began the penal action is instead the least 
important variable to compute this component.  
In more details, the first component is obtained by calculating the linear 
combination of the initial eight variables on the Italian justice system, with 
weights equal to the elements of the eigenvector corresponding to the highest 
eigenvalue (that is equal to 3.41).  
Because all weights associated to the initial eight variables have positive sign, 
the first component can be considered such as an indicator of the quality of the 
institutional environment at provincial level. Particularly, provinces with larger 
and positive values of the first component are the areas where the eights 
variables on the justice system are larger and, therefore, are characterized by a 
worse quality of the institutions. 
As regards the second component, variables concerning the civil justice and 
variables concerning the penal justice and bankruptcy proceedings have opposite 
sign. Therefore, provinces where the second component takes larger and 
positive values are characterized by a greater degree of inefficiency in the civil 
justice system. 
Analogously to the first component, the second one is computed by weighting 
the eight original variables concerning the court system in Italian provinces with 
weights equal to the elements of the eigenvector associated to the second 
eigenvalue (that is equal to 1.32). 
The initial values of the two components are rescaled so that the range for each 
indicator is between 0 and 1 with low values indicating higher average quality 
levels of the institutional environment in Italian provinces during the period 
2000-2003. 
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For every year of the period object of analysis, the following table shows the 
first and the last 10 provinces according to the first component (that, as I pointed 
out before, can be considered such as an indicator of the social infrastructure). 
The first section of table 3.2 suggests the presence of a worse institutional 
environment in the Mezzogiorno area.  
 
Table 3.2. Ranking of Italian provinces according to the value of the first 
component.  
First 10 Italian provinces according to the value of the first component 
2000 2001 2002 2003 
Province Value Province Value Province Value Province Value 
Messina 0.94 Messina 1.00 Avellino 0.83 Catanzaro 0.81 
Massa Carrara 0.93 Avellino 0.90 Catanzaro 0.81 Avellino 0.77 
Catanzaro 0.87 Catanzaro 0.90 Messina 0.74 Messina 0.66 
Avellino 0.81 Massa Carrara 0.87 Salerno 0.64 L'Aquila 0.62 
Benevento 0.80 Rome 0.72 L'Aquila 0.64 Salerno 0.60 
Rome 0.71 Salerno 0.70 Benevento 0.61 Massa Carrara 0.60 
Reggio Calabria 0.71 Benevento 0.70 Potenza 0.60 Potenza 0.58 
Siracusa 0.71 Latina 0.68 Massa Carrara 0.57 Prato 0.55 
Salerno 0.70 L'Aquila 0.66 Rome 0.57 Rome 0.55 
L'Aquila 0.68 Naples 0.62 Crotone 0.53 Benevento 0.54 
Last 10 Italian provinces according to the value of the first component 
2000 2001 2002 2003 
Province Value Province Value Province Value Province Value 
Pavia 0.12 Como 0.11 Arezzo 0.09 Arezzo 0.09 
Verbano Cusio 
Oss. 0.11 Cremona 0.10 Como 0.08 Cremona 0.08 
Arezzo 0.11 Novara 0.10 Lecco 0.07 Bolzano 0.08 
Sondrio 0.10 Verbano Cusio Oss. 0.10 Vercelli 0.06 Como 0.07 
Pordenone 0.10 Pordenone 0.09 Novara 0.06 Trento 0.07 
Bolzano 0.09 Trento 0.04 Verbano Cusio Oss. 0.05 Novara 0.05 
Varese 0.08 Cuneo 0.04 Cuneo 0.05 Lecco 0.05 
Trento 0.07 Sondrio 0.04 Sondrio 0.03 Cuneo 0.05 
Cuneo 0.05 Varese 0.03 Trento 0.03 Sondrio 0.04 
Lecco 0.00 Lecco 0.01 Varese 0.03 Varese 0.02 
Source: elaborations on ISTAT data. 
 
Indeed, among the first 10 provinces according to the value of the first 
component, there are, almost exclusively, provinces localized in Southern 
regions. Campania is the region with the most serious institutional problems: 
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particularly, in every year of the period taken into consideration, in this region 3 
provinces out of 5 (Avellino, Benevento and Salerno) are ranked among the 10 
Italian provinces with the highest values of the first component.  
On the contrary, the second part of table 3.2 shows that Northern provinces have 
the best results. In fact, with the exception of Arezzo, the provinces 
characterized by the lowest values of the first component are localized in North 
Italy. Particularly, the Lombardy provinces have the best performance in terms 
of social infrastructure. 
The better institutional environment in Northern areas is confirmed in figure 3.1. 
This figure allows to assess the overall distribution of Italian provinces 
according to the average value of the first component during the period 2000-
2003.  
Provinces with lighter colours are characterized by a better quality of the 
institutions while the areas with darker colours are less virtuous.  
Southern provinces generally belong to the highest quartiles of the distribution; 
on the contrary, provinces located in the Northern and Central Italy are 
characterized by smaller values of the indicator. Milano and Brescia are the only 
Lombardy provinces that do not belong to the first quartile of the distribution. 
In conclusion, the analyzed data point out relevant differences in the quality of 
the institutions among Northern and Southern areas. The worse institutional 
environment in the Mezzogiorno area is caused by the higher organized crime 
and by the difficulties of the Southern courts to solve civil disputes and 
bankruptcy proceedings. On the whole, these elements cause a lower rights 
protection in the Mezzogiorno and are able to negatively influence borrowing 
conditions applied to the firms operating in this area.  
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Figure 3.1. Indicator of the quality of the institutional environment  
in Italian provinces (1) 
 
Sources: elaborations on ISTAT data.  
(1)  For each province, the index of the quality of the institutional environment has been 
obtained by calculating the average value of the first component during the years 2000-2003. 
 
129 
 
3.3.4 Does institutional environment affect borrowing conditions 
in Italian provinces? 
In light of the analysis developed in the previous paragraph, the aim of this 
section is to verify if the higher lending rates applied to Southern borrowers are 
caused, together with the structural elements concerning the financial system 
examined in the first chapter, also by institutional factors. 
In details, the following analysis intends to examine the impact on borrowing 
conditions of social infrastructure at a provincial level. 
In order to quantitatively express the level of the institutional environment, I 
employ the first two components computed in the PCA developed in paragraph 
3.3.3. I chose to take into consideration also the second component because, 
together with the first one, it allows to express about 60% of the overall 
variability of the information contained in the initial eight variables that reflect 
the degree of crime, corruption, efficiency of the court system and rights 
protection. 
Analogously to the analysis developed in the first chapter, because of the 
relevant persistence in lending rates, it would be appropriate to explain the 
relationship between social infrastructure and the cost of money by using a 
dynamic panel model. In this context, the Arellano and Bond estimator would 
lead to consistent and efficient estimates. 
However, while homogeneous data on lending rates are available for 6 years 
(from 1998 to 2003), it is possible to employ data on the judicial system only for 
4 years (from 2000 to 2003). If I would have included 2 lags for the dependent 
variable and used first differences (according to the Arellano and Bond 
methodology), the number of the remaining observations for each series would 
not permit to obtain estimates for the Arellano and Bond estimator. 
In light of the above considerations, the following analysis develops a set of 
cross-section models where, for every province, the dependent variable is the 
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average of lending rates during the period 2000-2003 and the explanatory 
variables are the average values of the first and the second component and the 
average values of the variables concerning the banking system that, according to 
the first chapter, significantly affect the cost of money at a macroeconomic 
level: the degree of territorial diffusion and the average operating size of the 
branch network and the riskiness of loans. 
Because of the high negative correlation between the average value of the 
number of branches per 10,000 inhabitants and the average value of the ratio 
between non-performing loans and total loans (as shown in table A3.4, the 
correlation coefficient between these variables is equal to -0.82), the effect of 
these two variables on lending rates is evaluated separately in order to avoid 
multicollinearity problems. 
Table 3.3 shows the output of the estimated OLS regressions together with the 
Breusch-Pagan heteroskedasticity test and the Ramsey Regression Equation 
Specification Error Test (RESET test).  
With reference to the first model, the Breusch-Pagan test leads to reject the null 
hypothesis of homoskedastic errors. Consequently, the inferential analysis is 
developed by using the White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.  
Coherently with the results achieved in the first chapter, the first model indicates 
a significant and negative relationship between the average operating size of 
branches and lending rates; on the contrary the aggregate riskiness of loans 
positively affects the cost of money. 
As regards the institutional aspects, provinces with higher values of the first 
component are characterized by more cumbersome borrowing conditions (large 
values of the first component reflect worse institutional environments). 
Particularly, the coefficient associated to the first component indicates that a 
reduction of 0.53 in this variable (this value is the difference between the 
median and the maximum values of the first component) leads to a decrease of 
72 basis points in the provincial lending rate.  
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Table 3.3. Regression output 
(dependent variable: lending rates average) (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: elaborations on Bank of Italy and ISTAT data. 
 (1) The values in brackets are the values of the t-statistic based on White heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors. *** variable significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10%. 
 
There is not instead a significant relationship between the second component 
and lending rates.  
According to the second model, the cost of money is negatively affected both by 
the operating size and the degree of territorial diffusion of the branch network; 
furthermore, the presence of a positive and significant relationship between the 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Pc1_average 1.362*** 0.973*** 0.963*** 0.928*** 
  (4.38) (3.67) (3.44) (3.29) 
Pc2_average -0.079 0.004 -0.111 0.127 
  (-0.26) (0.02) (-0.40) (0.45) 
Loans/Branches_average -0.036*** -0.045*** -0.039*** -0.041*** 
  (-6.75) (-8.92) (-8.06) (-8.81) 
Bad debts/Totale loans_average 0.070***       
  (5.15)       
Branches_average -0.259*** -0.255*** -0.243*** 
  (-8.80) (-8.98) (-8.26) 
Share of firms operating in    0.012**   
agricolture_average     (2.63)   
Share of firms operating in     -0.025** 
manufacturing_average       (-2.34) 
Constant 6.898*** 9.207*** 8.859*** 9.272*** 
  (22.06) (29.53) (24.63) (27.44) 
Number of observations 103 103 103 103 
R squared 0.7546 0.8042 0.8172 0.8146 
Adjusted R squared 0.7446 0.7962 0.8077 0.8050 
F 80.33 101.69 86.71 85.24 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Breusch-Pagan test         
   chi2(1) 5.93 0.30 1.26 0.81 
   Prob > chi2 0.0149 0.5850 0.2620 0.3673 
Ramsey RESET test         
   F 1.46 2.63 1.32 1.64 
   Prob > F 0.2293 0.0544 0.2729 0.1859 
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indicator of the quality of the institutional environment and lending rates is 
confirmed. 
The RESET test leads do not reject the null hypothesis that the model has no 
relevant omitted variables at 5% level of significance.  
Furthermore, departing from model 2, I estimated other two specifications in 
order to take into consideration also the differences, among provinces, in firms’ 
industry composition. 
Particularly, models 3 and 4 include, respectively, the share of firms operating in 
agriculture and manufacturing. By taking into consideration these two variables, 
it should be possible to assess, in the same specifications, the impact on lending 
rates of the territorial diffusion of branches and loans’ riskiness. In fact, 
according to several authors, the overall riskiness of loans in an area is 
significantly influenced by the size and industry composition of the bank 
customers18. 
A simple correlation analysis seems to confirm this assumption: higher ratios 
between bad debts and total loans are associated with a large incidence of the 
agriculture sector and a smaller share of firms operating in manufacturing (see 
table A3.4). Because these two variables are not highly correlated with the 
number of branches per 10,000 inhabitants, multicollinearity problems are 
avoided. 
Models 3 and 4 substantially confirm the results obtained in the first two 
models: the cost of money is negatively affected by branches’ operating size and 
territorial diffusion, while improvements in the quality of the institutional 
framework lead to better borrowing conditions. Moreover, the industry 
composition of the bank customers (that reflects also the overall loans’ riskiness 
according to the Panetta’s opinion) significantly influences lending rates 
(provinces with a higher incidence of the agriculture sector are characterized by 
                                                 
18
 For example, Panetta (2003), Evoluzione del sistema bancario e finanziamento dell’economia 
nel Mezzogiorno, in “Temi di Discussione della Banca d’Italia”, No. 467. 
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worse borrowing conditions, while the share of firms operating in manufacturing 
negatively affects lending rates). 
The Breusch-Pagan and the RESET tests allow do not rejecting the hypothesis 
of homoskedastic errors and correct specification for both model 3 and 4.  
On the whole, according to the estimated models, the effect of a decrease of the 
first component from the maximum value observed in the province of Catanzaro 
(0.85) to the minimum value noticed in the province of Lecco (0.03) amounts to 
a reduction in the cost of money between 76 and 112 basis points. This result is 
rather important because the actual difference among the lending rates observed 
in these provinces is equal to 262 basis points. 
The developed analysis indicates hence that, in order to adequately understand 
the differences in the cost of money among the Italian provinces, it is necessary 
to take into consideration, together with the features of the banking system, also 
the quality of the institutional environment in different areas.  
3.4 Conclusions 
The economic literature widely recognizes that the quality of the institutions 
positively affects economic performance.  
Because the availability of financial resources determines the overall investment 
ability in a system, it is important to understand if institutional environment also 
influences local borrowing conditions. 
Indeed, the quality of the institutions (measured by taking into consideration the 
degree of corruption, crime, rights protection and efficiency of the court system) 
is able to influence the conditions at which banks grant loans because it 
represents a crucial aspect to assure the accurate functioning of every economic 
transaction. In other words, banks tend to require an additional premium in those 
areas characterized by a worse social infrastructure because this premium allows 
facing the greater probability that borrowers will not repay their debts because 
of exogenous factors that increase their fragility. 
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The analysis developed in this chapter aimed to verify the significance of the 
relationship between the quality of the institutions and the cost of money in 
Italy. 
In order to reach this aim, by means of the principal component analysis I 
elaborated an indicator at a provincial level that expresses the quality of the 
institutions on the basis of data concerning the general crime (measured by the 
number of crimes for which the judicial authority began the penal action per 
100,000 inhabitants), the organized crime (expressed in terms of extortions and 
criminal associations per 100,000 inhabitants), the level of corruption (measured 
by the number of crimes against the State per 100,000 inhabitants) and the 
degree of rights protection (expressed by the ratio between losses and liabilities 
in bankruptcy proceedings, the average length of civil disputes, the number of 
first-degree civil pending suits and the ratio between first-degree civil suits 
pending and settled during the year). 
Although politically unified since 150 years, Italy is a country where social and 
economic gaps remain large among Northern and Southern areas. Organized 
crime is particularly heavy in the Mezzogiorno area, where the incidence of 
extortions and criminal associations continues to be significantly larger with 
respect the other geographical areas. 
According to the estimated models, the quality of the institutions negatively 
influences lending rates even if the structural features of credit supply and 
demand at provincial level are taken into account. 
The effect on provincial lending rates of an improving in the indicator of the 
quality of the institutions is significant. The effect of a reduction of this 
indicator from the maximum value observed in the province of Catanzaro to the 
minimum value in the province of Lecco is a significant improving of borrowing 
conditions (the reduction of lending rates is comprised between 76 and 112 basis 
points).  
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Consequently, the more cumbersome borrowing conditions applied to the 
Southern bank customers are influenced, together with the greater aggregate 
riskiness of loans and elements concerning credit supply (the lower operating 
size and territorial diffusion of the branch network) also by the worse quality of 
the institutional environment in the Mezzogiorno area. 
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Appendix 3.1: Tables 
 
 
Table A3.1. Legend of the variables used in the PCA. 
Variable Description 
Average_length Average length in days of a first-degree civil court trial 
Civil_trials_pending_100000 First-degree civil suits pending per 100,000 inhabitants 
Civil_trials_pending_settled Ratio between first-degree civil suits pending and settled 
Crimes_action_100000 Total crimes for which the judicial authority began the penal 
action per 100,000 inhabitants 
Crimes_state_100000 Crimes against the State for which the judicial authority 
began the penal action per 100,000 inhabitants 
Extortions_100000 Extortions for which the judicial authority began the penal 
action per 100,000 inhabitants 
Criminal_associations_100000 
Criminal associations and mafia criminal associations for 
which the judicial authority began the penal action per 
100,000 inhabitants 
Loss_liabilities Ratio between losses and liabilities in bankruptcy 
proceedings 
 
 
 
Table A3.2. Explained total variance. 
Component Eigenvalue Percentage of  
explained variance 
Cumulative percentage 
of explained variance 
1 3.41 42.64 42.64 
2 1.32 16.56 59.20 
3 0.97 12.10 71.30 
4 0.85 10.67 81.97 
5 0.69 8.65 90.61 
6 0.37 4.61 95.22 
7 0.30 3.81 99.03 
8 0.08 0.97 100.00 
Source: elaborations on ISTAT data. 
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Table A3.3. Principal components eigenvectors. 
Variable Pc1 Pc2 
Average_length 0.473 0.350 
Civil_trials_pending_100000 0.451 0.147 
Civil_trials_pending_settled 0.434 0.408 
Crimes_action_100000 0.118 -0.553 
Crimes_state_100000 0.387 -0.416 
Extortions_100000 0.323 -0.169 
Criminal_associations_100000 0.279 -0.425 
Loss_liabilities 0.196 -0.048 
Source: elaborations on ISTAT data. 
 
 
 
Table A3.4. Correlation matrix. (*) 
  
Rates Pc1 Pc2 Loans/ Branches Branches 
Bad debts/ 
Total loans 
% firms in 
agricult. 
% firms in 
manuf. 
Rates 1.0000 0.5284 0.1780 -0.6128 -0.7429 0.7862 0.4756 -0.5410 
Pc1 0.5284 1.0000 -0.1828 -0.0176 -0.6142 0.5213 0.0355 -0.2833 
Pc2 0.1780 -0.1828 1.0000 -0.3703 -0.0491 0.2021 0.3270 0.0312 
Loans/ 
Branches -0.6128 -0.0176 -0.3703 1.0000 0.1942 -0.4532 -0.5596 0.3852 
Branches -0.7429 -0.6142 -0.0491 0.1942 1.0000 -0.8189 -0.1746 0.3885 
Bad debts/ 
Total loans 0.7862 0.5213 0.2021 -0.4532 -0.8189 1.0000 0.4013 -0.5153 
% firms in 
agricolture 0.4756 0.0355 0.3270 -0.5596 -0.1746 0.4013 1.0000 -0.6010 
% firms in 
manufact. -0.5410 -0.2833 0.0312 0.3852 0.3885 -0.5153 -0.6010 1.0000 
Source: elaborations on Bank of Italy, ISTAT, Guglielmo Tagliacarne Institute and 
Unioncamere data. 
(*) For each variable, the correlation coefficients shown in the table are computed on the basis 
of the average values during the period 2000-2003. 
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Appendix 3.2: Principal Component Analysis 
The principal component analysis (PCA) is a method used in multivariate 
statistics in order to reduce the dimensionality of a dataset containing a large 
number (p) of interrelated variables. This simplification is realized by retaining 
as much as possible the variation present in the dataset by transforming the 
original variables x into a new set of variables z (the so-called principal 
components), where x and z are, respectively, two vectors of p and m random 
variables, with m much smaller than p.  
The principal components (PCs) are uncorrelated and are ordered such that the 
first few ones retain most of the variation present in the original dataset. This 
transformation allows to analyze only the first few PCs without losing 
information.  
Hence, it is possible to compute up to p PCs but, because the aim of PCA is to 
simplify the dataset by reducing its dimensionality, m PCs will be calculated, 
with 0 ≪  . 
If the correlation among the p original variables x is substantial, the first few 
PCs (that are linear combinations of the x) will account for most of the variation 
of them, allowing to not consider the remaining PCs. 
The first PC is that linear function & W that has the maximum variance, where  is a column vector of size p. 
  = ´  ⋯ ¶′ 
 
Í = & x = W + W + ⋯ + W = Î W  
 
Hence,  is that vector that maximizes PEF(Í) = PEF(& W) = &∑ , where 
∑ is the variance-covariance matrix of the original variables x. 
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Without imposing any constraint, the variance of & W will be maximized by a 
vector  that is not fined. The constraint usually imposed is &  = 1. Other 
normalizations are possible, but this one allows to give to the Lagrange 
multiplier used in the maximization problem, the meaning of eigenvalue of ∑ 
and variance of the PC. 
The first order condition is obtained by maximizing, with respect to , the 
Lagrangian 
   = &∑  − Ï(&  − 1) 
 
where Ï is a Lagrange multiplier.  
Therefore, the first order condition is: 
 
∑  −  Ï = 0 
or (∑ − ÏÐ) = 0 
 
that is, Ï is an eigenvalue of ∑ and  is the eigenvector of ∑ associated to λ1. 
Because ∑ is a real symmetric positive semidefinite matrix, its eigenvalues are 
real non-negative and the eigenvectors associated to distinct eigenvalues are 
orthogonal (therefore, the PCs are uncorrelated). Particularly, Ï corresponds to 
the highest eigenvalue of ∑  because the optimization problem leads to 
maximize the following quantity: 
 PEF(Í) = PEF(& W) = &∑ = & Ï = Ï&  = Ï 
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where the third and the last equality arise, respectively, from the first order 
condition and the constraint. Therefore, Ï is the largest eigenvalue and  is the 
corresponding eigenvector.  
The second PC, & W, is determined by computing the unit norm vector  that 
maximizes the variance of & W and that is uncorrelated with the first PC, & W. 
The last condition requires that: 
 Ám(& W, & W) = &∑ = &∑ = Ï&  = Ï&  = 0 
 
Therefore, the Lagrangian function associated to this maximization problem 
becomes: 
  = &∑ −  Ï(&  − 1) − γ&  
 
where Ï and γ are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the two constraints of 
the problem.  
Differentiation of the Lagrangian function with respect to  gives: 
 
∑ − Ï − γ = 0 
or, equivalently &∑ −  Ï&  − γ&  = 0 
 
Because &∑ and Ï&  are equal to zero from the constraint about the 
covariance between the first two PCs and &  is equal to 1, the last equation is 
verified only for γ equal to zero. Therefore, the first order condition can be 
rewritten as: 
 
∑ − Ï = 0 
or 
144 
 
(∑ − ÏÐ) = 0 
 
Hence, Ï is an eigenvalue of ∑ and  is the corresponding eigenvector. The 
variance of the second PC, that must be maximized, is equal to: 
 PEF(Í) =  PEF(& W) = &∑ = & Ï = Ï&  = Ï 
 
Consequently, Ï must be as large as possible. Because Ï cannot be equal to Ï 
(because in this case the covariance between the first two PCs would not be 
equal to zero), Ï is the second largest eigenvalue of the variance-covariance 
matrix ∑. 
The other m-2 PCs are calculated by following an analogous procedure, by 
imposing that the covariance between every pair of PCs must be equal to zero 
and the normalization of unitary norm. 
More generally, it is possible to show that the vectors of coefficients , , ⋯ ,  are the eigenvectors of the variance-covariance matrix ∑  
associated to Ï, Ï, ⋯ , Ï, that are the first, the second largest, …, and the 
smallest eigenvalues respectively. 
Furthermore, PEF(Íc) =  PEF(c& W) =  Ïc, for Ë = 1, ⋯ ,  . 
Consequently, the variance of the dataset explained by the n-th PC is equal to Ï·, while the cumulative variance explained by the first n PCs (with n<m) is 
equal to ∑ Ï· ∑ ÏÑÀ . 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis developed in this thesis aimed to understand why, in Italy, 
Southern borrowers pay greater lending rates with respect to the bank customers 
operating in Northern and Central regions. This work has particularly been 
motivated by a reflection about the “Italian dualism”: the dichotomy between 
North and South Italy is important not only in terms of economic performance 
and productive structure but also in terms of credit market conditions. 
In details, this analysis tried to answer the following question: are regional 
borrowing conditions determined by borrowers’ objective characteristics and 
creditworthiness or, instead, represent the result of spatial elements related to 
local economies’ institutional features? In other words, in order to explain the 
reasons underlying interregional interest rate spreads in Italy, we need to verify 
the hypothesis that the environment where Southern borrowers operate is able to 
hinder financial transactions and determine higher lending rates.  
Instead, the literature has traditionally focused on elements concerning credit 
demand and supply. Although in the Italian framework exists a spatial and 
institutional component that can play a crucial role to explain interregional 
differences in the cost of money, a few contributions have focused on this 
element (Guiso et al., 2004, Guiso, 2006 and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2009). 
For these reasons, I chose to examine these issues in three essays by using 
methodologies such as dynamic panel models, panel models with binary 
dependent variable and principal component analysis.  
In details, the first essay, using the Arellano and Bond methodology, examines 
the classical macroeconomic reasons that the literature indicates to explain the 
regional differences in the cost of money among areas of the same country 
(aggregate loans’ riskiness, branches’ territorial diffusion and operating size and 
pressure on financial resources exerted by the demand).  
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The Arellano and Bond estimator allowed to take into consideration the degree 
of persistence that characterizes lending rates in Italian provinces.  
At a macroeconomic level, lending rates depend both on elements concerning 
credit demand and supply.  
Although since the second half of the nineties of the last century the continuous 
aggregation processes among banking groups have increased the average size of 
the banking system, in the Mezzogiorno the branches’ operating size continues 
to be lower with respect to other areas. Therefore, larger branches operating in 
Northern regions, by exploiting bigger scale economies, often apply to their 
customers better borrowing conditions with respect to branches localized in 
Southern areas. At the same time, the expansion of the branch network has not 
permitted to Southern regions to cover the gap, respect to Northern and Central 
regions, in terms of number of branches per 10,000 inhabitants. Under the 
hypothesis that a greater value of this indicator implies a larger degree of 
competition in the banking system, the lower degree of territorial diffusion of 
branches in the Mezzogiorno contributes to determine worse borrowing 
conditions in the area.  
Loans’ riskiness represents another important element that we need to analyze to 
explain differences in provincial lending rates.  
The quantification of firms’ credit risk and loans’ risk premium represents a 
crucial aspect of banks’ credit policies. The subprime financial crisis in the USA 
has made this topic more relevant. In fact, this crisis has been caused by 
inadequate banks’ credit risk assessment procedures and has originated the 
current global crisis, whose effects are still in progress.  
The crucial role played by adequate banks’ credit risk management policies is 
confirmed also in the current revision framework of the Basel Accords. 
Particularly, the Basel Committee’s new proposals to strengthen the global 
capital regulation do not change the methodology to calculate the Risk Weighted 
Assets; consequently, the quantitative relationship between firms’ probability of 
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default and banks’ capital requirements remains valid also in the new 
framework.  
I largely analyzed these topics in the second essay elaborating a set of probit 
panel models to estimate the probability of default for a stratified sample of 
Italian firms. The stratification methodology employed permitted to obtain a 
representative sample reflecting the actual territorial and industry distribution of 
Italian firms. 
Although the sample size is limited with respect to the population of Italian 
firms, an interesting result can be drawn from this analysis: the Southern firms’ 
probability of default is not larger than the probability of default of the firms 
operating in North and Central Italy.  
Consequently, the spreads risk adjusted applicable to Southern borrowers should 
not be greater than those chargeable to Northern and Central borrowers. Under 
the same supply conditions (i.e. under the assumption that banks operating in 
different areas sustain the same funding and operating costs), the interregional 
interest rate differentials in Italy do not seem to be caused by the “pure” firms’ 
risk. 
In order to explain differences in lending rates among North Italy and the 
Mezzogiorno is necessary to look at other macro variables.  
Because the literature has largely showed the existence of a causal relationship 
between social infrastructure and economic performance, it appears to be natural 
to ask whether potential differences in the quality of the institutions among the 
Italian provinces can be considered among the elements underlying the 
territorial gaps in credit market conditions.  
Banks’ credit policies cannot disregard the institutional environment where 
firms operate because of the significance of the strong interconnections between 
economic operators and institutions, both formal and informal. 
Indeed, in the areas characterized by a smaller quality of the institutions, 
potential investors can perceive a greater risk because of negative externalities 
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that burden on local firms and caused by higher degrees of crime, corruption and 
inefficiency of the court system. 
These effects are further amplified if the territorial relationships system is not 
enough transparent, causing significant asymmetric information problems about 
borrowers’ credit risk.  
In other words, these elements can induce banks to build a credit risk pricing 
more related to a “spatial (territorial) framework” than a “specific risk logic”.  
The changeover towards a spatial risk perspective could determine phenomena 
of territorial discrimination of lending rates caused by institutional factors.  
In the third essay the significance of institutional elements has been analyzed to 
explain the differences in the cost of money at a provincial level; improvements 
in the quality of the institutional framework lead to a significant reduction of 
lending rates at local level. 
Institutional environment matters because the structural problems of the 
Mezzogiorno area represent actual negative externalities for local firms. In other 
words, firms operating in a worse institutional environment must pay larger 
lending rates not caused by their structural characteristics. 
Hence, borrowing conditions do not reflect bank customers’ size but they 
represent the result of the overall conditions of local systems. 
Given the importance of credit availability to economic growth processes, it is 
important to understand what governments can do. 
The policy implications of these results seem clear: in order to facilitate 
Southern firms’ access to credit market, it is necessary to carry out a program of 
structural interventions able to improve the quality of the institutional 
environment in the Mezzogiorno. 
Interventions able to increase the degree of rights protection, contracts’ 
enforceability, efficiency of the justice system and to fight against organized 
crime are necessary to increase the Mezzogiorno attractiveness improving 
borrowing conditions applied to firms operating in this area: a necessary 
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condition to boost the Southern firms’ overall investment ability and able to 
reduce the North-South disparities of Italian economy. 
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